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David W. Cantrill, ISB #1291 
Daniel J. Skinner, ISB #7225 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIV AN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE ) 












STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV PI 0707453 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. 
CANTRILL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
DAVID W. CANTRILL, Being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That affiant is one of the attorneys of record for defendants in the above entitled 
action and makes this affidavit based upon his own personal knowledge and belief of the facts 
contained herein. 
:0 
AFFIDA VIT 01<' DA VIn W. CANTRILL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S ;::; 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - I "'" -
000204~ 
r-
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Expert Report by 
Earnest F. Harper that this office received on February 17,2009. 
Further your affiant sa~h not. 
DATED This \ ~ day of ±~., 2009. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
By: ~ wfJd?11 
Davi W. Cantrill, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of February, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho l 
Commission Expires: _OO .... f_'2--'-j1 J-!:l(}=.!..ll~ ___ _ 
AFFIDA VIT OF DAVID W. CANTRILL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MEMORAl"'lDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2 
000205 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on February 18,2009,1 served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
John T. Edwards 
Kurt Holzer 
HOLZER EDWARDS & HARRfSON, CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, ID 83702-5316 







David W. Cantrill 
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EXPERT REPORT 
SAFETY & FORENSICS 
ANALYS:JSAN;DOPINIQN 
Concerning 
Jim Phillips vs.MiJt Erhart 
February 15th, 20-09 
EARNEST F. HARPER, CSP, DABFE, DACFET, CFC 
Board Certified Safety Professional 
Diplomate American Board of Forensic Examiners 
Diplomate, American College of Forensic Engineering and Technology 
Board Certified Forensics Consultant 
ASSE Fellow: ACFE Fellow 
~------------------------------------~~~8 1 
EXPERT REPORT 
SAFETY & FORENSICS ANALYSIS AND OPINION 
Concerning 
Jim Phillips vs. Milt Erhart 
February 15th, 2009 
ByEARNESTF.HARPER,CSP,DABFE,DACFET,CFC 
Background: 
My name is Earnest F. Harper and I reside at 11263 W. Bodley Drive, Boise, Idaho 83709. I am 
a Certified Safety Professional, a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners, a 
Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Engineering and Technology and a Certified 
Forensics Consultant. Professional honors include being selected as a Fellow of the American 
Society of Safety Engineers and a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners 
Institute. I have over 40 years experience in industrial and product safety engineering, 
construction, extensive accident reconstruction experience, electrical safety. community and 
industrial noise, fire safety and loss prevention, systems design, human factors and ergonomics, 
loss prevention, code compliance and design safety in machinery, processes, products and 
buildings. My experience includes being an Expert Witness, many years of working with 
disabled employees, the ADA and other accessibility codes, limited or no-English speaking 
individuals and a diverse workforce with a wide range of employment challenges. Injury 
investigations number well over 2000 over the period including several hundred slip, trip and 
stumble fall injuries. I am currently a technical co-contributor to Dr. Nigel Ellis's new edition of 
his widely read, "Introduction To Fall Protection - Fourth Edition, expected out in 2009 and have 
been retained as an expert in fall injury cases. 
A Fee schedule will be provided and is pased on hourly charges of $19S.00/hour. There are set 
Fee's for full day commitments, depositions and trial testimony not based upon actual hours. A 
CV will be provided or otherwise made available upon request. . 
I have formally published only one technical document within the last 10 years in a peer 
reviewed Journal. The title of this publication is: A Perspective on Regulations & Standards for 
Safety Professionals.» This was published in the Journal of the American Society of Safety 
Engineers, August 2008. I am the creator and current Editor of ASSE's Region /I Newsletter 
and in that capacity have written a number (Nine since first issue, September 2007) of short 
technical articles of relevance to Safety Professionals. This newsletter reaches well over 2,SOO 
safety professionals including our Middle East Chapter and ASSEs Society Board of Directors 
and Society Staff. These six quarterly issues (the last one being January 2008 as of the date of 
this report) can be produced upon request. 
2 000209 
A complete list of my cases is available upon request or will be provided if part of the 
requirements of this action. Those cases I have provided depositions or trial testimony are 
separately listed again at the end (bottom) of the full list. 
Initial Tasking: 
Briefly, I have been asked to evaluate, assess and to provide my professional opinions on the 
circumstances, premises and other details leading to a determination of causal findings 
surrounding the March 20th ! 2006 stairway-related fall injury involving Mr. James Phillips. This 
report will outline my factual findings, conclusions and final opinion based on the investigation. 
Preparatory and Site Work 
1. Analysis and forensics data was collected during four site visits on June 2200, 2006, July 
20th ! 2006 and February tt' - 8th ! 2008. Detailed measurements were taken along with 
photos of the incident scene. Also noted the elevator location inside the structure at 1406 
North Main, Meridian. 
2. Elevator Drawings and other sources (BUilding Department and the City Clerk) were 
examined or contacted for building occupancy and building code dates in effect during 
relevant periods. The City of Meridian adoption of the building codes are: 
• 1982 UBC - Adopted September 20th , 1982 
• 1985 UBC - Adopted September 3rd, 1985 
• 20031BC -Adopted December 1ih, 2002 
• 2006 IBC - Adopted June 28th, 2005 
3. In addition to the above I have read the depositions, affidavits or transcripts of Plaintiff's 
experts Dr. Richard Gill and Mr. Thomas R. Fries. 
4. The following is a summary (Le., long titles may be abbreviated) list of documents, other 
depositions and material including black & white copies of stairway photos taken the day of 
the Incident, March 20, 2006 that I have reviewed to date. 
Depositions: 
Angela Sisco; Dan Phillips; Dr. Beaver (2); Dr. Green; Gale Phillips; Jim Phillips; Ken 
Doolittle; Milt Erhart; Randy Jenks; Wanda Jenks. 
Other documents or materials: (Not in any order and Miscellaneous motions, notices of 
depositions, court proceedings and similar will not be detailed here.) 
Plaintiff's pre-Trial Memorandum; Defendants witness list; Elevator Material list; Fax from 
Mr. Erhart to Anna Brown dated 4/21/06 on some railing and step billing data and 
information on railing and the precast cement steps and it's tested load factors from Trex 
Company and Diamond Concrete Stairs; Plaintiff's Answers & responses to Plaintiff's 
Initial Discovery Requests; Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Answers and responses to 
Defendants First Set of Discovery Requests; 
5. Mr. Phillip's Injuries noted by the treating paramedics and Doctors were reviewed. 
000210 
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My Opinions and Conclusions: 
I have condensed my opinions with appropriate forensics support, human factor assessments, 
or explanations, other relevant data or testimony leading to my professional conclusions in the 
matter, as follows: 
1. The Stair Treads modified in 2003 were not the proximate or actual cause of Mr. Jim 
Phillips Fall of March 20. 2006: 
a. The Stair Treads installed by Mr. Erhart were in compliance with building and Idaho 
codes as bulleted here. These codes include; The UBC 1982 and 1985 codes; The 
IBC 2000, 2003 and 2006 codes; and Idaho Code, Part 071. 
• Riser height between 4" - 7" or 7 ~" (UBC 1982-1985 and IBC 2000-2006, 
Idaho Code) 
• Run Length ~ 10" (UBC 1982) and ~ 11" (UBC 1985, IBC 2000-2006, 
Idaho Code) 
• Maximum Riser variation:s 3/Sth inch (0.375 inch), meets all codes listed 
here 
• Maximum Run variation :s 3/Sth inch (0.375 inch), meets aJI codes listed 
here 
• Strength tested and passed in accordance with the UBC 1997 code per the 
January 26th , 2000 letter from Chopelas & Associates, Engineering 
Services of Arlington, WA. 
Notes: UBC is the abbreviation for the Uniform Building Code 
IBC is the abbreviation for the International Building Code 
The 1982 & 1982 codes cover the original building date. 
The 2003 IBC code was adopted on December 1'th, 2002 
The 2006 IBC code was adopted on June 2~, 2005. 
The Rise/Run and variations thereof are critical safety dimensions 
b. The Pre-Cast Stair Tread and mounting bracket used by Mr. Erhart replaced a less 
safe worn carpet-covered wooden stair material and in my opinion, because of the 
replacement tread characteristics, further support the statement above (item 1) as 
bulleted here: 
• The total weight of each 42" wide concrete tread is 105 - 107 pounds 
• It is supported by a steel "L - shaped" bracket covering 68% of the width 
• The steel bracket is mounted approximately % to 1 % inch behind the lower 
part of the tread nosing's. With a ratio of about ~ - 1 ~ to the overall tread 
length of 11 % inches, a vertical tipping force of hundreds of pounds would be 
required to cause the tread to "tip forward, even if there were no bolts in 
place. 
• Because of the high Coefficient of Friction (O.S - 1.0) of dry cement with 
rubber soled foot wear (e.g. tennis shoes), it is very unlikely in my opinion 
that slippage of the descending foot where the ball of the foot is centered 




• The pre-cast concrete step (tread) does not flex. It was tested to strength 
standards as noted above including meeting the 300 pounds over any 4 
square inches (e.g. 2" x 2"); the 100 pounds per square foot and a concrete 
strength tested to withstand an applied load of 4000 pounds/square-inch 
• With at least two (2) of the four (4) bolts attaching one of the two steel 
support brackets for each step (tread), in my professional opinion and 
considering the weight of the tread, movement from normal pedestrian use is 
not going to allow step movement. 
• Based on the swore testimony of Mr. Erhart and lack of evidence or testimony 
to the contrary only a few of the 20 steps (treads) had only two bolts fastening 
a step (tread) to the bracket while the majority had aU four bolts in place. 
There is UQ evidence that any step (tread) had only one bolt attaching the 
step. 
• Close up photographic evidence of lower steps shows no physical evidence 
(scratches, etc.) of horizontal movement expected if steps (treads) had 
moved under a load such as a large man pushing off as he descended. 
c. In my opinion, the conclusion that Mr. Jim Phillips fall was not caused by faulty steps 
(treads) is further supported by the following deposition testimonies. 
Note that any "quote" is not necessarily a literal duplication but may be shortened for 
convenience when used. 
• Jim Phillips: P23/L23; "I don't know why I felL" 
• Angela Sisco: P10/L 17-18; Q&A, any problems noticed, no I don't have the 
skills. 
• Angela Sisco: P11/L3-5; did you ever complain to anybody ... no. 
• Angela Sisco: P18/L 19-25; step looked a little out of kilter. (Dan and Angela's 
photo later shows this to be step 10 from the bottom or the step immediately 
below the middle landing, vet all 1 0 steps are properly aligned in descending 
order. Use photo showing Dan Phillips shoes.) 
• Angela Sisco: P22/L22-25 and P23/L 1-2; Never noticed any loose steps. 
• Angela Sisco: P19/L8; I don't use handrails 
• Dan Phillips: P11/L 11-20; used 3-4 months before fall, no problems noted. 
• Dan Phillips: P17/L 19-25 and P18/L 1-7; Dan did not notice problems before 
but on day of fall had a general observation that he felt there was some 
"rocking." (Number and location not noted.) 
• Dan Phillips: P24/L9-19; one step seems ajar. Appears to be a misalignment 
with the middle landing rather than adjacent steps. Note photo with Jim's 
shoe showing. 
• Randy Jenks: P11/L 10-25; Saw nothing wrong with stairway 
• Randy Jenks: P21/L 1-25; Checked stairs next day, having a background in 
the building industry, everything looked fine. P21 and 22, did not use 
handrail. 
• Randy Jenks: P221L 1-16; Observed no defects and steps seemed solid. 
• Randy Jenks: P29 & 30/L22-25 & L 1-15; No step (tread) moved, not one. 
• Ken Doolittle: P10/L9-25; Saw Jim on concrete off the steps face down and 
thought to check for objects or slippery issues. Saw no problems and 
observed steps (treads) were in alignment. Note, it was Ken who found and 
returned box Jim was carrying back to Angela and Jim' office. 
000212 
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• Ken Doolittle: P121L22; no idea how this happened 
• Ken Doolittle: P14/L 1-7; went up and down stairs, observed no problem and 
steps (treads) were not out of alignment. 
• Ken Doolittle: P17/L 1-7; I specifically looked at the stairs. It was more than a 
passing glance. No, I'm not an Engineer nor a Safety Engineer. 
2. In my opinion, Mr. Jim Phillips fell nearer the bottom several steps as opposed to 
falling near the top just past the middle landing. This is based upon the following 
bulleted items. 
a. Randy Jenks: P17/L 1-7; Saw him first from about 30 feet away lying at the foot of the 
stairs. Mr. Phillips was lying prone on the ground, face down, feet about two (2) or 
three (3) feet away from the steps. One arm was under him, the other on top, one 
leg was twisted and he wasn't unconscious but not conscious either. (This was the 
stair bottom at ground level.) 
b. Ken Doolittle: P10/L9-18; Saw Mr. Phillips face down on the concrete at the bottom 
of the stairs, he was not on the stairs. There appeared to be blood on the concrete 
near his head. 
c. Ken Doolittle: P11/L3-16; Face down, on stomach, head turned, believes head was 
turned to the left. 
d. Ken Doolittle: P11/L 11-14; Mr. Phillips feet were a step or two away from the bottom 
of the stairs. 
e. Ken Doolittle: P11/L 19-25; there was a box lying next to Jim to his right and forward 
of him about an arms length from his right shoulder. 
(Note: In my opinion, had Mr. Phillips fallen near the top of the lower landing. the 
box, being very light weight would have been unlikely to have stayed right next to 
him while falling up to a distance of about 9' down the stairs and beyond.) 
f. In my opinion, based upon a Human Factors and forensics assessment Mr. Phillips 
could not have fallen from the top of the staircase for the following bulleted items. 
• In a sudden and unexpected fall, because his size (6' 5" and over 300 
pounds), Mr. Phillips could not have reached the bottom of the stairs in a 
forward fall without rolling or tumbling and this is not supported by his injury 
locations which were left-dominate. A forward sliding fall would have created 
more frontal trauma than was indicated by the medical reports and he would 
not have reached the stair bottom as witnessed above by, in effect, sliding. 
• Mr. Phillips would have sustained impact and acceleration stresses to 
multiple parts of the body causing any number of associated trauma 
indicators of varying degrees, based on my years of similar investigations and 
medical reports. Joints, back, neck, wrists and similar areas would be 
particularly vulnerable to acceleration forces even if direct contact with the 
surface did not occur. These gravity-induced forces can reach several 
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hundred inch-pounds and likely account for some of the pain experienced 
such as his neck and back pain. 
• The injuries I base part of my opinion on are summarized here and the 
sources for this information lies in the summary provided by Dr. Greens 
"Forensic Neuropsychological Examination Report" February 11-12, 2008. 
(Note, the following list offers a simplified description of Mr. Phillips primary 
injuries as extracted from Dr. Greens reporl starling around pages 13 - 15 of 
43 and is not intended to ref/ect a word-for-word recap.) 
1. Contusion to forehead, facial abrasions to the left side of face & hand. 
2. Closed head injury left zygomatic/frontaJ area of head 
3. Left elbow pain. 
4. Left leg numbness. 
5. Left wrist sprain 
6. Anterior part of left thigh. 
7. Left hip pain 
8. Left foot felt like it was asleep 
9. Abrasion to left cheek 
3. In mv opinion. the handrail, despite its recognizable defects of a non-code, non-
graspable configuration. was not a factor in Mr. Phillips fall. This is based upon the 
following bulleted items. . 
a. When the speed (velocity) of the fall is estimated using Mr. Phillips height of 6' 5" and 
a weight of 300 pounds and assuming that his head strikes first (assumes, for 
simplicity a rigid body mode!) his head speed would approach 24.8 fps. In short, his 
head would travel about six (6) feet in close to 0.25 seconds. If his hand was not 
already on the lower handraiJ which was fastened, there would be no chance to 
arrest his fall. [Speed, USing the head as first to strike = the square root of 3gh.] 
b. Even if Mr. Phillips could have caught the handrail within 2 feet from fall initiation, his 
speed (velocity) using a rigid body model, would be 13.9 fps. In order to stop his fall 
with a hand on the rail, he would have to exert a counter force of around 900 foot-
pounds. It would have been impossible to have arrested his faU regardless of 
handrail design at this stage. 
4. Based upon the above combined work, testimony and physical findings, I can only 
conclude that Mr. Phillips had an unfortunate "mis.-step"wbile carrv.ing a small box of 
trash in the following .rnanner. In my opinion, after examining the above, the cause of 
his fall must be diagnosed as a mis-step probably resulting from the "ball" of the left 
foot overstepping the stair nosing causing a rapid toe-down movement with an 
interrupted traiJing rigbt foot preventing any recovery. My reasoning is expanded as 
follows: 
a. A sudden fall as described by item 4, would have resulted in a very rapid forward 
movement with his head and his center of gravity weU forward of his feet 
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b. Based upon Mr. Erhart being right-handed (Dr. Green report page 4 of 43) and 
evidence showing that the box he was carrying landed on his right side above and 
next to his right shoulder, it can be concluded with a high likelihood of being correct 
that he had the box in his right hand or under his right arm. In most falls I have 
investigated and studied over time, the normal reflex is to try and bring the 
unencumbered other arm forward in an attempt to break the faU. This motion would 
account for the pattern of left-dominant injuries described above including the left 
wrist. 
c. In my opinion, no simple tread movement could account for this combination of 
injuries and there is no evidence establishing the lower treads failing in any way as to 
create this type of fall. 
d. The step reported as loose by Ken Doolittle (Pages 5 & 6/l 17-25 and 1-25 was the 
first step (Erhart, pages 14, 21 & 22) and this was not the step that could have 
caused this fall and subsequent injuries. None of the treads were reported as mis-
aligned after the fall except step (tread) 10 at the top and it is in alignment with the 
other 9 treads. The slight angle in the Angela Sisco and Dan Phillips photo (feet 
showing) is due to the landing to step (tread) viewing angle and a small error of 
misalignment between the landing and the stair of a few degrees (greater than 90 
degrees). 
5. A possible contributing factor leading to his mis-step and fall is the Sun angle which on 
March 20th, 2006 would have come into view as he reached near the bottom of the stairs. 
• On that day at 1 :00 PM, the sun would have been 46 degrees above the horizon at 
an azimuth (bearing) from magnetic north of +167 degrees which would be very 
close to being in a position of his forward looking vision field as he descended. 
MV final conclusion based upon my experience, training, education and the above 
factors, is that Mr. Phillips experienced a mis-step resulting in his fall and subsequent 
injuries. Furthermore, that this fall cannot be attributed to the stair treads nor code 
violations since these do not bear on the incident as a contributing causal factor. 
Furthermore. that this fall cannot be blamed on a lack of a hazard analysis or a poor 
safety program. loose guardrails or lack of a standard of care. 
Completed this day, February 15th , 2009 
Earnest F. Harper, CSP, DABFE, DACFET, CFC 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
RE:MOTIONS RELATED TO 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
This matter came before the Court on the motion by plaintiffs to amend the complaint to 
include a prayer for punitive damages; a motion to amend the complaint to clarify the negligence 
per se claims; and defendants' motion to strike the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert. Plaintiff 
Phillips sued the defendants after he fell down a flight of stairs at an office building owned by the 
defendants. This opinion will first discuss the motion to strike plaintiffs' expert and then the 
motions filed by plaintiffs. 
1. MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF FRIES 
In support of its motions, plaintiffs filed the affidavit of Thomas R. Fries. In this affidavit 
Mr. Fries opines, among other things, that the stairway and handrails on Mr. Erhart's building 
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violated general design and loading requirements. He also opines that Mr. Erhart's method of 
2 constructing the stairs, including the handrail portion, constituted an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct. 
4 Expert testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand scientific, 
5 technical, or other evidence requiring specialized knowledge. I.R.E. 702. The expert must be 
6 
qualified to express the opinion offered. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999). 
7 
There must be some demonstration that the witness has acquired, through some type of training, 
8 
9 
education, or experience, the necessary expertise and knowledge to render the proper opinion. 
10 
Stale v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 192 P .3d 1065 (2008). 
I I The Court has reviewed the qualifications of Mr. Fries as set forth in the attachment to his 
12 affidavit. Among other things, Mr. Fries is a registered professional engineer. His background 
13 includes the authorship of a number of articles and seminar materials concerning accident 
14 reconstruction. His experience includes product and machine design, as well as investigation of 
15 
slip and fall cases, including cases involving stairway and walkway design. He claims 
16 
experience in over three hundred product and structural investigations. He has conducted 
17 
18 
investigations of industrial accidents. He has engaged in inspection and testing of consumer 
19 products for defects and compliance with codes and standards. Without repeating the entire 
20 Curriculum Vitae of Mr. Fries, the Court finds that he is qualified to express opinions concerning 
21 compliance with codes, engineering principles, and the forces and factors involved in accidents, 
22 including the alleged incident in this case. Defendants' motion to strike the affidavit is denied. 
24 
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II. MOTION TO AMEND TO ADD PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
2 The grant or denial of a motion to amend to add a claim for punitive damages is within 
the discretion of the court. That discretion is bounded by certain statutory principles. 
4 To recover punitive damages, "the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing 
5 evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party against whom the 
6 
claim for punitive damages is asserted." I.C. § 6-1604(1). When a party moves to amend a 
7 
pleading to include a claim for punitive damages, "[t]he court shall allow the motion to amend 
8 
the pkadings if, after weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving 
9 
10 
party has established at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to 
1 J support an award of punitive damages." I.C. § 6-1604(2). Allowance of punitive damages 
12 requires "the intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of mind." Nfyers v. Workmen's 
l3 AUio ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,503,95 P.3d 977, 985 (2004). 
14 In this case I find there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can establish the 
15 
underlying facts as set forth in their brief and in Mr. Fries' affidavit. I do not, however, have 10 
16 
accept Mr. Fries' conclusion that this constitutes "an extreme deviation from reasonable 
17 
18 
standards of conduct." While Mr. Fries is competent to testify regarding certain scientitic facts 
19 and the conclusions that can be drawn from them, this does not mean he is allowed to express an 
20 opinion on every facet of the case. There is nothing in his background or other credentials that 
21 makes him an expert on the conduct of Defendant Milt Erhart in this case. That is, I do not find 
22 that his opinion drawing the conclusion that Erhart's "overall conduct is an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards" is the type of conclusion requiring expert testimony in the context of 
24 
this case. Mr. Erhart is a landlord doing maintenance and repair to his own building. The expert 
25 
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may be qualified as to compliance with building codes standards, etc, but that does not mean he 
is qualified to opine on what is to be expected from someone in Mr. Erhart's position. Even 
considering the expert's opinion as to the character of the conduct, that alone does not justify 
punitive damages. 
There must be an intersection of a bad act with an extremely harmful state of mind. If the 
jury chooses to believe plaintiffs' evidence, there is no question but that Milt Erhart was 
negligent. His conduct might even be characterized as "an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct." But the evidence required to support an award of punitive damages must 
show both that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct," and that the act was performed by the defendant with "an understanding 
of or disregard for its likely consequences." Seinigar Law Ojlices, P.A. v. North Pac?/ic Ins. Co., 
) 45 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008). What is missing here is the evidence of a suHiciently bad 
state of mind to warrant punitive damages. The fact that Mr. Erhart may have been given notice 
that the stair was loose is not sufficient to establish the requisite state of mind. The motion to 
amend to add punitive damages is denied. 
III. MOTION TO AMEND TO CLARIFY NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIMS 
The plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to clarify negligence per se claims is governed by 
ObemlOlfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 188 P.3d 834 (2008). In that case the 
court specifically held: "a party is not required to specifically plead negligence per se in their 
complaint when alleging a cause of action for ordinary negligence. Therefore, Respondents were 
not required to amend their complaint as a condition precedent to the district court's 
consideration of their request that the jury be instructed as to negligence per se." 145 Idaho at 
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892, 188 P.3d at 841. If the evidence at trial of this matter justifies an instruction on negligence 
per se, one will be given. If the evidence does not justify such an instruction, it will not be given. 
There is no need to amend the complaint. The motion is therefore denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated thi~ 6-"' day of March 20 9. 
IC 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV PI 0707453 
Defendants' Motion in Limine 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Cantrill, 
Skinner, Sullivan & King, and move this Honorable Court for an Order instructing the Plaintiffs, 
their counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention or interrogating, 
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening 
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any other 
time while in the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after selection) 
concerning the matters identified below. Defendant seeks an Order in Limine which instructs 
Plaintiff in the following way: 
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a. To refrain from presenting any evidence of medical billing which fails to 
accurately represent the actual special damages incurred. 
b. To refrain from presenting the inadmissible hearsay in the form of alleged 
statements made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips immediately following the accident. 
c. To refrain from presenting any opinions from Dr. Gill which rely on 
information not reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 
d. To refrain from allowing Dr. Gill to reference the inadmissible hearsay 
which he relied upon to form his opinions. 
e. To refrain from making any statements that the alleged negligence of the 
Defendant was somehow "reckless". 
f. To refrain from making any mention whatsoever of subsequent remedial 
measures. 
This motion is made on the general grounds that the matters identified are inadmissible 
for any purpose on proper and timely objection and that they have no bearing on the issues in this 
action or the rights of the parties to this action, and on the further grounds that permitting such 
mention would prejudice the jury, and sustaining objections to such mention would not cure such 
prejudice, but rather would reinforce the impact on the jurors of such prejudicial matters. 
I. Motions in Limine generally: 
Idaho Courts have recognized the importance of the motion. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 
I 12 Idaho 560, 563, 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Ct.App.1986), partially overruled on other grounds, 114 
Idaho 107,753 P.2d 1253 (1987). A Motion in Limine enables a judge to rule on evidence 
without first exposing it to the jury. It avoids juror bias occasionally generated by objections to 
evidence during trial. The court's ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make 
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strategic decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be presented. /d. 
at 563, 733 P.2d at 784. 
II. Arguments: 
a. This Court should bar any introduction of evidence referring to the original 
billed amounts for medical costs because the figures are irrelevant, 
prejudicial, and the actual claimed special damages can be accurately 
presented without the admission of any mention of insurance. 
The Plainti ff has disclosed two sets of figures relevant to special damages claimed for 
medical expenses. The first represents the amounts originally billed by the medical providers. 
The latter represents the amounts that the medical providers were actually paid by the Plaintiffs 
or their insurers. The Plaintiff should be barred from any mention or presentation of the fonner 
because they do not represent actual damages, serve no legitimate purpose, and would mislead 
the jury. 
Relevant evidence is defined by I.R.E. 401: 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
detennination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
1. R. E. 401. Special damages are defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "damages that are alleged 
to have been sustained in the circumstances of a particular wrong. To be awardable, special 
damages must be specifically claimed and proved." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 396 
(1999). An old Idaho case put it more succinctly: "Special, as contradistinguished from general, 
damages are those which are the natural but not the necessary consequence of the act complained 
of." Kirk v. }v/adariela, 32 Idaho 403, 407,184 P. 225, 226 (1919). 
The bills disclosed by Plaintiff which detail $84,540.21 in medical costs are irrelevant 
because they do not accurately represent the special damages sustained by the Plaintiff. Further, 
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they cannot be said to be the "natural.. . consequence of the act complained of'. Jd. at 407, 184 P. 
at 226. Whatever the originally billed amount may have been cannot be considered relevant for 
the purpose of determining the actual special damages from medical costs. A bill representing 
30% more than the moneys paid cannot be said to be the "natural consequence" of the accident. 
The bill's detailing the $84,540.21 are irrelevant. 
Admitting the medical bills which reflect the int1ated figure would be akin to allowing 
the admission of a bid from a contractor as the definitive evaluation of the actual cost of the 
contract. The bid is irrelevant to the final figure paid for the contract. 
Even if the bills could somehow be found relevant, they should be barred because they 
would do nothing more than mislead the jury. I.R.E. 403 bars the admission of evidence whose 
probative value is outweighed by it prejudice: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
I.R.E. 403 (2008). Admitting this evidence would mislead the jury. By law, special damages 
must be proven in detail. The Plaintiff cannot prove damages that were not sustained. The 
special damages sustained for medical costs were the amounts paid. Presenting the jury with 
ligures 30% higher than the actual special damages would mislead the finders of fact and 
seriously prejUdice the Defendants. 
While admitting only the figures of the actual amounts paid could risk the exposure of the 
jury to the existence of insurance, this could be easily overcome by stipulation between the 
parties. The Defendants are willing to stipulate to the foundation and admission for all medical 
bills paid, totaling the actual special damages incurred by the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
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$55,068.37. Based on that stipulation, it would be unnecessary to admit the source of the 
payment in any manner, thereby avoiding the potential presentation of the existence of insurance 
in this matter. 
Failing to bar this irrelevant and misleading evidence prior to trial will undoubtedly 
create a recurring evidentiary problem in front of the jury. Every time a bill with the artificially 
int1ated numbers was presented by the Plaintiff, the Defendant would be forced to object and 
state the basis to be that the figure is 30% higher than funds paid. The jury would repeatedly be 
exposed to the fact that the bills do not represent the damages incurred and thereby create 
confusion, waste the court's time, and repeatedly require speculation on the source of the 
payments. 
Because the medical bills are irrelevant, misleading, and highly prejudicial, the 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court instruct the Plaintiffs, their counsel, 
representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention or interrogating, directly or 
indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening statement, 
interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any other time while in 
the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after selection) any mention 
whatsoever of the medical bills which do not accurately ret1ect the actual special damages 
sustained. 
b. The Plaintiff should be barred from making any mention of hearsay 
statements allegedly made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips. 
Mrs. Phillips has testified under oath that Mr. Phillips told her about the accident the day 
of the injuries. Plaintiffs attorney has repeatedly referred to these hearsay statements as a basis 
of causation for the accident. Any statements purportedly made to Mrs. Phillips by Mr. Phillips 
are inadmissible hearsay if offered by the Plaintiff. 
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""Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, ot1ered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801 (2008). 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho. I.R. E. 802 (2008). 
Any statement presented by the Plaintiff made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips after the 
accident would be an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. As such, 
it is hearsay. There are no applicable exceptions to these purported statements. 
Because the statements are inadmissible hearsay not subject to an exception, the 
Defendant's respectfully request that this Court instruct the Plaintiffs, their counsel, 
representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention or interrogating, directly or 
indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening statement, 
interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any other time while in 
the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after selection) 
any mention whatsoever of the statements purportedly made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips 
outside the courtroom. 
c. Any opinions based solely on Mrs. Phillip's statements should be barred 
outright as inadmissible because the statements do not represent the type of 
information reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. 
Dr. Gill was disclosed by the Plaintiffs as an expert in this matter and subsequently 
deposed by Mr. Erhart's counsel. At that deposition, Mr. Gill testified that he had three overall 
opinions in this case. See Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Daniel J. Skinner in Support of 
Detendant's Motion in Limine. He stated that Mr. Erhart was liable for the injuries alleged 
because he lacked a meaningful risk management program, the stairs were in an unreasonably 
dangerous condition because of that lack of a program, and that the accident was caused by 
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deficiencies in the actual condition of the stairs. Id. at 16-17. That latter opinion stated that 
there were four specific issues which likely "induced" the "loss of balance": an open handrail on 
this inside rail, the inside handrail being too low, the stair tread being loose, and the outside 
handrail not being adequately secured. Id. As to the first two elements, he stated that the sole 
basis of his presumption that the inside handrail contributed to the accident was based upon the 
representation from Mrs. Phillips C'That would be the only evidence I'm aware of.") Id. at 17 
As to any opinions on the outside handrail, he stated "I believe that the fall was most likely to 
have occurred at a place other than that. So in terms of directly contributing to the fall I don't 
believe it would have." Id. at 14. 
Placing the cause of an accident solely on the representation of a person who was not 
present at the time of the accident, through two levels of hearsay, cannot possibly serve as a 
source of information reasonably relied upon by an expert in Dr. Gill's field. Further, by his own 
admission, the status of the outside rail could not have contributed to the fall. Id., p 14. As such, 
all opinions based solely on the two levels of hearsay from Mrs. Phillips cannot possibly form a 
foundation for the opinions. To the contrary, I.R.E. 703 specifically addresses this type of 
opinion: the expert can only rely upon inadmissible hearsay "If of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." l.R.E. 703 
(2008). The hearsay from Mrs. Phillips does not qualify. 
Because the hearsay from Mrs. Phillips cannot serve as the type of information 
reasonably relied upon by an expert such as Dr. Gill, all opinions derivative of such should 
barred as being without foundation. Defendant's respectfully request that this Court instruct the 
Plaintiffs, their counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention or 
interrogating, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, 
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opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any 
other time while in the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after 
selection) 
any mention whatsoever of the opinions of Dr. Gill which rely upon the statements purportedly 
made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips. 
d. The inadmissible hearsay from Mrs. Phillips cannot be introduced by 
through Dr. Gill. 
In addition to an outright bar against the admission of the inadmissible hearsay from Mrs. 
Phillips in general, and there being no basis to assert that it is the type of information reasonably 
relied upon by experts, this Court should instruct the Plaintiff's expert to refrain from making 
any reference whatsoever in trial to the hearsay statements. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 allows the expert to rely on inadmissible evidence if it is the 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field to reach a conclusion, but it bars the 
admission of the evidence through the expert. I The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed this 
exact issue: 
The rule addresses the type of information upon which an expert 
may rely in developing the opinions or inferences to which the 
expert will testify at trial; the rule does not contain any provision 
for admission into evidence of the material the expert relied upon. 
That is, it is the admissibility of the expert's opinion that is 
provided by Rule 703, not the admissibility of the underlying facts 
or data. 
Stute v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 592, 38 P.3d 625,630 (Ct.App. 2001)(emphasis in original). 
I Rule 703. Basis of opinion testimony by experts. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, 
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data 
that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless 
the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. I.R.E. 703 (2008). 
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If this Court tinds that this type of information is reasonably relied upon by experts in Dr. 
Gill's field, then it can only allow the conclusions reached by Dr. Gill and not allow the basis 
therefore to reach the jury. Defendant's respectfully request that this Court instruct the Plaintiffs, 
their counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from making mention or inten-ogating, 
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening 
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, or any other 
time while in the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to selection) or jurors (after selection) 
any mention whatsoever of the inadmissible hearsay statements from Mrs. Phillips by Dr. Gill. 
e. This Court should bar any reference to the actions taken by the Defendants 
to maintain their stairway as being willful or reckless because there is no 
evidence that the Defendant intended to harm the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff has indicated in con-espondence that he will argue that the Defendant's 
actions were "reckless" in an attempt to avoid the statutory cap on noneconomic damages under 
I.e. § 6-1603. Reckless means "actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or 
should have known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of haHn to another, but 
involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result." 10112.25.2 
Noting that the Legislature did not define reckless as it relates to the statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the standard with similar 
language: 
The Idaho courts, however, have interpreted "willful" and 
"reckless" in connection with several similar statutory provisions, 
and have determined that it refers to conduct where the actor 
"intentionally does or fails to do an act, knowing or having a 
Though the instruction is for "willful and wanton", there does not appear to be a distinction between "reckless" 
and "willful and wanton" in Idaho Law. 10112.25. Citing DeGraffv. Wight, 130 Idaho 577, 579, 944 P.2d 712, 
714 (1997)(" ... intentionally does or fails to do an act, knowing or having reason to know facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only creates unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involves high 
degree of probability that such harm would result). 
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reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize 
that his conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, but involves a high degree of probability that such harm 
would result." Harris v. Idaho, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 
Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992) (quoting Jacobsen v. Cily 
of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736, 740 (1988». The Idaho 
courts have emphasized that the key to the meaning of reckless or 
willful conduct is knowledge, thus implying an element of 
foreseeability. Hunter v. Idaho, Dep'l ofCorrs., Div. (~r Probation 
& Parole, 138 Idaho 44,57 PJd 755, 760 (2002); Harris, 847 P.2d 
at 1160. 
Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F .3d 1177, 1185-1186 (9th Cir. 2004). 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Erhart took any action with both the 
knowledge that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm and a "high degree of 
probability that such a harm would result." To the contrary, Mr. Erhart testitied that he was at 
the building several times a week and never witnessed a problem with the stairs. See Deposition 
of Milt Erhart. attached to the Affidavit of Kurt Holzer, p. 11. He also testified that the sheer 
weight of the tracks rendered them stable: "the tracks on those treads are extremely heavy, and, 
you know, they were very very stable." Id at 26. When asked if "it was your belief that the tread 
vvould stay in place?", Mr. Erhart stated "uh-huh." Id. at 26-27. He was asked under oath ifhe 
executed "a regular program or process for walking through your properties to see if there is 
anything that needs fixing or repair." Id. at 10, I. 14-18. He responded that "I endeavor to go by 
every weekend when nobody's around and walk through." Id. He was then asked directly the 
purpose of his regular inspections: 
Q: Do you look for dangerous conditions or things that may be 
safety hazards when you walk through your buildings? 
A: Well, certainly . 
.. . Q: Are you trying to prevent people from getting hurt? Would 
that be something you're trying to prevent? 
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A: Well, certainly. 
Q: Did you regularly examine these stairs at issue? 
A: Well, I was over there in Meridian several times a week and I 
probably went up and down those stairs several times a week. So, 
the answer is I would have noticed if there was a problem, if that's 
what you're questioning. 
Id. at 11-12. Mr. Erhart took no actions in this case with the knowledge of an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, or anything approaching a high degree of probability that 
such a harm would actually result. 
The standard for the allowance of a finding of reckless (knowledge of an unreasonable 
risk of harm) is similar to that for the punitive damages (knowledge of the likely consenquences). 
As this court has already ruled that the latter are barred, the Defendant's respectfully request that 
this Court instruct the Plaintiffs, their counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from 
making mention or interrogating, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the 
voir dire of the jury, opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, 
closing statements, or any other time while in the presence of the prospective jurors (prior to 
selection) or jurors (after selection) any mention whatsoever that any actions by Mr. Erhart were 
reckless or willful. 
f. The Plaintiffs should be barred from making any mention whatsoever of 
subsequent remedial measures. 
After the Plaintiff's accident, Mr. Erhart took remedial measures to attach the stair treads 
in a more secure manner. Idaho adheres to the general rule that evidence of post-accident repairs 
or alterations to show antecedent negligence is inadmissible. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 
357,364,659 P.2d Ill, 118 (1983). "Such evidence is excluded as immaterial." Id. at 364, 659 
P.2d at 118. Idaho Rule of Evidence 407 memorializes the rule and bars the introduction of 
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Mr. Erhart has admitted ownership, control in his deposition and the feasibility of 
precautionary measures have never been questioned. As such, no exception is applicable and the 
Plaintiff has no legitimate basis to offer the evidence of measures taken after the accident. 
III. Conclusion: 
Because the evidence is irrelevant, inadmissible, would prejudice the jury, and is based 
upon information not reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, the Defendants' request that 
this Court order to the Plaintiffs from introducing any of the following: 
a. To refrain from presenting any evidence of medical billing which fails to 
accurately represent the actual special damages incurred. 
b. To refrain from presenting the inadmissible hearsay in the form of alleged 
statements made by Mr. Phillips to Mrs. Phillips immediately following the accident. 
c. To refrain from presenting any opinions from Dr. Gill which rely on 
information not reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 
d. To refrain from allowing Dr. Gill to reference the inadmissible hearsay 
which he relied upon to form his opinions. 
e. To refrain from making any statements that the alleged negligence of the 
Defendant was somehow "reckless", 
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, 
measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, or a defect in a product, a defect in a 
product'S design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of 
subsequent measures if offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of 
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. I.R.E. 407 (2008). 
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f. To refrain from making any mention whatsoever of subsequent remedial 
measures. 
The Defendants request these evidentiary rulings based upon the general grounds that the 
matters identified are inadmissible for any purpose on proper and timely objection, that they 
have no bearing on the issues in this action or the rights of the parties to this action, and on the 
further grounds that permitting such mention would prejudice the jury, and sustaining objections 
to such mention would not cure such prejudice, but rather would reinforce the impact on the 
jurors of such prejudicial matters. 
~ ~(~
DATED This  day of 
Defendants' Motion in Limine - 13 
~'2007. 
'" CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
By~,j~ 
David~ Cantrill, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I hereby certifY that on March 26, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
John T. Edwards 
Kurt Holzer 
HOLZER EDWARDS & HARRlSON, CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, ID 83702-5316 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 












John T. Edwards, ISB No. 4210 
Kurt Holzer, ISB No. 4557 
HOLZER • EDWARDS, CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5316 
(208) 386-9119 telephone 
(208) 386-9195 facsimile 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE 
PHILLIPS, individually and as a marital 
community 
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PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
MILT E. ERHART and MARY C. 
ERHART, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs respond to Defendants' Motion in Limine as follows: 
1. The Supreme Court has determined that the jury is to 
be presented the amount billed by the medical service 
provider. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a reduction due to arrangements 
between the payor and the service provider is properly addressed by a post-trial 
reduction. In Dyet v. McKinley, 135 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236 (2003), the district court 
denied the defendants' effort to offer evidence of the amounts actually paid on behalf of 
the plaintiff. The court found the proper way to handle the write-downs was to treat 
the reductions as collateral source payments and reduce the amounts awarded pursuant 
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to Idaho Code §6-1606. See id. at 529. See also Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 925, 
104 P.3d 958,967 (2004) (treating write downs pursuant to Idaho Code §6-1606 as a 
post verdict adjustment). 
Idaho Model Jury Instruction 9.01 provides one measure of plaintiffs' damages is 
"The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses incurred as a 
result of the injury. Idaho Code §6-1606 provides:; 
[A] judgment may be entered for [a personal injury] claimant only 
for damages which exceed amounts received by the claimant from 
collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury .... 
Evidence of payment by collateral sources is admissible to the 
court after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such 
award shall be reduced by the court to the extent the award 
includes compensation for damages which have been compensated 
independently from collateral sources. (emphasis added) 
The write downs in this case arise from agreements between the workers 
compensation insurer and the care provider. The only reported Idaho case makes clear 
the actual charged cost for the services is the appropriate number to place before the 
jury for its evaluation and verdict. After the verdict is rendered, any award is properly 
subject to adjustment pursuant to Idaho Code §6-1606. 
2. Mr. Phillips' statement to Mrs. Phillips that the step 
moved and he grabbed for the rail is admissible when 
offered to explain why Dan Phillips and Angela Sisco left 
the hospital to inspect the stairwell. 
In the emergency room, Mr. Phillips told Mrs. Phillips the step moved, he 
grabbed the rail, and he fell. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." LR.E. 801 (c). That 
statement however, is offered to explain the classic call to action that resulted in Dan 
Phillips and Angela Sisco leaving the hospital to inspect the scene of the fall. A 
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statement is not hearsay if it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. State v. 
Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,657 (Ct.App.1993). In Nichols the court allowed in out of 
court statements offered to explain what caused Nichols to confess. Because the 
statements were offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for what was 
said that precipitated an action, they were properly admitted. 
Mr. Phillips' statement is not offered to prove the step actually slipped (the truth 
of the matter asserted), it is not hearsay and is admissible. Defendants' motion must be 
denied. 
3. None of Dr. Gill's opinions are based solely on Mrs. 
Phillips' statements and are admissable. 
Defendants misstate, grossly, the testimony of Dr. Gill. First, Defendants refer 





You have to help me here a little bit, okay. You indicated that the 
failure to have a horizontal extension of the handrail at the bottom 
of the stairs is a violation of code and reasonable care, is that 
correct? 
Yes, sir, I believe it is. 
Can you tell me what evidence you observed on the date of your 
examination that indicates that that would contribute to the fall? 
I believe that the fall was most likely to have occurred at a place 
other than that. 
These statements clearly and unambiguously refer to the absence of a horizontal 
extension at the bottom of the stairs, Dr. Gill opines the fall occurred near the top of the 
lower flight of stairs. The testimony regarding the absence of the horizontal extension 
has nothing remotely to do with the unsecured outside handrail referred to by 
Defendants. Defendants seem to be confusing the simple terms outside handrail with 
an absent horizontal extension at the bottom. What is readily apparent, is the 
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information provided is inaccurate and cannot be a basis for excluding Dr. Gill's 
testimony. 
At no point has or will Dr. Gill testify that Jim Phillips' statement to which Mrs. 
Phillips testified in her deposition is the sole basis for any opinions he expresses 
regarding the cause of the fall or the safety of the stair system as a whole. He does 
freely admit that the only direct evidence that Jim Phillips used that handrail was her 
statement, but he does not indicate that the use of the handrail was a cause of the fall. 
Dr. Gill testified at page 16 line 4 through page 17 line 24: 
A. Thirdly, there's a number of criticisms that I have of the stairway 
and why I believe it's unreasonably dangerous. Some of which I 
believe are directly relevant to where I believe the most likely point 
of the fall was and some of them, if that is the location of the fall, 
would not be directly relevant. Did that answer your question? 
Q. Well, yeah, why don't you just narrate for me so I don't have to 
keep interrupting you with questions. 
A. Okay. What would you like to have more detail on? 
Q. On those defects that you feel may have contributed to the accident. 
A. The ones that I think are most likely to have contributed to the 
accident because of where I feel the most probable point of loss of 
balance was induced would be the open handrail ends where you 
have the trun from the upper flight of steps on the intermediate 
landing to the lower flight of steps. So the inside handrails. 
I think the second most likely thing is the excessively low 
handrail in that area. 
The third thing that I think is a likely factor that is 
interacting with htose is the stair tread itself not bolted on the 
right-hand side as you are descending from the intermediate 
landing to the sidewalk. 
And the fourth component would be the handrail itself which 
was on the left-hand side or the outside rail, was not bolted or 
secured to the top. 
So those are the four primary things that are right in the area 
where I believe the most probable loss of balance was induced. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Phillips even used the handrail on the 
day in question? 
A. The best answer I could give you to that is it's my understanding 
from his wife that when the loss of balance was induced that he 
attempted to grasp a handrail. Whether or not he had it before or 
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whether or not he was able to fully grasp it, I can't tell you. I don't 
have any data on that. 
Q. Let's assume for a moment, Dr. Gill, that her testimony is not 
admissible as being hearsay, what evidence do you have to show 
that in fact he did use a handrail? 
A. That would be the only evidence I'm aware of. 
Dr. Gill did not testify he knows whether Jim Phillips used the handrail. 
Nowhere does Dr. Gill state that Jim's actual use of the handrail before or during the 
fall induced the fall. Nowhere does Dr. Gill opine that such use/nonuse in any way 
effects his conclusion that the fall began at or near the top of the lower flight of stairs. 
Dr. Gill's opinion remains admissible and is not based upon the statements made by Mr. 
Phillips to Mrs. Phillips. Defendants' motion must be denied. 
4. Defendants' attempt to explode the scope of Idaho 
Code 6-1604 by equating arguments of willful or reckless 
behavior for the purposes of 6-1603 is unsupported by 
Idaho law. 
Defendants have moved the Court to preclude any reference to the willful or 
reckless behavior of Mr. Erhart ruling on an unrelated issue. There is no law 
whatsoever that establishes that the determination of the factual matter of reckless or 
willful behavior should not be referenced to the jury. It remains the jury's ultimate 
determination based on the facts presented at trial. This is directly contrary to the 
procedures for punitive damages which direct the Court to weigh the evidence plaintiff 
chooses to present at a pre-trial hearing. 
No statue or rule precludes the use of the terms willful or reckless in presentation 
to the jury or arguments at trial. The evidence actually adduced at trial in the case will 
either support or not support a finding by the jury. 
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A key to the issue of both willful and reckless behavior is that the actor "knew or 
should have known" the level of danger imposed by his actions. Regardless of his 
testimony, whether Mr. Erhart knew of the dangers his action presented, or should have 
known is a simple and basic question of fact for the Jury 
"Willful misconduct" occurs when a person intentionally does or 
fails to do an act, knowing or having reason to know facts which 
would lead a reasonable man to realize his conduct not only creates 
an unreasonable risk of harm to another but involves a high degree 
of probability that such harm would result. LD.J.I.2d 2.25 
(modified) 
The issue of willful misconduct presents a classic jury question. 
Idaho Code section 6-1603 makes clear that behavior can be "willful or 
reckless." And Idaho law does contain a definition of recklessness consistent with 
dictionary definitions: 
"Reckless misconduct" occurs when a person acts carelessly or 
without due caution and circumspection or in a manner that 
indicates a disregard of the potential consequences in a situation 
involving danger to the life or safety of others. Idaho Code section 
49-1401; Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) at 1142; 
Webster's New World Dictionary (2d Ed. 1986) at 1186. 
5. Defendants attempt to explode the scope of Idaho Code 6-1604 by 
equating arguments of willful or reckless behavior for the purposes of 6-1603 is 
unsupported by Idaho law. 
Rule 407 is limited to precluding evidence of a repair when it is offered to 
"prove negligence or culpabale conduct." Defendant's motion is primarily directed at 
photographs plaintiff has marked as exhibits 3, 20 & 21. 
Because the evidence that may also show the remedial measure will be adduced 
for other purposes allowed by the Rule, this aspect of the Motion should be denied. 
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Defendant's motion does not address the limited scope of the evidence at issue. 
This case involves specific failure areas for which the Rule 407 limitations rule may be 
considered. Those construction defects at issue here are: 
1. The failure to use two of four bolts on the second and third step 
of the stairway. 
2. The failure to use screws to install the top half of the outer 
handrail on the lower stairway; and 
3. The failure to install a properly sized handrail 
4. The failure to properly construct interior handrail interface 
between the steps and the landing to meet code. 
There is no issue whatsoever about photos that shows the areas referenced in 3 & 
4 because the defects remain present today. There were, in fact no subsequent 
remedial measures taken, and the dangers faced by Mr. Phillips are fully present. 
Regarding no. 2, evidence of the reattached handrail will be offered to directly 
impeach the testimony of Mr. Erhart. In his deposition he testified 
Q: [By Mr. Holzer] Did you do anything to reattach the handrail 
after? 
A: [By Mr. Erhart] No. We left the handrail alone. 
Q: Okay. And its your testimony that you have never gone in and 
put another screw in? 
A: I don't believe so? 
Photos and testimony showing that the handrail was not screwed in before and is 
screwed in now provide direct impeachment of Mr. Erhart's sworn deposition 
testimony. Rule 407 expressly allows such information in for impeachment purposes. 
Mr. Erhart cannot now be heard to say he DID repair the handrail and use the shield of 
Rule 407 to protect him from false testimony to the exact opposite. 
Finally, this leaves the issue of the uninstalled bolts on the two steps. Without 
authority, Defendant argues that because he will admit feasibility of a proper 
installation, plaintiffs are precluded from showing the jury the ease of the feasibility. 
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Defendant has objected to plaintiffs' presenting photographs of steps OTHER than 
those that plaintiff's claims caused the injury. These later scene photos of other steps 
on the stairway not involved in Mr. Phillips fall do not show "subsequent remedial 
measures that "would have made the event less likely to occur." 
Because it needs to be evaluated for the purpose submitted no overarching order 
is appropriate regarding any subsequent scene photos 
DATED thiXay of March, 2008. 
HOLZER+EDWARDS, CHTD. 
Ba~/ 
Kurt D. Holzer, for the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the U day March, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David Cantrill 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King 
PO Box 359 
Boise,ID 83701 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand delivery 
-K-Facsimile 
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C> 
:;0 -Cf) - John T. Edwards, ISB No. 4210 Kurt Holzer, ISB No. 4557 
HOLZER. EDWARDS, CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5316 
(208) 386-9119 telephone 
(208) 386-9195 facsimile 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAR 3 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE 



















Case No. CV PI 0707453 
MOTION IN LIMINE/OBJECTION 
REGARDING PROPOSED 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF KEN 
DOOLTTLE 
Plaintiffs have not been able to subpoena Mr. Doolittle as they have learned that he is 
now and has been in either California or Nevada. 
Thus, Plaintiffs intend to submit the deposition testimony of Ken Doolittle as redacted on 
the attached Deposition Copy. 
There are two matters in his deposition on which Mr. Doolittle engaged in rank 
unadulterated speculation and it is improper for that testimony to be presented to the jury. The 
MOTION IN LIMINE/OBJECTION REGARDING PROPOSED 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF KEN DOOL TTLE - 1 
000245 
objectionable testimony is boxed in black with Asterisks placed beside it on pages 6 and 16 of 
the enclosed deposition. 
Plaintiffs hereby object to the presentation of the testimony offered by Mr. Doolittle at 
line 9 and 10 of Page 6 commencing with "but I am going to guess it was the third .... " 
Pursuant to Idaho Ru1e of Evidence 602 a witness may not testify unless he has personal 
knowledge. Witness who states he is guessing conclusively establishes he has no personal 
knowledge. In this case the context, in which the witness states "I don't know exactly" prior to 
guessing at what level the step he reported was makes doubly clear that he has no personal 
knowledge of the step. A guess does not have any tendency to make a fact more or less probable. 
Thus pursuant to Ru1es 602 and 401, this line of the deposition shou1d not be read to the jury. 
Plaintiffs similarly object to the presentation of the testimony offered by Mr. Doolittle at 
line 9 and 10 of Page 6 at lines 21 to 25 of page 15. This is the complete sentence commencing 
with "In other words, he could have fallen ... " This sentence is rank speculation based on 
nothing. It too should be precluded from presentation to the jury pursuant to Idaho Ru1es of 
Evidence 602 and 401. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2009. 
HOLZER+EDW ARDS, CffARTERED 
MOTION IN LIMINE/OBJECTION REGARDING PROPOSED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31 st day of March 2009, I caused to be served, by the 
methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
David Cantrill 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand delivery 
X Facsimile 
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called as a witness rprein, P.aving been first duly S'.om, ,;as 
examined and testified as fo11O'tls: 
~..TICN 
11 BY MR. C1lNl'RILL: 
Q Your name IS? 12 
13 
14 
A Kenneth Mark Doolittle. live 0' s a.."ld 1:'.0 T' s . 
Q And, Mr. Doolittle, "ne..re do you live? 
15 JI. I live at 892 East Sto=l Dnve, Maridian, Idaho. 
16 Q h@ 1£&8 16M LZft pi S3 
17 ... Iii L! ' lvbnne? a-
18 ~ e!ii' .. I.' sr 898-8889 
19 Q And what's your ro.."'tlpd.tion? 
A I'm an investrrEnt advisor. 
. 0 It 808ft. is ... 
sft 
20 
21 Q Okay. A..re pc! still at tr..:.s D>'iHir,g "ne..re Mr. 
22 Phillips fell? 
23 A Yes, sir. That • .culd be 1406 Nort.'l Main Street, 
24 M:lridian, Idaho. ~ suite is nunber 210. 
25 Q How long have you been there? 000249 
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A Since -- let's see. I signe:i the lease in 
Sep!:eIh;r -- no. I Slgned the lease in -- that's oorrect. 
In SeptaJrer 2005 and rroved :L."lto the suite beginnirq in 
I::ecati::.er of 2005 after the tenant irtprovarents were !rede. 
q H I Xii, RIZI ::tid i!l:'S &CE£C!I12 I_I. 1 Ll ql If 
.. £ lISlE h4ljZSi £1 64, W; E 1? • 
A 66. 
Q Okay. So. 00 you have a written lease with Mr. 
Erhart? 
10 A I 00. 
11 Q And 00 you use these steps, the back steps? 
12 A I 00. Every day. 
13 Q How long have you used them? 
14 A Continuously since I rroved in. 
15 Q Okay. Have you ever abse.rvtrl arrJ problem wi th 
16 the.n? 
" A Yes. When I first rroved in there were one step, 
18 perhaps !!Ore than one step on the lxlttan section of steps --
19 the stair,;ay gees cbwn fran the top and, then, reverses 
2D directlon halfway d;"n. It's a two story building. So, it's 
21 the lxlttan level of steps and there rray be 10 or 12 treads, 
22 scnething like that, in each section and there were at least 
23 one step that was loose on the lxlttan section of treads on --
24 just up fran the lxlttan. 
.... Q Pk li glit iea ilmW is, It and 11. All B If!It? 
lock ae d£§@. '4 
3.. &5 What J 2d 5 . ; , "iss. 
9 wpich RPG R .. I 1~jr rlait 
d -, J I hPi 3" ,11 liIP& 
Q 11 liW shb d j uc'81tmiL • 
" ,*; 4i. 
Q jim where was the loose step? 
~ A don't know which exactl 
~ 9.-~~.. .. ........ , 
1- ~~ .. iiiiiiiQ~ijO~kay-... And~you_·noliti .. ·ced~~tha~t:i:tiiwasl loose? 
12 A Yes. The tread actually rroved hack and forth on 
:3 the S"~c.S tl-.at W&e holding it. It wasn't anchored to tl-.e 
14 Slcl:. So, that if you pushed on it it actually would slide 
15 backwacls . 
16 Q Or forwa.rds, dep:nding upon which direction you 
17 ;.e..re gmng" 
18 A Yes. !Will, I don't know as you would be able to 
19 push it for.vards unless you got unde.."1leath the stair I'cll and 
20 pushed it forwards. 
21 Q Oh. Okay. 
22 A The natural weight of a person going down the 
23 stairs is to push it backwards. 
24 Q What was the length of the !l'OV6!EIlt, if you know? 
25 A Oh, I never really teste::! it. All I knew was that 
I stepped on the stair and it jiggled and I tllOught to rIT{sili 
at the tirre that it I>.I:)U].d be appropriate to say scnet.lung Mr. 
Erhart, which I did, and I, actually, tried ffi)ving it a"ld it 
.llOiled !!Ore than a couple of lIlchcs for Ire a"ld at that ::oint I 
thought, I'cll, this is hazardous, p::>tentially, ana cr.at he 







Q And when was tr.at 111 relation to tIllS acCl~"lt? 
A I don't kna;1. It would have DeoJl prd:Jably L~ the 
spring, perhaps February or March of 2006. 
Q Okay. 
A Late I'ilnter, early spring. 
Q Did you continue to use the step? 
A Yes. I used all of the sta:.rs. 
Q Okay. 
A And I noticed that because the step was rrade of 
16 concrete it didn't lID\fe easily, but it did I!Dve. It did have 
17 a !!Otion to it. If you pressed on it ha.'1i e.'lOUgh you could 
18 gat it to !!Ove. If you were carrpng sanethi:1g heavy, for 
19 exarrple, it would be easler to Il'GJe it than if 'IOU were jus;: 
20 using the weight of your a"n b::x:i'j> 
21 Q Did you use the handrail? 
22 A I typically oon' t use a handral.l "i.en I use t'le 
23 stairs and I ;;ypicall Y -- because I'm tall, I'm SlX op.e, I 
24 take two steps at a tirre "TIe.') I go up and ciown the stalrs. 
25 Q How old are you? 
1 
A I will be 48 l'earS old late:: trclS r:onth. 
Q That t'v.\:) steps is goi.'lg to qUl.t pretty sexxl. So. 
did you ever trip or fall on the steps? 
A Never. 
Q Okay. Arq other problem that you noticed? 
A The handrail is -- at the landing half ·tlaY up the 
stairs is bent. I rrentioned l:..'lat to him. :;: also rrentioned 
to him that the lights al:xlve all of these stairs I wtic.'l wo"ud 
l::e at the top level fran the ceiling there is t'dC lights, 
10 that those lights don't seem to functlon a."ld I rrentloneci that 
11 to him as I'cll. I'm kind of a safety nt:t and I wocld --
12 anyti.rre I ever saw ilIlY"Jring that I felt like n~ to be 
13 addressed, I felt like I would be doL"lg the 0\IIIler or :"1c 
14 prq::erty a favor to tell hi:1l about it I so I did. 
15 Q liere these oral staterents? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And what was Mr. Erhart's typical respor.se? 
18 A Oh, he didn' t have a negative response or a 
19 p:lsitive response. He would thank Ire for telling h.llll a."ld I 
20 didn't gat the inpression that he was i.'l. a big hurry ever, 
21 one way or another. In other words, it vlasn' t tr.at he ,.-as 
22 neglecting it on pu!p)se, but it also wasn't that he waS Li a 
23 hurry to rrayl:e rreke repairs. There were other tr.:mgs about 
24 the building that I braJght to his attention cr.at had to 00 
25 with the air oonditioning and the heating of the b '1 250 
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the way that was laid out and ~ -- I actually got into a 
di5pUte Wlth him concerning that later that sane year. My 
unit wasil' t prq:erly air conditionel, oor was it prq:erly 
heated, and he I>1:lUld call repair j:€Ople and they I>1:lUld o::m: 
out, but it never seared to change. And, then, there was an 
lSsue with wind:Jws not tcir:g properly sealed and that caused 
7 tf.e unit to 00 really hot in the = and also really cold 
1Il the winter. The systare couloo' t keep up with the air 
flew tr,at was going th..TOUgh the windows, either hot or cold 
10 all. 
Q Did you know Jim Phillips? 
12 A 0Ill Y in passing. I rret him when he IlOved in. He 
13 noved into the suite after I lll:JIled into Il!f suite. His 
14 CuslneSS associate -- I think her r,aITe was Allgelica. 
:5 Q Angela. 
16 A Arlgela. And they worked for a nonprofit, as I 
17 recall. He explaine::i to rre it had sarething to do with 
18 houslllg. And so ~ chatted just as neighbors I>1:lUld chat in 
19 the hallway, but I never got to kPm him or never really 
20 spent any titre Wlth him. He was a big tall fellow, as I 
21 recall. But never really got into any kind of deep 
22 conversation about kids or school or anything else. 
23 Q So, you carre upon Mr. Phillips the date of the 
24 acCldent, did you not? 
25 A Yes. The circurrstances were that I lcoked out the 
WlI'J:bw and saw an arrbulance and I walked across the hallway 
to ::he CaIbined Insura'1Ce office ar£i the secretary there, her 
narre 15 Tracy, I asked her if she knew why there was an 
arrbulance outside and she said sareone had fallen down the 
stairs. J.JJd I walked out me door and lcoked down the staip 
and saw pararredics attending'to this fellow. You sai'!. his .. 
'" 7 narre was Jim? 
Q Right. 
A Okay. I'm sorry, I diOO't r:ararber his narre. And, 
10 you knew, I reo:JgIlize rim by his ~ance, not by his narre. 
11 So, r.e was laying at the bottcm of the stairs. He was, 
12 actually, not on the stairs, he was on the concrete bela,; the 
13 stairs face down and there ~ to 00 blood next to his 
14 read on the concrete and I asked the pararredics if there was 
15 any way l1Jat I could 00 of help, because I instantly had 
16 o::rrpassion towards him in regard to his -- sareone in family 
17 knoollg that he was hurt and that he was going to 00 taken to 
18 the hospital.. 
19 Q So I you walked down the steps? 
20 A I did. 
21 Q Did you notice any prablens? 
22 A No, I diOO' t -- in fact, that was the first thing I 
23 thought of was, ~, rrayl:e he slipped because of this stair. 
24 The stair that -- none of the stairs were out of alignrre:nt 





OOcause I thought, ~l, rrayl:e it's because of this 1Ssue 
that I previously P.ad brought up to Mr. Erhart. 
Q I want to get Hr. Phillips I exact position. yC"~ 
said he was face da ... n? 
A Yes. 
Q Has his -- he , .. as on his starac.'l, ciA'lously" 
A Yes. And his head was turned to the SlC::. 
Q To the lef t or to ::.lJe ngh t? 
A IOOlieve it was to the left. 
Q To the left? 
A I don't rt:Call exactly, but llJ.at' S Il!f recollect.:on. 
Q How far ~ his feet fran the bottan st€p? 
A I diOO' t ITeaS'J..re, so I don't k:.1OW. But he was 
14 ~haps one sLop or a r,alf a step fran ll;e bottan stEp. 




A Semi. 1S Il!f recollection. 
Q Did lUll stay there until l1ey took hlm away" 
A I did. 
19 Q Angela testified prior to "jQU I Mr. D:x:;~ ttle. Sf.e 
20 said you brought P.er a box the next day or a couple da:rs --
21 A Correct. TP.ere ,;as a box lay'.Jlg next to Jim. 
22 
23 
Q Right next to him? 
A Has I OOlieve to his right arii for ... -a..rd of h:Zll. b 
24 ollJer ~rds, within an ann's lengt.lJ of rJ.s :::ght should2r. 
25 Q Okay. 
A And tr,at box contalned sare papers a'ld a fe''; otf.er 
itens. I don't recall what it ,,-as. But I ,,-as COl1ce...rnei l'lat 
the pararred!:cs were t.aki.1g him away, tfoa t sareone WJUld 
notify eitb'er lmgela ar£i/or his w'.d'e aTJd fa.rrdJy, a1d l'lat 
this box ~uld just 00 left tf.ere a.'1d rrayl:e the papars ~e 
inp:lrtant, ~r.aps, or the stuff would blow away or sorreone 
WJUld steel. it or whatever. So, I tcok ll;e box, w-alked l:? --
back up the stairs, wrnt da..m the hallway l:lW his offIce. 
the door was unlocked, no one ,,-as tlleJ:e. I w::.,t lllto t.l;e 
10 ro::m and lcoked for a buslnesS card or sare contact 
11 lllfomation and I found a buslfJess card. : believe, for 
12 J..ngela and I called her on tf.e phone to notify her tfoat tl'.lS 
13 had transpired and I think I left the box in llJe office at 
14 that tirre. 
15 Q Could you tell rre how ruch it weigb.ed? 
16 A Oh, coulOO't have been IlOre tr.a:n a few ounces. It 
17 w-as a srra1l cardboard box. As I recall it ,,-as square or 
18 ~haps rectangular. It W"<lSn' t as big as a box tf,at ccp'j 
19 paper ~uld oorre iT). and llJere really weren't tr.at rraI:Y itens 
20 in it, so It was very light weight. 
21 Q Co you know how lllls accident i>.a;:pe.n.ed? 




Q AllCi have you tall;ed to a'ljune that does? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever talk to Mr. Phillips f= tfci.ot) U 2 51 
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fran that date? 
A No, I have oot. I asked. ab:mt his conditien Ill3.llJ 
ti..rres, but never saw him again. Don't know what happened to 
him or any of the ootails at all. 
Q T'nere is aoother gt.:l that was there I think befere 
you. Randy Jenks. Do you know Randy" 
A I do not. 
Q Rand'f 15 111 Missouri now. Have 1'00 ever talked to 
a"lJ'One else ab:mt the accident? 
10 A No, sir. 
11 Q You did not see anyone else there? 
12 A other than the pararredics there were a few of the 
: 3 p:qlle in 'Offices fran the downstairs 'Of the building that 
14 ware present as this all was unfelding. It took the 
15 pararredics awhile to get him out 'Of there, because they 
16 wanted to rrake sure and brace his neck. 
17 Q Yeah. 
18 A They didn't know -- you know, I guess that's 
19 standard protocol ill an accident, that if you possibly have a 
20 neck injury they want to brace your neck, so that they don't 
21 !lake It w:lrse. So, that took than awhile -- took than awhile 
22 to get him en one of those hard flat :t:oards where they could 
23 anchor his head to the board, so that it w:luld i.ntrcbilize 
24 tum. So, that took I'm going to say 10' 'Or 15 minutes fer 




Q Okay. But you physically ~'lt up and down the 
steps that day and observed no problars, ether than what you 
hav'e told us about? 
A Correct. 
Q And the steps we...'"e oot out of alignrrent en that 
day? 
MR. CANI'RILL' Okay. That's all I have, Mr. Doolittle. 




12 BY MR. HOLZER: 
Q (:icture l~Jle top 'One to your left. 13 
14 A Yes, sir. 
15 Q Does any 'Of the steps swear out 'Of alignrrent in 
16 that P1Cture? 
A Vhll, the step that sarrone is standing on appears 
18 to be out 'Of alignrre.'1t, but it may be the carrera angle. I 
19 don't know. 
20 Q ~ the -- did the reconstructicn of these steps 
21 hafpen after you ;;ere already in the building or do you koow? 
22 A There rray have been !!Ore than one reconstruction. 
23 It appeared -- weil, perhaps I should back up. My belief is 
24 fran knowing Mr. Erhart fer the ti.rre that I have known him, 
25 is that he rrakes many of the repairs to the building himself. 
For exarrple, window installatien, he would de all of that 
w:lrk himself. He would 'Only hire pecple to de thil1C]S tr2t 
either he didn't want t'lun to do 'Or t'lat he physically 
couldn't do. So, when it carre ti.'lE -- and I don't rEm:'!li:P...: 
when this was, but it was perhaps a !!Onth 'Or to'l-) after tr!lS 
had happened -- this event had happened that ~ are 
discussing tcday, this accident, that !II. Erhart was rrakir;!J 
repairs to the stairs himself. He was reanchonng thsn 
himself. He had a ratchet and he }1..:!d a serles of wT.a.t locked 
10 like washers that he had placed in bet:~'e"Jl the al'.chor brace 
11 fer the stairs arri the actual bec.""llS, they appear to re ·tIOOd 
12 beams that go up and down the stairs. He had placed washers 
13 111 l::e~ there to fill that spa;::e and had l:clts of SalE 
14 type that he was ratc.l-,eting 1I1W place to hold the steps. 
15 So, he maOO -- he maOO a lot 'Of repairs himself and Mr. 
16 Erhart gives rna the mpression w.at he's a very har.ds-on 
17 person and that he's involved with type of repairs or ar:y 
18 type 'Of w:lrk the t needs to be done on a personal basis. 
19 '! re!!, Itt fiB ult lea a il!ittxRS tl£1£ealE qacsaoh. 
20 taa 16& bab :aIM i: bI III tg W you 31 if dil? 
d Sj. • a: iles UZj s&liS. 
Ii j iUS Wins w , 
):fA dl&;gm liS hi J gf ·bw 
IS 
Q Dka]5 TOO baye saw testinpny that the sIs' r§ ba0 
rspt@Vi6U§iy EGa CkW @Zi h_ !lSiY. tisa ill WIGe 
jti§t ditty La j' d got tirre +=rarn 
t9'& Ute 6£±gi1M sMig dgE WaiE RIUi me BhlIMHy d.b 
agE Oiij ita; Wi6 ElGn Broda bMIMitj. i Mh; £ K,.;aJ. 
±fMC Jk3&1!l ad!! l5!i 4kumtClOn Sf nq pat. @ .. dt m 6t 
ihli I iuzI =5 a: tl:aLSib nieh ilal bt!!!!dhi!j, W 1l@ 
LJ&l!!:SCI!!i:sa ilk saztzS Jkf@ Wiicl@d!. 
10 Q Okay. On that day w'hen you looked at the stairs, 
11 w:luld you describe it as in-depth evaluation 'Of w.e stalls, a 
12 curso.."y revletl of the stairs, a quick glance at t~e stairs? 
13 How did you look at them or did you w-dk on t.l-,e:rt? 
14 A It was -- I walked. en them -- ~, let ma -- 1e: 
15 rna rephrase. Are you referri.'lg to the day that Jirn fell t1at 
16 I locke:! at --
17 
18 
Q That Jim fell. 
A I maOO a qw.ck glance to see if the stair W-c:S the 
19 cause of his fall al'.d I did not see that the stair was out of 
20 alignrrent and I alse didn't know wnere he started to f 1 ''1d 
could have fallen fran u1e 
tcp and turrbled all the via'j dc;-m 
or perhaps he had a stroke 'Or a heart attack or a thousand 
other reasons fer goina down the stair, otlJer then tile starr 
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reason and so I specifically looked at the stairs. So, it 
was I1Dre than a passing glance to see if the stair was an 
overt cause fran its ~ance. 
Q You I re oot an engineer? 
A No. 
Q You I re oot a safety engineer? 
A No, sir. 
~lR. HOLZER: All right. That's all I have. 
D IIW SiI/iFS· ad p\ II . BWllCde. ! appreCJ.al!! 
10 .. 
11 
12 (Whereup:ln the dq;osition enCed at 11:45 a.m.) 
l3 ****************tt 
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Case No. CV PI 0707453 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion in Limine 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, by and through their attorneys, CantrilL 
Skinner, Sullivan & King, and tiles with this Honorable Court the following Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine. 
I. Arguments: 
The Defendants do not concede any of the arguments forwarded in the Motion in Limine. 
Though, they are only addressing three of the seven prayers from the Motion herein to allow this 
Court to fully address the issues at hand. 
:0 -Ci) -
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine - 1 000254~ 
r-
a. There is no testimony whatsoever that Dan Phillips and Angela Sisco returned to the 
building because of the alleged hearsay between Jim and Gale Phillips. 
The Plaintiff argues that because the alleged statement between Jim and Gale Phillips 
will be offered to show the effect on the listener, then it is not hearsay. See Plaintiffs 
Opposition, p. 3. This ignores the fact that the alleged communication was from Jim Phillips to 
Gale Phillips, and Gale Phillips did not inspect the stairs. As such, the Plaintiff is adding a 
second level of hearsay in an attempt to allow the admission of the first. If this information was 
about the eifect on the listener, it would have to explain the effect on Gale Phillips, not other 
witnesses. 
This argument also is also directly contradicted by both Dan Phillips and Angela Sisco. 
Dan Phillips testified in no uncertain terms that he was entirely unaware of any communication 
from Jim Phillips to anyone on the cause of the accident at any time. He first stated that Jim 
Phillips never told him about how he fell: 
Q: Has he told you he never remember or he has never told you 
how he fell; right? 
A: No. How did you know that? 
Q: Because he told us he couldn't remember, so ifhe couldn't if 
he couldn't tell me he couldn't tell you? 
A: No. 
See Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Daniel 1. Skinner in Support of Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum, p. 30. Dan Phillips then stated that he was unaware of Jim telling anyone else: 
Q: Do you know ifhe's told anybody how he fell? 
A: No. 
Jd. If Dan Phillips testitied under oath that he is unaware of any communication from 
Jim to another stating the cause of the accident, he carmot now be used to admit the hearsay. 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine - 2 000255 
There was no "effect on listener" exception relevant to Dan Philips because there was no 
statement to him. 
Angela Sisco also testified that there was no causal connection between the alleged 
hearsay and her returning to the office that day. She testified that Jim could not remember the 
cause of the accident: 
Q: Has Jim ever told you how and why he fell? 
A: No. 
See Exhibit 2 to the Skinner Affidavit, p. 17. She then stated that her trip to the office was not for 
the purpose of investigating the stairs. Rather, the decision to investigate followed a chance 
meeting with Dan Phillips. 
Q: Well, who was it that made the decision to go take these 
pictures, you or Dale Phillips [sic]? 
A: When - after I left the hospital I went back to the office and-
Dan; right? You said Dale? 
Q: Dan, I said Dale. Dan. 
A: Dan happened to be walking up at the same time that I was. 
was walking up and he pulled up and got out. He said he was just 
there to check it out to see - try and get some idea of what had 
happened and he was looking - I suggested that I had a camera, did 
he want it for pictures? . .! encouraged Dan to get the general 
condition of the steps, because it would, I thought, show the 
overall condition of them. 
Id. p. 17-18. Again, no testimony from Angela Sisco indicates that she was told anything by 
anybody as an incentive to go investigate the stairs. As such, the "etIect on listener" exception 
to the hearsay rule is inapplicable. 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine - 3 000256 
b. The Plaintiff admits that the expert, Dr. Gill, has no opinion that the railing caused the 
accident. As such, any testimony from him regarding the rails should be barred. 
The Plaintiff responds to the argument that any conclusions based solely on inadmissible 
hearsay from Mrs. Phillips should be barred by stating unequivocally that the expert has no 
opinions on the relevance of the rails in this case: 
Nowhere does Dr. Gill state that Jim's actual use of the handrail 
before or during the fall induced the fall. Nowhere dies Dr. Gill 
opine that such use/nonuse in any way effects his conclusion that 
the fall began at or near the top of the lower flight of stairs. 
Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 5. Because Dr. Gill cannot base his assertions solely on the 
inadmissible hearsay, and in fact has no basis to state that the rails in any way contributed to the 
fall, any testimony based on such should be barred as irrelevant. In addition to this court barring 
the introduction of testimony based solely on the inadmissible hearsay, it should order that Dr. 
Gill be barred from opining on the rails, as by the Plaintiffs own admission, they are not relevant 
to the facts of this case. 
c. Plaintiff asserts that the request to bar any evidence of subsequent remedial measures is 
addressed to three photos. This is not the motion before the court nor the basis for the 
Defendants' prayer to bar any admission of subsequent remedial measures. 
The Plaintiff misstates the Defendants Motion relevant to remedial measures. There were 
no specific photographs addressed in the motion whatsoever. See Plaintiff s Opposition, p. 6. 
Rather, the prayer is that no evidence of any kind be introduced of the subsequent remedial 
measures taken by Mr. Erhart in an attempt to prove negligence or culpable conduct under l.R.E. 
407. As the feasibility of the repairs is not at issue, there is no exception relevant to the rule. 
While the Plaintiff argues that the failure to repair the rails is not covered by Rule 407, the 
failure to repair the rails at some date after the accident is irrelevant. How possibly could the 
failure to repair a railing after the accident be probative of a fact at issue? 
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~ 
DATED This ~ day of ~, 2007. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
BY~UIddii 
David . Cantnll, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE-
MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN 
TESTIMONY OF ERNIE HARPER 
AND MEMO IN SUPPORT 
Defendants. 
--------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Plaintiffs move the court for an 
order to exclude certain proposed testimony of Earnest F. Harper and submit the following 
memorandum in support of this motion. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants have indicated that they will call Earnest F. Harper as an expert witness at 
trial. Based on Mr. Harper's Expert Report! , he is expected to testify as to the cause of Plaintiff 
James M. Phillips's March 20,2006 fall on Defendants' stairway. Specifically, Mr. Harper 
claims he can calculate and testifY to the speed of the Plaintiff's fall, and attempts to offer a 
I Attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
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conclusion based on that calculation that the defective handrail was not a factor in Mr. Phillips's 
fall. 
Because Mr. Harper's testimony regarding the speed of the fall lacks a factual, scientific 
basis, any testimony related to the speed of the fall, and to his conclusion that the handrail was 
not relevant to the fall, must be excluded. 
This Court's "Gatekeeper" Role Obligates It To Preclude Any Junk Conclusions Arising 
From The Improper Application of Science From Being Presented To The Jury. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. State v. 
l'vferwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). Rule 702 states that 
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
I.R.E.702. 
"The admissibility of expert testimony is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial 
court ..... " Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 
(2003). "Because the trial court has the discretion to determine whether a proper foundation has 
been laid for the admission of expert testimony, the trial court has discretion to determine both 
whether the expert is qualified as an expert in the field and whether there is a scientific basis tor 
the expert's opinion." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
ARGUMENT 
A. I.R.E. 702 requires that expert scientific testimony be based on sound 
scientific principles and methodology. 
''The inquiry under I.R.E. 702 is whether the expert will testify to scientific knowledge 
that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. 
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Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 522, 81 P.3d 1230, 1232 (2003). "This entails a preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." ld. (citing 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 
482 (1993». 
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the court should focus on the 
expert's methodology rather than the expert's conclusions. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.2 "Expert 
opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no 
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under 
Rule 702." Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812,979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999). Expert 
testimony is also inadmissible if the Court concludes that "there is simply too great an analytical 
gap between the data and the opinion proffered." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 519, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal 
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit ofthe expert." ld. 
Moreover, "[w]hen an 'expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must 
likewise be a scientific basis for that opinion' because if the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of 
fact." Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007) 
(quoting Swallow., 138 Idaho at 592, 67 P.3d at 71 (2003». In Swallow, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that the 
2 "The [Idaho Supreme] Court has not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but 
has used some of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid .... 
[including] whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been subjected to peer-review and publication." 
Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 838, 143 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007). 
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drug Cipro caused the plaintiff's heart attack because there was no scientific basis to make that 
causal determination. Swallow, supra, at 593, 67 P.3d at 72. Similarly, in Bromley v. Garey, 
132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision to exclude evidence of expert testimony that would have offered various possible 
explanations as to why a shotgun had misfired. Id. at 811, 979 P.2d at 1169. The expert could 
only give possible sources of causation which were consistent with his external examination of 
the firearm. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that since the expert did not examine internal 
parts of the gun and could not explain from a scientific standpoint what had caused the misfiring 
in that case, the trial court had properly excluded the testimony under Rule 702 of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Id Cf Weeks, supra, at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184 (admitting expert testimony 
that mistake in attaching fluid mixture to catheter rather than intravenous line caused patient's 
death because expert had a scientific basis to explain how such a blunder would cause serious 
deleterious effects on the brain). See also, Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269,277 
(5th Cir. 1998) (affirming preclusion of clinical doctor from testifying to the toxicological cause 
of the plaintiff's respiratory problem where the opinion was not sufficiently grounded in 
scientific methodology since the "analytical gap" between the causation opinion and the existing 
data and the procedures used was too wide); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (excluding proffered expert testimony that jet fuel was external cause of plaintiff's 
symptoms because expert had not sufficiently adhered to established scientific methodologies in 
forming conclusion as to causation). 
Mr. Harper's testimony regarding the speed of Mr. Phillips's fall, and his conclusion that 
the defective handrail played no role in the fall are equally unfounded. Any testimony from 
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Harper regarding the speed of the fall would be speculative and conclusory based on the 
procedures (or lack of them) employed by Harper in this case. 
B. Harper cannot scientifically determine the speed of Mr. Phillips's fall when 
he lacks information on the many variables that must be included in the 
complex calculation required to reach such a conclusion. 
While Harper may be qualified to give some opinions, there is no scientific basis for him 
to determine the speed of Mr. Phillips's fall down the stairs. Mr. Harper's proffered testimony 
does not arise from a sound application of scientific principles or methodology and he cannot 
present a scientific basis for his conclusion. "Expert opinion must be based upon a proper 
factual foundation." Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999). In his 
Expert Report, Mr. Harper makes several assumptions that have no relation to the actual physics 
of a human being falling down a flight of stairs, and he omits many variables that can affect the 
rate of speed. Mr. Harper claims he has "assume [ d], for simplicity a rigid body model." Harper 
Expert Report, at 7. Based on this assumption that Mr. Phillips was rigid and immobile when he 
walked down the stairs, Mr. Harper then concludes that the velocity of the fall was 24.8 feet per 
second. Id. Further, he claims if Mr. Phillips grabbed the handrail (somehow grabbing the rail 
while simultaneously in a rigid body model), Harper asserts the speed of the fall would be 13.9 
feet per second. Id. 
The fundamental error underlying Mr. Harper's calculation assumes that Mr. 
Phillips fell straight down to the earth with no movement whatsoever laterally. That is 
he provides no calculation of Mr. Phillips moving across the stairs. 
He does not state it in the report, but he simply uses the basic calculation from 
high school calculus that starts from the calculation of gravitational potential energy. 
To walk the court through that math: 
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An object held above the ground has a potential energy related to the height at 
which it is held. That is mass (times) gravity3 (times) height equals the potential 
energy of an object. A standard equation for that calculation is PE = mgb 
If you drop an object, its potential energy becomes the kinetic energy of motion 
(PE = KE). That is the potential energy equals the kinetic energy. 
The basic high school calculation for kinetic energy is calculated as Yz of mass 
times velocity squared. Thus, kinetic energy is equal to one-half of the mass of an 
object times the velocity of the object squared. 
Since PE = mgb and KE = Yz mv2 , and PE = KE then then mgb = Yz mv2 • 
Thus, the speed an object is traveling after falling a certain height (b) is found by 
solving the equation for v. The mass on both sides of the equals sign (m) cancels out 
of the equation. This is proves objects fall at the same rate. 4 Thus the calculation 
becomes v1 = 2gb (velocity equals 2 times gravity times height). Simplify for velocity 
and you end up with v = "'(2gb) (velocity equals the square root of 2gb)5. 
This calculation is for a shapeless object falling straight from its place of rest 
towards the center of the earth. 
This calculation has no relevance to ANYTHING in this case. 
Mr. Harper's "scientific" calculation of the speed of the fall is based on a six 
foot fall straight down. He does nothing to explain where and how that number was 
3 Gravity is a constant of32 ftls2 or 9.8 mls2• 
4 The story of Galileo dropping the ten pound weight and the one pound weight from the Leaning tower of Pisa may 
be apocryphal, but it proves the point (see e.g., httpIw'v\\\.iimlov.com/physics,galileo.htm). As thousands of high 
school students have observed in vacuums, a ten pound weight and a feather will fall at the same rate. 
S Mr. Harper indicates he uses the formula the "square root of' 3 gh. ", This is just one of the many errors in the 
report. Ifhe testifies to that as the formula, he deserves a failing grade in high school mathematics. 
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developed. It is a metaphysical impossibility for Mr. Phillips to have fallen straight 
towards the earth from six feet. 
Dr. Richard Gill's testimony further shows that Mr. Harper's "calculation" is 
pure bunk. During his April 2, 2009 trial testimony of Plaintiff's expert Dr. Richard 
Gill, Dr. Gill explained how it is extremely difficult to calculate the speed of a fall of 
this nature. He described why it is in fact impossible to calculate the speed of Mr. 
Phillips's fall when there are so many needed variables that are unknown. Trial 
Testimony of Richard Gill, Ph.D. ("Gill Testimony"), at 49-51. 6 As Dr. Gill explained, 
a simple calculation of the speed of a fall may be possible where one is calculating the 
speed of a "particle, something that has no dimensions." Id. at 49. However, this 
model is not applicable to the human body, which is a non-rigid object with many 
moving limbs. Id. at 49-50. 
You have to have [the model] as multiple links of a body 
connected together, and then you have to make assumptions of 
what's called forward motion - forward motion, as well as vertical 
motion going down the steps, as well as rotational motion. How 
much is the body starting to rotate or move before it then begins to 
fall? It's very complex. 
Id. at 50. 
Moreover, one must also consider issues of friction, such as, "[i]f a hand gets out 
on the handrail, where is it? How far out? What's the friction between the hand and 
the handrail? It's an extraordinarily complex process." Id. at 50-51. Dr. Gill 
concluded that it is simply not scientifically supportable to calculate the speed of Mr. 
Phillips's fall even were an expert to use a computer and apply sophisticated modeling, 
because there are just "too many unknowns in terms of the rate at which the body is 
6 Excerpts attached hereto as exhibit 2. 
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moving, the angular motion, where the hands are or aren't. There's just no way you 
could begin to model it." Jd. at 51. 
In fact, Mr. Harper falsely claims that his calculation is a "rigid body" 
calculation. It is in fact a simple "particle" calculation. In physics, particles are 
objects that have mass, position, and velocity, and respond to forces, but that have no 
spatial extent. 7 In contrast, in physics "rigid bodies" occupy space and have 
geometrical properties, such as a center of mass and moments of inertia. These are the 
items that characterize motion in six ways- i.e. movement in three directions 
(essentially fore-aft/Side to side/ up and down) plus rotation in three directions. The 
rotational directions are referred to as the Eularean angles. 8 
Mr. Harper does not attempt calculate any of this. 
Not only does Mr. Harper falsely state his calculation is a real rigid body 
calculation, he ignores and cannot deal with any of the considerable variables such as 
Mr. Phillips's various moving limbs, his body's angle, the rate of his rotational, vertical 
or forward motion, or issues of friction. The only information upon which he claims to 
base the conclusion is Mr. Phillips's height and weight. Of course Mr. Phillips weight 
is irrelevant to the calculation, so that was not relied upon either. It cannot because it 
has no relevance to the calculation of 2gh. That calculation requires nothing but the 
height to determine velocity in a vacuum. 
This issue is not merely a battle of credibility between the Plaintiffs' and the 
Defendants' experts. Rather, Mr. Harper's testimony on the speed of the fall must not 
7 Physically Based Modeling: Principles and Practice, Particle System Dynamic, Dr. Andrew 
Witkin, Ph.D. J 99. 
8 They are referred to as "yaw," "pitch" and "roll." A relatively simple discussion of these principles can be found 
at~~~~~~.~~~~~,~~.~~~~. 
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be presented to the jury under LR.E. 702 when it is so obvious that there is no scientific 
foundation for his claimed calculation. "If the reasoning or methodology underlying 
[an] opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinion will not assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue." Swallow, at 592. Mr. Harper's 
calculation is not a scientific conclusion. In fact, it is mere speculation and assumption 
not based on a scientific methodology fairly applicable to the incident and it must 
therefore be excluded under Rule 702. 
C. Mr. Harper's testimony that the defective handrail was irrelevant to Mr. 
Phillips's fall must also be excluded because it is based solely on unscientific 
principles. 
Because Mr. Harper's conclusion regarding the speed of Mr. Phillips's fall should be 
excluded, his opinion that the defective handrail played no part in the fall must also be excluded. 
In his report, Mr. Harper asserts he concludes that "[i]n my opinion, the handrail, despite its 
recognizable defects of a non-code, non-graspable configuration, was not a factor in Mr. Phillips 
[sic] fall." Harper Expert Report at 7. He bases this opinion wholly on his scientifically 
insupportable calculation of the speed of the fall: 
Even if Mr. Phillips could have caught the handrail within 2 feet from fall 
initiation, his speed (velocity) using a rigid body model, would be 13.9 fps. In 
order to stop his fall with a hand on the rail, he would have to exert a counter 
force of around 900 foot-pounds. It would have been impossible to have arrested 
his fall regardless of handrail design at this stage. 
Id. But Mr. Harper cannot form his opinion that the handrail played no part in the fall when his 
conclusions regarding the speed of the fall are not based on any applicable scientific principles. 
Thus, since any testimony regarding the speed ofMr. Phillips's fall should be excluded under 
I.R.E. 702, Mr. Harper's opinion that the defective handrail was not a factor in the fall should 
also be excluded, when it is based solely on a conclusion which lacks any scientific support. 
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D. Mr. Harper's Opinion regarding Sun angle has absolutely no basis and also be 
excluded. 
Mr. Harper opines that the sun angle was "possible" to be a contributing factor. 
Such a possibility is an insufficient basis on which to allow testimony to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court plays an important "gatekeeper" function in determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony under I.R.E. 702, in order to shield the jury from information that could 
inappropriately sway it. A jury might easily be swayed by evidence offered through a witness 
deemed an "expert." Thus, the Court needs to carefully evaluate the proffered testimony to 
determine if it is supported by proper application of scientific principles and methodology. If 
certain portions of the proffered testimony are not so supported, the Court has an obligation 
under I.R.E. 702 to exclude those portions. In this case, Mr. Harper cannot provide any scientific 
basis for his calculation of the speed of Mr. Phillips's fall, nor for his conclusion that the 
defective handrail played no part in the fall, and his testimony relating to these subjects must be 
excluded under I.R.E. 702. 
DATED this in- day of April, 2009. 
~ ~ Olzert:::::? 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day April, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David Cantrill 
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PO Box 359 
Boise,ID 83701 
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SAFETY & FORENSICS ANALYSIS AND OPINION 
Concerning 
Jim Phillips vs. Milt Erhart 
February 15th , 2009 
By EARNEST F. HARPER, CSP, DABFE, DACFET,CFC 
Background: 
My name is Earnest F. Harper and I reside at 11263 W. Bodley Drive, Boise, Idaho 83709. I am 
a Certified Safety Professional, a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners, a 
Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Engineering and Technology and a Certified 
Forensics Consultant. Professional honors include being selected as a Fellow of the American 
Society of Safety Engineers and a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners 
Institute. I have over 40 years experience in industrial and product safety engineering, 
construction, extensive accident reconstruction experience, electrical safety, community and 
industrial noise, fire safety and loss prevention, systems design, human factors and ergonomics, 
loss prevention, code compliance and design safety in machinery, processes, products and 
buildings. My experience includes being an Expert Witness, many years of working with 
disabled employees, the ADA and other accessibility codes, limited or no-English speaking 
individuals and a diverse workforce with a wide range of employment challenges. Injury 
investigations number well over 2000 over the period including several hundred slip, trip and 
stumble fall injuries. I am currently a technical co-contributor to Dr. Nigel Ellis's new edition of 
his widely read, "Introduction To Fall Protection - Fourth Edition, expected out in 2009 and have 
been retained as an expert in fall injury cases. 
A Fee schedule will be provided and is based on hourly charges of $195.00/hour. There are set 
Fee's for full day commitments, depositions and trial testimony not based upon actual hours. A 
CV will be provided or otherwise made available upon request. 
I have formally published only one technical document within the last 10 years in a peer 
reviewed Journal. The title of this publication is: A Perspective on Regulations & Standards for 
Safety Professionals." This was published in the Journal of the American Society of Safety 
Engineers, August 2008. I am the creator and current Editor of ASSE's Region II Newsletter 
and in that capacity have written a number (Nine since first issue, September 2007) of short 
technical articles of relevance to Safety Professionals. This newsletter reaches well over 2,500 
safety professionals including our Middle East Chapter and ASSE's Society Board of Directors 
and Society Staff. These six quarterly issues (the last one being January 2008 as of the date of 
this report) can be produced upon request. 
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A complete list of my cases is available upon request or will be provided if part of the 
requirements of this action. Those cases I have provided depositions or trial testimony are 
separately listed again at the end (bottom) of the full list. 
Initial Tasking: 
Briefly, I have been asked to evaluate, assess and to provide my professional opinions on the 
circumstances, premises and other details leading to a determination of causal findings 
surrounding the March 20th, 2006 stairway-related fall injury involving Mr. James Phillips. This 
report will outline my factual findings, conclusions and final opinion based on the investigation. 
Preparatory and Site Work 
1. Analysis and forensics data was collected during four site visits on June 22nd, 2006, July 
20th, 2006 and February 7th - 8th, 2008. Detailed measurements were taken along with 
photos of the incident scene. Also noted the elevator location inside the structure at 1406 
North Main, Meridian. 
2. Elevator Drawings and other sources (Building Department and the City Clerk) were 
examined or contacted for building occupancy and building code dates in effect during 
relevant periods. The City of Meridian adoption of the building codes are: 
• 1982 UBC - Adopted September 20th , 1982 
• 1985 UBC - Adopted September 3rd , 1985 
• 2003 IBC - Adopted December 17th, 2002 
• 2006 IBC - Adopted June 28th, 2005 
3. In addition to the above I have read the depositions, affidavits or transcripts of Plaintiff's 
experts Dr. Richard Gill and Mr. Thomas R. Fries. 
4. The following is a summary (i.e., long titles may be abbreviated) list of documents, other 
depositions and material including black & white copies of stairway photos taken the day of 
the Incident, March 20, 2006 that I have reviewed to date. 
Depositions: 
Angela Sisco; Dan Phillips; Dr. Beaver (2); Dr. Green; Gale Phillips; Jim Phillips; Ken 
Doolittle; Milt Erhart; Randy Jenks; Wanda Jenks. 
Other documents or materials: (Not in any order and Miscellaneous motions, notices of 
depositions, court proceedings and similar will not be detailed here.) 
Plaintiffs pre-Trial Memorandum; Defendants witness list; Elevator Material list; Fax from 
Mr. Erhart to Anna Brown dated 4/21/06 on some railing and step billing data and 
information on railing and the precast cement steps and it's tested load factors from Trex 
Company and Diamond Concrete Stairs; Plaintiff's Answers & responses to Plaintiffs 
Initial Discovery Requests; Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Answers and responses to 
Defendants First Set of Discovery Requests; 
5. Mr. Phillip's Injuries noted by the treating paramedics and Doctors were reviewed. 
3 
My Opinions and Conclusions: 
I have condensed my opinions with appropriate forensics support, human factor assessments, 
or explanations, other relevant data or testimony leading to my professional conclusions in the 
matter, as follows: 
1. The Stair Treads modified in 2003 were not the proximate or actual cause of Mr. Jim 
Phillips Fall of March 20, 2006: 
a. The Stair Treads installed by Mr. Erhart were in compliance with building and Idaho 
codes as bu/leted here. These codes include; The UBC 1982 and 1985 codes; The 
IBC 2000, 2003 and 2006 codes; and Idaho Code, Part 071. 
• Riser height between 4" - 7" or 7 Y2" (UBC 1982-1985 and IBC 2000-2006, 
Idaho Code) 
• Run Length,::: 10" (UBC 1982) and.::: 11" (UBC 1985, IBC 2000-2006, 
Idaho Code) 
• Maximum Riser variation::: 3/8th inch (0.375 inch), meets all codes listed 
here 
• Maximum Run variation::: 3/8th inch (0.375 inch), meets all codes listed 
here 
• Strength tested and passed in accordance with the UBC 1997 code per the 
January 26th, 2000 letter from Chopelas & Associates, Engineering 
Services of Arlington, WA. 
Notes: UBC is the abbreviation for the Uniform Building Code 
IBC is the abbreviation for the International Building Code 
The 1982 & 1982 codes cover the original building date. 
The 2003 IBC code was adopted on December 1 ih, 2002 
The 2006 IBC code was adopted on June 28h, 2005. 
The Rise/Run and variations thereof are critical safety dimensions 
b. The Pre-Cast Stair Tread and mounting bracket used by Mr. Erhart replaced a less 
safe worn carpet-covered wooden stair material and in my opinion, because of the 
replacement tread characteristics, further support the statement above (item 1) as 
bulle ted here: 
• The total weight of each 42" wide concrete tread is 105 - 107 pounds 
• It is supported by a steel "L - shaped" bracket covering 68% of the width 
• The steel bracket is mounted approximately Y2 to 1 Y2 inch behind the lower 
part of the tread nosing's. With a ratio of about Y2 - 1 Y2 to the overall tread 
length of 11 % inches, a vertical tipping force of hundreds of pounds would be 
required to cause the tread to "tip forward, even if there were no bolts in 
place. 
• Because of the high Coefficient of Friction (0.8 - 1.0) of dry cement with 
rubber soled foot wear (e.g. tennis shoes), it is very unlikely in my opinion 
that slippage of the descending foot where the ball of the foot is centered 




• The pre-cast concrete step (tread) does not flex. It was tested to strength 
standards as noted above including meeting the 300 pounds over any 4 
square inches (e.g. 2" x 2"); the 100 pounds per square foot and a concrete 
strength tested to withstand an applied load of 4000 pounds/square-inch 
• With at least two (2) of the four (4) bolts attaching one of the two steel 
support brackets for each step (tread), in my professional opinion and 
considering the weight of the tread, movement from normal pedestrian use is 
not going to allow step movement. 
• Based on the swore testimony of Mr. Erhart and lack of evidence or testimony 
to the contrary only a few of the 20 steps (treads) had only two bolts fastening 
a step (tread) to the bracket while the majority had all four bolts in place. 
There is no evidence that any step (tread) had only one bolt attaching the 
step. 
• Close up photographic evidence of lower steps shows no physical evidence 
(scratches, etc.) of horizontal movement expected if steps (treads) had 
moved under a load such as a large man pushing off as he descended. 
c. In my opinion, the conclusion that Mr. Jim Phillips fall was not caused by faulty steps 
(treads) is further supported by the following deposition testimonies. 
Note that any "quote" is not necessarily a literal duplication but may be shortened for 















Jim Phillips: P23/L23; "I don't know why I fell." 
Angela Sisco: P10/L 17-18; Q&A, any problems noticed, no I don't have the 
skills. 
Angela Sisco: P11/L3-5; did you ever complain to anybody ... no. 
Angela Sisco: P18/L 19-25; step looked a little out of kilter. (Dan and Angela's 
photo later shows this to be step 10 from the bottom or the step immediately 
below the middle landing, yet al/ 10 steps are properly aligned in descending 
order. Use photo showing Dan Phillips shoes.) 
Angela Sisco: P22/L22-25 and P23/L 1-2; Never noticed any loose steps. 
Angela Sisco: P19/L8; I don't use handrails 
Dan Phillips: P11/L 11-20; used 3-4 months before fall, no problems noted. 
Dan Phillips: P17 /L 19-25 and P18/L 1-7; Dan did not notice problems before 
but on day of fall had a general observation that he felt there was some 
"rocking." (Number and location not noted.) 
Dan Phillips: P24/L9-19; one step seems ajar. Appears to be a misalignment 
with the middle landing rather than adjacent steps. Note photo with Jim's 
shoe showing. 
Randy Jenks: P11/L 10-25; Saw nothing wrong with stairway 
Randy Jenks: P21/L 1-25; Checked stairs next day, having a background in 
the building industry, everything looked fine. P21 and 22, did not use 
handrail. 
Randy Jenks: P22/L 1-16; Observed no defects and steps seemed solid. 
Randy Jenks: P29 & 30/L22-25 & L 1-15; No step (tread) moved, not one. 
Ken Doolittle: P10/L9-25; Saw Jim on concrete off the steps face down and 
thought to check for objects or slippery issues. Saw no problems and 
observed steps (treads) were in alignment. Note, it was Ken who found and 
returned box Jim was carrying back to Angela and Jim' office. 
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• Ken Doolittle: P12/L22; no idea how this happened 
• Ken Doolittle: P14/L 1-7; went up and down stairs, observed no problem and 
steps (treads) were not out of alignment. 
• Ken Doolittle: P17/L 1-7; I specifically looked at the stairs. It was more than a 
passing glance. No, I'm not an Engineer nor a Safety Engineer. 
2. In my opinion. Mr. Jim Phillips fell nearer the bottom several steps as opposed to 
falling near the top just past the middle landing. This is based upon the following 
bulleted items. 
a. Randy Jenks: P17/L 1-7; Saw him first from about 30 feet away lying at the foot of the 
stairs. Mr. Phillips was lying prone on the ground, face down, feet about two (2) or 
three (3) feet away from the steps. One arm was under him, the other on top, one 
leg was twisted and he wasn't unconscious but not conscious either. (This was the 
stair bottom at ground leve/.) 
b. Ken Doolittle: P1 0/L9-18; Saw Mr. Phillips face down on the concrete at the bottom 
of the stairs, he was not on the stairs. There appeared to be blood on the concrete 
near his head. 
c. Ken Doolittle: P11/L3-16; Face down, on stomach, head turned, believes head was 
turned to the left. 
d. Ken Doolittle: P11/L 11-14; Mr. Phillips feet were a step or two away from the bottom 
of the stairs. 
e. Ken Doolittle: P11/L 19-25; there was a box lying next to Jim to his right and forward 
of him about an arms length from his right shoulder. 
(Note: In my opinion, had Mr. Phillips fallen near the top of the lower landing, the 
box, being very light weight would have been unlikely to have stayed right next to 
him while falling up to a distance of about 9' down the stairs and beyond.) 
f. In my opinion, based upon a Human Factors and forensics assessment Mr. Phillips 
could not have fallen from the top of the staircase for the following bulleted items. 
• In a sudden and unexpected fall, because his size (6' 5" and over 300 
pounds), Mr. Phillips could not have reached the bottom of the stairs in a 
forward fall without rolling or tumbling and this is not supported by his injury 
locations which were left-dominate. A forward sliding fall would have created 
more frontal trauma than was indicated by the medical reports and he would 
not have reached the stair bottom as witnessed above by, in effect, sliding. 
• Mr. Phillips would have sustained impact and acceleration stresses to 
multiple parts of the body causing any number of associated trauma 
indicators of varying degrees, based on my years of similar investigations and 
medical reports. Joints, back, neck, wrists and similar areas would be 
particularly vulnerable to acceleration forces even if direct contact with the 
surface did not occur. These gravity-induced forces can reach several 
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hundred inch-pounds and likely account for some of the pain experienced 
such as his neck and back pain. 
• The injuries I base part of my opinion on are summarized here and the 
sources for this information lies in the summary provided by Dr. Greens 
"Forensic Neuropsychological Examination Report" February 11-12, 2008. 
(Note, the following list offers a simplified description of Mr. Phillips primary 
injuries as extracted from Dr. Greens report starting around pages 13 - 15 of 
43 and is not intended to reflect a word-for-word recap.) 
1. Contusion to forehead, facial abrasions to the left side of face & hand. 
2. Closed head injury left zygomatic/frontal area of head 
3. Left elbow pain. 
4. Left leg numbness. 
5. Left wrist sprain 
6. Anterior part of left thigh. 
7. Left hip pain 
8. Left foot felt like it was asleep 
9. Abrasion to left cheek 
3. In my opinion. the handrail, despite its recognizable defects of a non-code, non-
graspable configuration. was not a factor in Mr. Phillips fall. This is based upon the 
following bulleted items. 
a. When the speed (velocity) of the fall is estimated using Mr. Phillips height of 6' 5" and 
a weight of 300 pounds and assuming that his head strikes first (assumes, for 
simplicity a rigid body model) his head speed would approach 24.8 fps. In short, his 
head would travel about six (6) feet in close to 0.25 seconds. If his hand was not 
already on the lower handrail which was fastened, there would be no chance to 
arrest his fall. [Speed, using the head as first to strike = the square root of 3gh.] 
b. Even if Mr. Phillips could have caught the handrail within 2 feet from fall initiation, his 
speed (velocity) using a rigid body model, would be 13.9 fps. In order to stop his fall 
with a hand on the rail, he would have to exert a counter force of around 900 foot-
pounds. It would have been impossible to have arrested his fall regardless of 
handrail design at this stage. 
4. Based upon the above combined work, testimony and physical findings, I can only 
conclude that Mr. Phillips had an unfortunate "mis-step" while carrying a small box of 
trash in the following manner. In my opinion, after examining the above, the cause of 
his fall must be diagnosed as a mis-step probably resulting from the "ball" of the left 
foot overstepping the stair nosing causing a rapid toe-down movement with an 
interrupted trailing right foot preventing any recovery. My reasoning is expanded as 
follows: 
a. A sudden fall as described by item 4, would have resulted in a very rapid forward 




b. Based upon Mr. Erhart being right-handed (Dr. Green report page 4 of 43) and 
evidence showing that the box he was carrying landed on his right side above and 
next to his right shoulder, it can be concluded with a high likelihood of being correct 
that he had the box in his right hand or under his right arm. In most falls I have 
investigated and studied over time, the normal reflex is to try and bring the 
unencumbered other arm forward in an attempt to break the fall. This motion woUld 
account for the pattern of left-dominant injuries described above including the left 
wrist. 
c. In my opinion, no simple tread movement could account for this combination of 
injuries and there is no evidence establishing the lower treads failing in any way as to 
create this type of fall. 
d. The step reported as loose by Ken Doolittle (Pages 5 & 6/L 17-25 and 1-25 was the 
first step (Erhart, pages 14, 21 & 22) and this was not the step that could have 
caused this fall and subsequent injuries. None of the treads were reported as mis-
aligned after the fall except step (tread) 10 at the top and it is in alignment with the 
other 9 treads. The slight angle in the Angela Sisco and Dan Phillips photo (feet 
showing) is due to the landing to step (tread) viewing angle and a small error of 
misalignment between the landing and the stair of a few degrees (greater than 90 
degrees). 
5. A possible contributing factor leading to his mis-step and fall is the Sun angle which on 
March 20th, 2006 would have come into view as he reached near the bottom of the stairs. 
• On that day at 1 :00 PM, the sun would have been 46 degrees above the horizon at 
an azimuth (bearing) from magnetic north of +167 degrees which would be very 
close to being in a position of his forward looking vision field as he descended. 
My final conclusion based upon my experience, training, education and the above 
factors, is that Mr. Phillips experienced a mis-step resulting in his fall and subsequent 
injuries. Furthermore, that this fall cannot be attributed to the stair treads nor code 
violations since these do not bear on the incident as a contributing causal factor. 
Furthermore, that this fall cannot be blamed on a lack of a hazard analysis or a poor 
safety program, loose guardrails or lack of a standard of care. 
Completed this day, February 15th , 2009 
Earnest F. Harper, CSP, DABFE, DACFET, CFC 
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Q. On the day that I1t to 
. Erhan's building. were there any of the steps 
\vould move'? 
There were. There wasn't 
signitlcanr motion in them because they all had 
bolts in (hem. But some of the bolts were not 
sulficicntly secured that you could feel some and 
sce Sl)l11C motii)l1. but 1101 significant. 
Q. What kind of motion? 
I 1 U Y ()u could see motion forward-back 
I 1 1 clI1d up-down. botb. 
12 Q. SO 3 wobbly motion? 
1_; A. Yeah. That's a good description. 
Q. Is there any way to calculate or 
tell huw E1S[ Jim Phillips was i~llling when he 
rell down the stairs? 
You can make some assumpTions and 
h .. :gin to do that, but it's a very sophisticated 
calculation. 
The reason I say that is, when you 
study physics. the first thing you lcal11 is high 
schou! pbysics. simple physics. And you modd 
things in the real world as what we call a 
p~lniclc. something that has no dimensions. 
Obviuusly. that's nol a very good 
49 
mode! It)r tbe human body because we're made up oC 
multiple moving parts. So the next level up in 
physics is you model it as a rigid body. So you 
would treat the person as one rigid object that 
has a height. And that becomes more sophisticated 
6 nnd requires calculus. 
7 
i 10 





The next level up is then to take 
Jinks of the body, the bottom half ofthe leg. 
upper hal r of the leg. torso. arms, head. That 
r;:q uin:s even more sophistication. 
So, to be able to predict the speed 
at 'vvhich someone j~ills. you can't treat it as a 
particle. People aren't a particle. You have tl) 
havc it as multiple links of a body connected 
together. and thl'l1 you have to make assumptions of 
what's called forward motion -- l()rward motion, as 
.. 17 well as vertica1l1lotion going down the steps, as 
j K wcJ] as rotational motion. How mLlch is the body 
j l/ starling tu rotate or move bel(m.~ it then begins 
20 10 j~dl? It's very compkx. 
::: 1 Q. \Vhat aboLlt issues of friction, if 
there's varioLls parts touching other--
.23 A. That's why I said it gets wry 
:>1 complicated. If a hand gets out on the handrail, 
:::s where is it'! How nlr out? What's the friction 
50 
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J between handrail') It's [1n 
2 extraordinarily compkx prucess. 
3 Q. Y OU c~m't do it simply? 
:+ A. You can't do it withollt a 
5 and some pretty sophisticated modding. 
6 software you can buy tbm docs thal. 
7 Q. \Vould it be scientifically 
8 supportable to do it in this case'! 
() A. 1'11\..'1\:\ [\)\1 
J U terms of the rate ~lt 
II angular motion. 
lhe bodv is !1lcn' .1 
12 '1 here's .i liSl no \va) could begin to 
Q. Ifv,'l' 




A. All right. 
Q. One your 
A. Yes. sir. it is. 
Q. And it's a Llir 
lU\llL:r 
19 in there as it was the day you \vere there? 
20 A. It sure is. 
21 Q. Would it help you tc!lthc 
Y) about the stairwell \OUf 
23 A. Yes, sir. 






MR. CANTRiU : :2; 
MR. HOLlER: -1.. 
MR. CANTRI ,: It 
MR. BOLL.ER: Y 
6 band writing. 
1 i1\ (' 
one to 
7 MR. CANTRJI.L: I have 110 
is that, Your Honor. 
9 ITlE COURT: :21-L will be ,:d11liltl~cL 
10 MR. HOL7ER: Thank you. Your 1 
1 J (Plaintiff,,' Exhibit :21-L admitkd.) 
J2 Q. (BY MR. HOLZER) Dr. Gill. can 
13 explain (0 the jury just what you were. tu 
I-I show with Exllibil 2] -L? 
J'i A. W<:lL it's bard to see on this 
J 6 picture on the scn:eil. All 1 was c1nins wus 
17 a picture from duwl1 bdow 
I i) subject stairway. because I think it \(ILl 
19 gain perspective. 
20 Tbe Jel1-h,mci corner is 1J 
21 that vvc've been talking abuLlt v'iith the open 
'Y) that's too wide in its cross-section. It's too 
11 
23 low. As you come around that cornel'. tread !. _. 
24 and 3 -- tread three down is seven Up,Jl}{l{\ Vit.Q 2 
25 bottom. This is the one that is cockL4,.l\J.\R4"t? 
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PLAINTIFFS ' SUPPLEMENTAL 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 




Plaintiffs hereby request the following Supplemental Jury Instructions attached 
hereto as exhibit A 
Plaintiffs' pleading attaching their requested jury instructions filed October 14, 
2008, mistakenly referred to the life expectancy as IDJI2d 9.33, when it should have 
been IDJI2d 9.15. Requested Instruction No. 18 identifies the proper citation. 
DA TED this itil day of April, 2009. 
HOLZER+EDWARDS, CHTD . 
. Holzer, for the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ? 10 day of August, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David Cantrill 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 







PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
There is evidence that some of Plaintiffs' medical expenses were paid by workmen's 
compensation insurance. Pursuant to Idaho Law,Plaintiffs are required to repay the workmen's 
compensation insurance for the benefit amounts paid by it out of the amount you award, if any. 
Idaho Code §72-223 
GIVEN _____ _ 
REFUSED ____ _ 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER ____ _ 
000286 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
There is evidence that some of Plaintiffs' medical bills were paid by Plaintiffs' health 
insurer. Plaintiffs are required to repay their health insurer for amounts determined by this court 
to have been paid by it, out ofthe amount you award, if any. 
Idaho Code §6-1606 
See, Boll v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 334, 339-40 (2004) 
GIVEN ____ _ 
REFUSED ____ _ 




PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
A defendant in an injury lawsuit takes the plaintiff as he finds him. The fact that a 
plaintiff's circumstances prior to the injury were challenging does not lessen defendant's 
responsibility, if any. 
Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665 (1967); Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487 (1949) 
GIVEN -----
REFUSED -----
MODIFIED ___ _ 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER -----
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Case No. CV PI 0707453 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Cantrill, 
Skinner, Sullivan & King, and files this Response Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine. 
1. Timeliness: 
The court's ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make strategic 
decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be presented. Davidson v. 
Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Ct.App.1986), partially overruled on other 
grounds, 114 Idaho 107,753 P.2d 1253 (1987). (emphasis added). ::0 -Cl -2 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine - 1 0002~ 
Plaintiff has failed to properly place this Motion before the court in a timely manner. 
Motions in Limine allow the parties and the Court to address evidentiary issues prior to trial, not 
after their experts have testified and opened the door wide open to the relevance of particular 
allegations. Motions in Limine are not tools to be used a day before the end of the trial, after all 
Plaintiff's experts have testified. 
Plaintiffs were given the expert report from Earnest Harper on February 17,2009. The 
calculations attacked by the Plaintiff in their Motion in Limine were in that report and have not 
changed since that date. Plaintiffs have had more than ample time to address the basis for the 
conclusions in Mr. Harper's report and only now move to exclude his testimony after their own 
witnesses have testified extensively to the hand rails and their conclusions thereon. 
It must also be noted that the Plaintiff has only moved to exclude some of the testimony 
of Mr. Harper after this court has excluded any proffer of testimony from Dr. Gill which was not 
disclosed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is essentially asking this court to operate as a rebuttal to 
Mr. Harper's testimony given they have failed to disclose such from Dr. Gill. Using a Motion in 
Limine tiled late in trial is plainly an attempt to shield them from the testimony which they failed 
to rebut through discovery. It is an improper use of the Motion in Limine to collaterally attack 
this court's ruling after their own failure to abide by Idaho's rules of discovery. Given 
evidentiary issues are well within the discretion of the trial court, the Plaintiff' Motion in Limine 
should be denied outright on timeliness and the interests of justice. 
2. The relevance of the handrails has been squarely introduced by the Plaintiff, and as 
such, the door is wide open to whether or not the rails contributed to the accident. 
When presented with a motion in limine, a trial court has the authority to deny the motion 
and \vait until trial to determine if the evidence should or should not be excluded. Kirk v. Ford 
l'v1otor Co., 141 Idaho 697,702, 116 P.3d 27, 32 (2005). 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine - 2 000290 
[A] motion in limine is based on an alleged or anticipated factual 
scenario, [and] without the benefit of all the other actual evidence 
which will be admitted at trial, the trial judge will not always be 
able to make an informed decision regarding the admissibility of 
the evidence prior to the time the evidence is actually presented at 
trial. 
Id. at 702, 116 P.2d at 32. Given we are already in trial, and the Plaintiffs experts have testified 
repeatedly to the relevance of the handrails, and Dr. Gill's opinions as to the cause of the 
accident, the door is wide open on testimony addressing whether or not the handrails contributed 
to the fall. As such, the only question before this Court is whether Mr. Harper can lay a 
foundation for the opinion that the rails did not contribute to the fall. 
3. Mr. Harper has applied a sound scientific basis to the determination that the rail 
was not a factor in Mr. Phillips accident. 
The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). Rule 702 of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise." Slvallow v. Emergency Medicine a/Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592. 
67 PJd 68, 71 (2003). 
When the expert's opmIOn is based upon scientific knowledge, 
there must likewise be a scientific basis for that opinion. If the 
reasoning or methodology underlying that opinion is not 
scientifically sound, then the opinion will not assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 
The foundation for the admission of opinion testimony based upon 
scientific knowledge includes both that the witness is an expert in 
the field and that there is a scientific basis for the expert's opinion. 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintifrs Motion in Limine - 3 000291 
Id. at 592-593, 67 P.3d at 71-72 (2003)(citations omitted). Because the trial court has the 
discretion to determine whether a proper foundation has been laid for the admission of expert 
testimony, the court has discretion to determine both whether the expert is qualified as an expert 
in the field and whether there is a scientific basis for the expert's testimony. Id. at 593, 67 P.3d 
at 72. 
The PlaintitT cites extensively to federal law on the admissibility of expert opinions. 
However, the Daubert standards have not been adopted by Idaho's courts and there is plain 
guidance from Swallow on the issue of laying a proper foundation for scientific knowledge. If 
the process is sound and the witness qualified, the evidence is admissible. 
The Plaintitl concedes the Mr. Harper is qualified to opine, but attacks that there is no 
scientific basis for his testimony. He then argues that because Dr. Gill says so, Mr. Harper's 
testimony is \vithout foundation. This is exactly what a jury is intended to do. 
Mr. Harper's calculations involve principles of physics which are beyond dispute: 
gravity, mass, and acceleration. Mr. Harper's calculation considers only the distance of Mr. 
Phillips head to the ground. As such, it does not speculate as to any greater distance than is 
necessary to reach his conclusion. He applies the simple formula of what speed the body would 
be travelling with the mass of 300 pounds at two feet from fall initiation and at impact. The 
scientific foundation for his opinion is plainly stated, appropriately calculated, and admissible. 
4. There is no direct evidence as to the actual cause of the accident in this case. As 
such, the sun's position at the time of the accident is plainly relevant and was 
property disclosed to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff argues that because Mr. Harper stated that the angle of the sun would have 
been directly in Mr. Phillips face as he descended the stairs was only a "possible" cause of the 
accident, that it is inadmissible. See PlaintitT's Motion in Limine, p. 10. Plaintiff presents no 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine - 4 000292 
authority for his position and fails to address the fact that given there were no eye witnesses to 
the accident and Mr. Phillips does not recal! the cause, the only testimony in the record addresses 
"possible causes" of the accident. Mr. Harper's calculation of the location of the sun is specitic, 
detailed, relevant, and with a sound foundation in scientific certainty. It is therefore admissible. 
5. Conclusion: 
The Plaintiff's Motion in Limine is improperly tiled as we are in trial and well beyond 
the presentation of their case. They are asking this court to limit testimony based on their own 
failure to disclose Dr. Gill's opinions. They have had nearly two months to address the 
testimony and have only challenged such near the end of their own presentation of evidence. 
Notwithstanding the improper form and purpose, the testimony of Mr. Harper is squarely 
relevant, they have conceded his qualifications, and his conclusions are based on the sound 
principles of gravity, mass, and acceleration. Given the court has excluded Dr. Gill's testimony 
addressing Mr. Harper, it should not now exclude Mr. Harper's testimony based on Dr. Gill's 
own testimony. 
Rulings on motions in limine are squarely within this Court's discretion and given the 
improper form, purpose, and arguments, the PlaintitT's should be denied in whole. 
Lk 
DATED This ~ day of_~r-=---=-_' 2007. 
ANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
B y:---loJtt;--::::::..;w:------>oL-...--'-"'--------
David . Cantril!, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintifrs Motion in Limine - 5 000293 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 7, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~AVID NAVARRO, lerk 
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Case No. CV-PI-07-07453 
James M. Phillips and Gale Phillips 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MILT E. ERHART and MARY C. ERHART 
Defendants. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 







INTRODUCTION TO TRIAL PROCEDURE 
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you may 
I 
I be ul1t~tmiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and 1 am going to 
outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed. 
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us. 
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. Ms. Kennedy, the deputy clerk of 
court, marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The baildY 
II will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals aner this case has 
been submitted to you for decision. The court reporter, Ms. Anderson, will keep a verbatim 
I, accollnt of all matters of record during the trial. 
iI 
The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and, perhaps, one or two alternate jurors 
(rol11 among you ladies and gentlemen. 
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will introduce 
I you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit there are two plaintiffs, 
James M. Phillips and Gale Phillips. The plaintiffs are represented by their lawyers, Kurt Holzer 
and John Edwards. The party against whom a lawsuit is brought is called the "defendanL" The 
defendants are Milt E. Erhart and Mary C. Erhart, in this suit. The defendants are represented by 
their lawyer, David W. "Tony" Cantrill. 
This is a civil case involving a claim for personal injuries. Plaintiffs allege James M. 
Phillips was injured in a fall down stairs owned and maintained by Defendants. The Phillips claim 
Ithe 1~!I1 was caused through the negligence of Defendants in the construction and maintenance of 
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the stairs. The Erharts deny any fault and claim that Mr. Phillip's injuries resulted from his own 
negligence. 
A trial starts with the selection of a jury. The purpose of the law is to obtain a fair and 
impartial jury. The Court and the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether 
you have any inforn1ation concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which either of the 
la\vyers believes might cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or 
the other. The questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but 
they are not intended to embarrass you. 
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do understand 














Now that the jury is selected and sworn, I will read to you some of your instructions. 
Then, tbe attomeys will make opening statements; or the defendant's attomey may, ifhe 
\\ishes, save his opening statement until later. The opening statement is intended to inform 
you about the party's case, and what he claims, and what evidence he intends to produce for 
you. The opening statement is not evidence, however. 
Then each side offers evidence to support his claim or defense. The plaintifTs, Mr. and 
\lrs. Phillips, proceed first and offer all their evidence on their claims. Then the defendants, 
Mr. and Mrs. Erhart, proceed to offer all their evidence on their defense. Thereafter, rebuttal 
evidence may be offered. 
After all of the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your instructions. In tbose 
instructions I will tell you what tbe law is and will tell you what you will have to decide. 
Then the trial concludes with the arguments of the lawyers for both sides. 








The jury instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law that applies to 
this case. You will have them with you during your deliberations. Your duties are to dctermme 
the j~lcts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the 
case. In so doing, you must follow these instructions. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in 
your del iberations. Faithful perforn1ance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of 
justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidcnce consists 0 f the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At 
limes during the trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to 
;ll1swer it or to an oiTered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the 
question called for testimony that was not admissible or when the exhibit itselfwas inadmissible. 
In reaching your decision, you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what 
the answer or exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit 
reccivcd, I may instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you 
dismiss it from your minds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence was 
inadmissible only after it had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, you may not 
consider this testimony or exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings are 
intended by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence in this case. 
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The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are intended to help you 
in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but they are not themselves evidencc. 
I f any argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it. However, 
there arc two cxceptions to this rule: (1) An admission of fact by one attorney is binding on his 
party; and (2) Stipulations of fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must deternline what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and 
background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you 
believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the 
considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the interest, bias or 
15 
prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and appearance of the witness 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony; the opportunity that the witness had to 
observe the facts about which he testified; the contradiction, if any, of a witness's testimony by 
other evidence; and any statements made by the witness at other times that are inconsistent 
with his present testimony. You will not be given a transcript of the testimony or copies of 
any deposition testimony admitted during the trial, so it is important that you listen carefully. 








During your deliberations at the end of the trial, you will have the exhibits which have 
bccn admitted. In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: thc 
circumstances under which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit 




As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each party is entitled 
to your full and fair consideration. 
As jurors and officers of this court you must obey the following instructions at any 
time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when you 
leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone else during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have heard 
all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final arguments. You 
may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is submitted to you tor 
your (lecision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do not let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does talk 
about it, tell them you are ajuror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to the 
bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors about 
vv'hat has happened. 
Third, during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
\vitnesses. By this, 1 mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to 
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are entitled 
to expect from you as jurors. 
23 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside of 
the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an 





I or any other source of infonnation, including computers, cell phones, or any other electronic 
I 
devices, unless I specifically authorize you to do so. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or television 
broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented in court 
and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have happened. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Certain evidence may be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled to 
neither more nor less consideration than you would give the same testimony had the witness 




INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _s=~_ 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to 
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average 
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the 
damage award or percentage of negligence. 
000307 
INSTRUCTION NO. _~b~_ 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
000308 
INSTRUCTION NO. _""'....;..7 __ 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide. 
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
000309 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---,S'",--_ 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _.....'lCJ,--_ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
000311 
INSTRUCTION NO. ____ 1_0 __ 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 
\vould do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. II 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
000313 
INSTRUCTION NO. --:...I-=)~ 
It was the duty of both plaintiffs and defendants, before and at the time of the occurrence, 
to use ordinary care for the safety of both themselves and each other, and for both their own and 
each other's property. 
000314 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1.3 
The owner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing persons on the 
premises to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
000315 
INSTRUCTION NO. _1--0-<1_ 
The owner owes a duty to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition known to 
the owner, or which, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have been discovered. 
000316 
INSTRUCTION NO. I~ 
The owner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in inspection of the premises for the 
purpose of discovering dangerous conditions. 
000317 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---,/~',---
There was a certain statute in force in the State ofIdaho at the time of the of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
Any system or method of construction to be used shall be based on 
a rational analysis in accordance with well-established principles of 
mechanics. Such analysis shall result in a system which provides a 
complete load path capable of transferring all loads and forces from 
their point of origin to the load resisting elements. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
000318 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
There was a certain statute in force in the State ofIdaho at the time of the of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
All buildings and portions thereof shall be designed and 
constructed to sustain, ... all dead loads and all other loads 
specified in this chapter or elsewhere in this code. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
000319 
INSTRUCTION NO. (g 
There was a certain statute in force in the State ofIdaho at the time of the of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
The handgrip portion of handrails shall be not less than 1 % inches 
nor more than 2 inches in cross-sectional dimension or the shape 
shall provide an equivalent gripping surface. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The words "willful or reckless misconduct" when used in these instructions and when 
applied to the allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean 
intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have 
known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a 
high degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
000321 
INSTRUCTION NO. ;;... 0 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. 
000322 
INSTRUCTION NO. ;) { 
If the jury decides the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendants, the jury must 
deternline the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff1 s] for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant['s/s'] negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
4. The loss of consortium occaisioned to the non-injured 
spouse. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received 
and expenses incurred as a result of the injury and the 
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably 
certain and necessary to be required in the future; 
2. The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of 
the injury; 
3. The present cash value of the future earning capacity lost 
because of the injury, taking into consideration the earning 
power, age, health, life expectancy, mental and physical 
abilities, habits, and disposition of the plaintiffs, and any 
other circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Whether the plaintiffs have proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 
000323 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ ~ 
"Loss of consortium" means the loss of the aid, care, comfort, society, companionship, 
services, protection and conjugal affection of an injured spouse. 
000324 
INSTRUCTION NO. ;J.3 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the 
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable 
rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the 
future damages will be incurred. 
000325 
INSTRUCTION NO. ;) 7" 
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a male age 39 is 42.7 years. 
This figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length 
of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data 
may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, 
including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities. 
000326 
INSTRUCTION NO. ;) s= 
There is evidence that some of Plaintiffs' medical expenses were paid by workmen's 
compensation and other insurance. If you determine Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages, 
you are not to consider insurance payments in your calculation of damages. It is for the Court to 
detem1ine the effect of any such payments on damages that may be awarded. 
000327 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that the plaintiff was negligent in any amount and that his negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injuries he sustained, then the total amount of damages you find were 
sustained by him will be reduced by the percentage of negligence you choose to attribute to him 
as causing the injury. Thus, in reaching your determination as to the amount of damages that 
plaintifT incurred, you should not reduce the amount of the award in any way for any portion of 
negligence you may find attributable to him. 
If you find that the plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff will receive no compensation for his injuries. 
000328 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2..1-
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This 
fonn consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. There are individual questions about 
the negligence or lack of negligence of each party and other specific questions about the amount 
of damages. In answering each question, you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in 
the case, that your choice of answers is more probably true than not true. I will read the verdict 
fom1 to you now. 
"We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was the defendant Milt Erhart negligent, and if so, was this negligence a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [--.-J No[_] 
If you answered this question "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and 
advise the Bailiff If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 2: Was the plaintiff James Phillips negligent, and if so, was this negligence 
a proximate cause of his own injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [--.-J No [_1 
If you answered "Yes" to question No.2, answer Question No.3. If you answered "No" 
to Question No.2, then you will not answer question No.3, but skip to Question No.4. 
Instruction for Question No.3: You will reach this question if you have found that the 
defendant and the plaintiff were negligent, which negligence caused the injuries to the plaintiff. 
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In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in tenns of a percentage. As 
to each party determine the percentage of fault for that party and enter the percentage on the 
appropriate line. Your total percentages must equal 100%. 
Question No.3: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Defendant, Milt Erhart % 
To the Plaintiff, James Phillips % 
Total must equal 100% 
If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to the defendant, you are done. Sign the verdict and advise the 
Baili ff If the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff is less than the percentage of fault you 
assigned to the defendant, answer the next question. 
Question No.4: Were the actions of Milt Erhart which were a proximate cause of James 
Phillips' injuries willful or reckless? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes [-.-J No [-.-J 
Question No.5: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a 
result of the accident? 
Answer to Question No.5: We assess plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
A. James Phillips economic damages, 
as defined in the Instructions: 
B. J ames Phillips non-economic damages, 
as defined in the Instructions: 
2 
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c. Gale Phillips non-economic damages, 
as defined in the Instructions: " 
You should include in your answer to Question No. 5 the total amount of all monetary 
damages which you find from the evidence were sustained by Plaintiffs. 
Finally, you should sign the verdict form as expalined in another instruction. 
000331 
3 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equaUy important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
000332 
INSTRUCTION NO. d} 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
An appropriate fonn of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict fonn, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions 
on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you 
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on 
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, 
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who 
wi 11 then return you into open court. 
000333 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the 
sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone 
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is 
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are 
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you 
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about 
your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the 
case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion 
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Case No. CV-PI-07-07453 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was the defendant Milt Erhart negligent, and if so, was this 
negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes No [----.J 
If you answered this question "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and 
advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No.2: Was the plaintiff James Phillips negligent, and if so, was this 
negligence a proximate cause of his own injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [_] No 
If you answered "Yes" to question No.2, answer Question NO.3. If you answered 





























Instruction for Question No.3: You will reach this question if you have found that 
the defendant and the plaintiff were negligent, which negligence caused the injuries to the 
plaintiff. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in tenus of a 
percentage. As to each party detenuine the percentage of fault for that party and enter the 
percentage on the appropriate line. Your total percentages must equal 100%. 
Question No.3: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Defendant, Milt ErhClli % 
To the Plaintiff, James Phillips % 
Total must equal 100% 
If the percc;ntage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the 
percentage of/fault you assigned to the defendant, you are done. Sign the verdict and advise 
the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff is less than the percentage of 
/' 
/ 
f~ft you assigned to the defendant, answer the next question. 
Question No.4: Were the actions of Milt Erhart which were a proximate cause of 
James Phillips' injuries willful or reckless? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes No[_] 
Question No.5: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a 
result of the accident? 
Answer to Question No.5: We assess plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
A. 
B. 
James Phillips economic damages, 
as defined in the Instructions: 
J an1es Phillips non-economic damages, 
as defined in the Instructions: 
000336 
'! 
c. Gale Phillips non-economic damages, 
1 as defined in the Instructions: 
2 
3 DATED this _-"---_ day of April 2009. 
4 
Jennifer Mansfield #4 
Nermin Bobaric #15 
Shellie Marcum #17 
~"fl~ J01lUNelS()l; #20 I -== 
Mich~le Warner #25 
" ~/ 
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Case No. CV PI 0707453 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
vs. 
MILT E. ERHART and MARY C. 
ERHART, 
Defendants. -------------------------------
This matter having been tried before a jury of twelve citizens, the jury having reached its 
determination upon the issues presented to them on the Special Verdict and having found that the 
negligence of Milt Erhart caused damages to the plaintiffs and the actions of Milt Erhart amounted 
to willful or reckless misconduct, and that the economic damages to plaintiff James Phillips were in 
the amount of$546,174.00, and that the non-economic damages to James Phillips were in the 
amount of $562,000.00, and that the non-economic damages to plaintiff Gale Phillips were in the 
amount of$556,200.00, and the verdict having been rendered in open court and affirmed on April 9, 
2009, the parties having previously agreed that any such verdict be reduced by $29,430.53 pursuant 
to Idaho Code section 6-1606, and good cause appearing therefore, 
PLAINTIFFS ARE HEREBY GRANTED JUDGMENT against the Defendants in the total 
amount of One Million Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty Three 
Dollars and Forty Seven Cents ($1,634,943.47), subject to such further additions for any 
appropriate award of costs allowed under Idaho law. 
DATED this l)h day of April, 2009. 
&J~DGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT· 1 
Richard D. Greenwood 
District Judge 000338 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisAday of April 2009, I caused to be served, by the 
methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
David Cantrill ~S. Mail 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King __ Overnight Mail 
PO Box 359 __ Hand delivery 
Boise, ID 83701 Facsimile 
Fax 345-7212 
Kurt Holzer, 
HOLZER. EDWARDS, CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5316 
(208) 386-9119 telephone 
(208) 386-9195 facsimile 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT- 2 
A.s.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand delivery 
Facsimile 
000339 
David W. Cantrill 
ISB #1291 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE 




















Case No. CV PI 0707453 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR REMITTITUR 
COMES NOW, Defendants Milt and Mary C. Erhart, by and through their attorneys of 
record, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
pursuant to Rule 50(b), for the reason that there was not substantial evidence upon which the jury 
could properly find a verdict for special or general damages in the favor of plaintiff. 
And, in the alternative, Defendant Milt and Mary C. Erhart hereby moves this Honorable 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND 
IN THE AL TERNA TIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 




Court for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(I); 59(a)(5); 59(a)(6); and 59(a)(7). 
And, in the alternative, Defendants Milt and Mary Erhart hereby move this Honorable 
Court for an Order of Remittitur, pursuant to Rule 59.1. 
These alternative motions are supported by the Affidavit of David W. Cantrill and the 
Memorandum submitted concurrently herewith. 
Oral argument is ~d pursuant to Rule 7(b )(3). 
Dated this a:1 day of April, 2009. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIV AN & KING 
BY:~~ 
David . C trill, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 27, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
John T. Edwards 
Kurt Holzer 
HOLZER EDWARDS & HARRISON, 
CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, ID 83702-5316 
Attorneys for PlaintiffS 
[] Facsimile 
( ] Hand Delivery 
[Xl u.s. Mail 
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David W. Cantrill, ISB #1291 
Daniel J. Skinner, ISB #7225 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE 




MILT E. ERHART and MARY C. 
ERHART, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. 
CANTRILL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR REMITTITUR 
David W. Cantrill, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendants Milt and Mary Erhart, and I attest to 
the following matters based upon my own personal knowledge. 
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MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR REMITTITUR - I 
(j 
o 
:D -(I") -2 
00034j 
• 
2. I personally tried this case to a jury and was present for all events detailed in this 
Affidavit. 
3. A jury instruction on willful and reckless behavior was given to the jury over my 
objection. 
4. A jury instruction using the "substantial factor" test was given over my objection. The 
"but for" instruction was the appropriate standard. 
5. No evidence was presented to justify the award of $444,720.51 in economic damages. I 
stipulated to the admission of $1 0 1,453.49 in economic damages based upon medical billings 
and proven lost wages. The jury awarded $546,174.00 in economic damages. 
6. The Court ruled upon my Motion in Limine that no evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures would be admissible. 
7. Upon cross examination of Angela Sisco, I asked her if the stairs moved when she 
returned to the scene of the accident in the days following Mr. Phillips injury. 
8. She offered a nonresponsive statement that they had been repaired and that they were no 
longer similar to when the accident occurred. 
9. Plaintiff's counsel then directly inquired of the subsequent remedial measures taken by 
Mr. Erhart. 
10. I objected, and this Court correctly ruled that the door to the remedial measures had not 
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been opened. ~ 
Dated this ~ day of April, 2009. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIV AN & KING 
By: [2JwJaJfl 
David W. Cantrill, of the finn 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ 11" day of April, 2009. 
,/ 
Notary Public for I aho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho I l 
Commission Expires: Dl; 21-2& { 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 27, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
John T. Edwards 
Kurt Holzer 
HOLZER EDWARDS & HARRISON, 
CHARTERED 







Boise, ID 83702-5316 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Q ;£ wft;I:fj/ 
David W. Cantnl 
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David W. Cantrill, ISB #1291 
Daniel J. Skinner, ISB #7225 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIV AN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys tor Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. PHILLIPS and GALE 
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DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR REMITTITUR 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Cantrill, 
Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP and submits this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion For New 
Trial, and in the Alternative, Motion For Remittitur. 
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JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
A. Rule 50(b): Standard for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
A motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("j.n.o.v.") based upon Rule 50(b) is 
treated as simply a delayed motion for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same. 
Quick v. Crane, III Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). The issue to be determined on 
a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Lanham v. Idaho 
Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495,943 P.2d 912, 921 (1997). The motion should be granted only 
where there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached 
and when that conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict. Id. at 495, 943 P.2d at 921. The 
function of aj.n.o.v. is to give the trial court the last opportunity to order the judgment that the 
law requires. Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. 
B. AU economic damages awarded above the evidence presented must be reversed 
because there was no evidence presented to justify the award. 
The jury awarded Mr. Phillips $546,174.00 for economic damages. The hard evidence 
on economic losses totaled $101,453.49 in claimed medical expenses and lost wages. 
StipUlations on evidence set real damages for hospital bills at $84,811.21 and real damages for 
past lost wages at $16,642.28. See Trial Exhibits 9 and 10. Instruction No. 21 states that the 
three factors for economic damages are medical expenses, past lost wages, and future lost 
earning capacity. As such, the remaining $444,720.51 awarded by the jury for economic 
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damages are without any foundation in the evidence presented. 
The award cannot be considered lost future wages. Mr. Phillips testified that he 
continues the very employment he had prior to the accident, that he is comfortable in his 
position, and has lost no wages after returning to full time work. The stipulated lost wages for 
actual time lost from work and the medical expenses were the only evidence before the jury. No 
other witness testified to any economic damages for Mr. Phillips which could justify the 
excessive award. I 
Given there was no testimony or evidence that Mr. Phillips lost future wages in any 
manner, and no other evidence to justify the award, the jury awarded economic damages that are 
entirely unsupported by the record. There is no evidence, much less substantial, that warrants the 
award of $444,720.51 for Mr. Phillips. The motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
should be granted as to the economic damage award as there can be but one conclusion that 
reasonable minds could reach: if a person presents evidence of $1 0 1,453.49 in economic 
damages, still has the exact job they held prior to the accident, and testified themselves that they 
intend to continue with the very employment, there is no evidence of any economic damages 
which could serve as a basis for an award of$546,174.00. 
C. Because no substantial evidence of willful or reckless behavior by Mr. Erhart was 
presented, this Court must overturn the finding by the jury and therefore apply the 
noneconomic damage cap from I.e. § 6-1603. 
The jury found that Mr. Erhart's behavior was willful and reckless based upon his 
installation of stair treads in a commercial office building. This is not supported by the evidence. 
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First, reckless means "actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have 
known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a 
high degree of probability that such harm would actually result." IDJI2.25.2 
Idaho courts have interpreted "willful" and "reckless" and have determined that it refers 
to conduct where the actor "intentionally does or fails to do an act, knowing or having a reason 
to know facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only creates an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involves a high degree of probability that such harm 
would result." Harris v. Idaho, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,847 P.2d 1156, 1160 
(l992)(quoting Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736, 740 (1988)). 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Erhart took any action with both 
the knowledge that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm and a "high degree of 
probability that such a harm would result." Harris, 123 Idaho at 299,847 P.2d at 1160. Because 
there was no evidence presented that Mr. Erhart took any action with a "high degree of 
probability that such a harm would result" there was no substantial evidence in the record which 
could form the basis for a finding that the Mr. Erhart's action were reckless or willful. As such, 
the Court should enter a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict eliminating the finding that Mr. 
Erhart acted willfully or recklessly, and thereby render the verdict subject to Idaho's 
I Mrs. Phillips did testifY without documentation that they were currently incurring $400 per month in prescription 
medications. If the award for $444,720.51 was for that expense, it would cover such for 92 years. 
2 Though the instruction is for "willful and wanton", there does not appear to be a distinction between "reckless" and 
"willful and wanton" in Idaho Law. lOll 2.25. Citing DeGraffv. Wight, 130 Idaho 577, 579, 944 P.2d 712, 714 
(1997)(" .. .intentionally does or fails to do an act, knowing or having reason to know facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only creates unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involves high 
degree of probability that such harm would reSUlt). 
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noneconomic damage cap. 
D. Because there is insufficient evidence to place all the blame on Mr. Erhart, this 
Court must overturn the verdict because the jury failed to apportion liability. 
Plaintiff's counsel opened their case by stating that all evidence as to causation was 
circumstantial. No witness was able to testify as to the known cause of Mr. Phillips' fall. 
Rather, the vast majority of testimony relayed that the stairs were stable and did not move. 
Notwithstanding the great weight of evidence pointing to Mr. Phillips contributing to the fall 
through stumbling of his own accord, the jury apportioned zero negligence to Mr. Phillips. As 
such, substantial evidence does not exist to support a finding of one hundred percent liability for 
Mr. Erhart. 
Proximate cause consists of actual cause and true proximate cause, which is also referred 
to as legal cause. Cramer v. Slater, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 540706, p.4 (2009)(citation omitted). 
In other words, proximate cause "is composed of two elements: cause in fact and scope of legal 
responsibility." ld. "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced 
a particular consequence." ld. 
I.e. § 6-801 requires an apportionment ofliability: "liability is to be apportioned 
between the parties based on the degree of fault for which each is responsible." Harrison v. 
Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,591, 768 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1989). While a plaintiffs conduct affecting 
his comparative responsibility is generally a question for the jury, "where the undisputed facts 
lead to only one reasonable conclusion the court may rule as a matter of law." Puckett v. 
Oalifabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 979 P.2d 1174 (1999). 
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The testimony can lead to only one conclusion in this matter, Mr. Phillips had to have 
comparative responsibility for his accident. Given the great weight of testimony that the stairs 
were stable, had been for months, and were used repeatedly by the Plaintiff and others without 
issue, there is insufficient evidence to apportion zero responsibility to the Plaintiff. Rather, some 
fault had to be assessed against the Plaintiff as a matter of law. Because the jury failed to 
apportion any liability to the Plaintiff in the face of repeated testimony as to the stability of the 
stairs, this Court should enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict consistent with the 
testimony as the jury failed to apportion liability. 
II. 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
A. RULE 59(a)(7): Error in the law occurring at trial as a basis for a new trial. 
Rule 59(a)(7) allows the trial Court to grant a new trial for error in the law, occurring at 
the trial. In Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 781 P.2d 229 (1989), the Court affirmed 
the standards governing this basis for new trial. 
The trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on every 
reasonable theory recognized by law that is supported at trial. 
However, instructions should not be given which are not based on 
evidence from the trial. Instructions should not be given on a 
theory which is not legally sound. An instruction which 
incorrectly states the law provides grounds for ordering a new 
trial. 
ld., 116 Idaho at 898,781 P.2d at 235 (citations omitted). "The trial Court has the duty to grant a 
new trial where prejudicial errors oflaw have occurred at the trial, even though the verdict of the 
jury is supported by substantial evidence." Sherwoodv. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 262, 805 P.2d 
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452,468 (1991). 
B. The Court incorrectly stated the law on proximate cause in Jury Instruction No. 11. 
The Court in this trial used the substantial factor instruction for cause. IDJI2.30.2. The 
appropriate instruction should have been the "but for" test as there is a single cause of the injury 
in this matter. IDJI 2.30.1. 
In Idaho, the "but for" test may be employed when there is a single possible cause of the 
injury; however, the "substantial factor" test must be employed when there are multiple possible 
causes of injury, and the jury must be instructed accordingly. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 
543,164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007). "The 'but for' instruction and the 'substantial factor' instruction 
are mutually exclusive." Id. at 543, 164 P.3d at 823. 
In Garcia, the Court noted that the appropriate analysis was the cause of the injury, and 
not the cause of the accident. Id. at 545, 164 P.3d at 825. This is directly supported by the prior 
Supreme Court cases addressing the substantial factor test. In Newberry, the Court "specifically 
reject [ ed)" the inclusion of the "but for" test where more than one cause could have brought 
about the injury. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005)(emphasis 
added). In short, the "but for" test may be employed when there is a single possible cause, but 
when there are multiple possible causes of the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 288, 127 P .3d at 191. 
There is only a single cause of the injury in this case: falling down the stairs. As such, 
under Garcia and Newberry, the appropriate instruction is the "but for" instruction. No one has 
alleged that the injuries suffered by Mr. Phillips were somehow not caused by the fall. Rather, 
the issues of fact which arose are whether Mr. Phillips stumbled, or whether the state of the stairs 
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caused the fall. The "but for" test is the only applicable instruction on proximate cause in this 
situation. If the Court's logic were extended to Idaho's law, any time that a defendant denied 
liability of a tort, or pled comparative negligence, the substantial factor test would be given. The 
Defendant here does not question whether the fall caused the injuries, the Defendant presented 
evidence as to whether or not he was the cause of the fall. 
Prejudice for the Defendant based upon this instruction is apparent given the jury was 
instructed that the alleged defaults in the stairs could serve as a basis for liability regardless of 
whether they were the actual cause of the accident. It lowers the standard to a point that 
essentially excuses the jury from having to find a definitive causal link. This is crystal clear 
given the Court of Appeal's analysis that the but for standard is more stringent, more readily 
addresses factual cause, and that the substantial factor test applies when causation is challenged 
by many possible sources: 
The substantial factor test was adopted to allow recovery in 
circumstances where the defendant's negligence may have 
concurred with another cause to bring about the injury, even 
though it could not be established that the damage to the plaintiff 
would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence. 
Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1040,895 P.2d 1229,1233 (Ct.App. 1995). There 
is no reason in this case that a jury could not determine that the accident would not have occurred 
"but for" Mr. Erhart's actions. Rather, the lower standard excused the jury from finding factual 
cause: 
... the substantial factor standard is employed to make proof of 
factual cause easier than it would be under the "but for" test, not 
more difficult. It aids the plaintiff in circumstances where the strict 
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"but for" test may not be satisfied. It is not intended to defeat the 
cause in fact element when "but for" causation is established. 
!d. at 1043,895 P.2d at 1236. Given the but for test is the more stringent, and deals directly with 
factual cause from a single source, the Erharts were prejudiced by the lower standard in the 
substantial factor instruction. Use of the substantial factor instruction has done exactly what it 
was not intended to do: defeat the cause in fact element when "but for" causation could have 
been found by the jury. 
A new trial should be granted based upon the inappropriate jury instruction on cause 
because there was a single cause of the injury and the substantial factor instruction was highly 
prejudicial to the Defendant by lowering the standard of proof. 
C. The Court should not have instructed the jury on willful or reckless behavior. 
As explained in Section I.e above, there was no evidence of willful or reckless behavior 
presented which would justify the instruction being given to the jury. Idaho courts have 
interpreted "willful" and "reckless" and have determined that it refers to conduct where the actor 
"intentionally does or fails to do an act, knowing or having a reason to know facts which would 
lead a reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, but involves a high degree of probability that such harm would result." Harris v. Idaho, 
Dep', of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992) (quoting Jacobsen v. 
City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736, 740 (1988». 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Erhart took any action with both 
the knowledge that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm and a "high degree of 
probability that such a harm would result." Harris, 123 Idaho at 299,847 P.2d at 
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1160( emphasis added). Because there was no evidence presented that Mr. Erhart took any action 
with a "high degree of probability that such a harm would result" the instructions on willful and 
reckless should never have been presented to the jury. As such, the Court should order a new 
trial because the jury was misled that Mr. Erhart acted willfully or recklessly. 
Prejudice from this instruction is apparent. Though there was no evidence of reckless or 
willful behavior, and the Judge himself stated on the record that he did not know how the jury 
could find as much, the instruction was given and the jury reached a conclusion unsupported by 
law or tact. That conclusion renders the noneconomic damage cap under I.C. § 6-1603 
inapplicable. 
III. 
A. Rule 59(a)(6): Insufficiency of evidence as a basis for a new trial. 
Rule 59(a)(6) allows the Court to grant a new trial when there is "insufficiency of 
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." LR.C.P.59(a)(6). 
This Court sits as the 13 th juror, having viewed the testimony, witness behavior, and all of the 
evidence. This Court may grant a new trial where the weighing of the evidence and 
determination of the credibility of the witnesses leads it to the conclusion that the verdict is not 
in accord with your assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Sheets v. Agro-West. inc., 
104 Idaho 880, 883,664 P.2d 787, 790 (Ct.App. 1983). A motion for new trial should be 
granted if the court believes that the jury verdict "is not in accord with law or justice." Id. at 
883,664 P.2d at 790. Implicit in this statement is the recognition that where reasonable minds 
could disagree, but the trial court believes the jury verdict is in error, the benefit of arriving at a 
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legally correct and just resolution of a dispute through a new trial outweighs the disadvantage of 
uncertainty, time and expense incident to continued litigation. !d. at 883-884, 664 P.2d at 790-
791. 
The Court may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support 
it: 
The trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict-winner. Although the mere fact that the 
evidence is in conflict is not enough to set aside the verdict and 
grant a new trial, when a motion for a new trial is based on the 
ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the 
judge is free to weigh the cont1icting evidence for himself. In fact, 
as Wright & Miller note in their treatise discussing the similar 
Federal rule of Civil Procedure 59, "the granting of a new trial on 
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence 
'involves an element of discretion which goes further than the 
mere sufficiency of the evidence. It embraces all the reasons 
which inhere in the integrity of the jury system itself. '" Wright & 
Miller, supra § 2806, at 45 (citing Tidewater Oil Co., v. Waller, 
302 F.2d 638 (loth Cir. 1962). 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. The role of the trial Court in passing on a 
new trial motion has long been established. 
[t]he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the 
verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is 
convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by 
vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or 
justice. 
ld. at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195(citations omitted). 
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B. There is insufficient evidence to support the award of economic damages because 
the evidence presented totaled merely $101,453 and Mr. Phillips is still employed, 
holds the same job, and offered no testimony of any future wage loss whatsoever. 
As explained in Section I.B above, no evidence of any future wage loss was presented 
whatsoever, yet the jury awarded economic damages of $444,720.51 in excess of those supported 
by the evidence. The jury awarded Mr. Phillips $546,174.00 for economic damages based upon 
evidence which totaled $101,453.49 in claimed losses. Instruction No. 21 states that the three 
factors for economic damages are medical expenses, past lost wages, and future lost earning 
capacity. Given an award was granted with no evidence to support it, the Court should order a 
new trial because there was insufficient evidence to support the economic damage award. 
c. There is insufficient evidence to allow a finding that Mr. Erhart acted in a willful or 
reckless manner. 
As explained in Sections I.C and II.D above, there was insufficient evidence presented to 
the jury to justify a finding that the Defendant somehow acted in a reckless or willful manner. 
The Judge noted from the bench during argument on jury instructions that he did not know what 
the jury could base the finding on but would instruct them anyway. This Court is plainly 
empowered to grant a new trial when it is satisfied the "verdict is not supported by, or is contrary 
to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence". Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. The Court must do so on this 
issue given the very standard is whether the verdict is not in accord with the Judge's assessment 
of the clear weight of the evidence. Sheets v. Agro-West. Inc., 104 Idaho 880, 883, 664 P.2d 787, 
790 (Ct.App. 1983). 
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D. There is insufficient evidence to apportion one hundred percent liability to Mr. 
Erhart. 
This Court must order a new trial because the jury's verdict as to the apportionment of 
liability is not supported by the evidence. As explained in Section II.C above the jury's failure to 
assign any comparative responsibility to the Plaintiff is error as a matter of law. Under l.R.c.P. 
59(a)(6), a new trial should be ordered because there is insufficient evidence to support a finding 
of one hundred percent liability for Mr. Erhart. 
I.C. § 6-801 requires an apportionment ofliability: "liability is to be apportioned 
between the parties based on the degree of fault for which each is responsible." Harrison v. 
Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,591, 768 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1989). 
The testimony can lead to only one conclusion in this matter, Mr. Phillips had to have 
comparative responsibility for his accident. Given the great weight oftestimony that the stairs 
were stable, had been for months, and were used repeatedly by the Plaintiff and others without 
issue, it is implausible that the Plaintiff was apportioned zero responsibility for the accident. 
Because the jury failed to apportion any liability to the Plaintiff in the face of repeated testimony 
as to the stability of the stairs, this Court should order a new trial because the there is insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of one hundred percent liability for Mr. Erhart. 
IV. 
A. RULE 59(a)(5): The appearance of passion or prejudice and excessive damages. 
A new trial is warranted under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) as excessive damages were awarded 
under the apparent influence of passion or prejudice. The Rule states that a new trial may be 
allowed for the reason of excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence 
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of passion or prejudice: 
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or 
excessive damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and 
then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had 
there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the 
trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that 
there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to 
such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient. A trial 
court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or excessive 
'as a matter of law.' Additionally, the rule that a verdict will not 
be set aside when supported by substantial but conflicting evidence 
has no application to trial court ruling upon a motion for a new 
trial. 
Wilson v. JR. Simplot Co., 143 Idaho 730, 731, 152 P.3d 601,602 (2007). This standard was 
explained in Quick v. Crane as an exercise in the trial Court's sense of fairness and justice: 
In other words, if the trial judge discovers that his determination of 
damages is so substantially different from that of the jury that he 
can only explain this difference as resulting from some unfair 
behavior, or what the law calls "passion or prejudice," on the part 
of the jury against one or some of the parties, then he should grant 
a new trial. 
QUick, II 1 Idaho at 769, 727 P.2d at 1197. 
B. This Court must weigh the evidence and compare the jury's award to what it would 
have given had the case been tried to the bench. 
This Court has the duty under a Rule 59(a)(5) to weigh the evidence and determine if the 
jury has awarded a verdict which is substantially different from what the Court may have 
awarded. The conclusion of that comparison must lead to a new trial. 
First, the jury awarded over $440,000 in economic damages without any evidence of 
such. Second, the jury found the Defendant reckless and willful for the means by which he 
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installed a set of stairs. Third, the jury awarded noneconomic damages over $1,000,000 when 
the documented special damages only totaled $101,453.49. Because the jury was inappropriately 
instructed on the willful or reckless behavior, the noneconomic cap on damages should limit that 
million plus award under I.C. § 6-1603. Awarding over $540,000 for special damages when 
merely $101,453.49 was presented to this court can lead to a single conclusion: "the disparity is 
so great that it appears ... that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Wilson v. JR. Simplot Co., 143 Idaho 730, 731, 152 P.3d 601, 602 (2007). 
As the thirteenth juror, this Court has the duty to analyze what it would have awarded. 
The Court was present for and aware of any sympathies that may have arisen for the parties or 
prejudice which may have arisen due to courtroom demeanor or testimony that had nothing to do 
with the evidence presented. There was also the express violation of the ruling against the 
admission of subsequent remedial measures that presented prejudicial evidence against Mr. 
Erhart. Given the comment from the bench that the Court saw no basis for a finding of reckless 
or willful behavior, and the only evidence of economic damages totaled $101,453.49, the 
appropriate award, if any, should have been an absolute maximum of $640,000 (applying the 
noneconomic damage cap to each noneconomic damage award and the full value of all claimed 
economic damages). A million dollar disparity plainly indicates that the award is substantially 
different from what this Court would have granted. 
A new trial is warranted under LR.C.P. 59(a)(5) as excessive damages were awarded 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
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C. Excessive damages were awarded under the apparent influence of passion or 
prejudice because the jury failed to apportion any responsibility to the Plaintiff. 
This Court must weigh the evidence presented and determine whether the jury could have 
reasonably found that Mr. Phillips had zero responsibility for his fall. As explained in Sections 
ltD and lItE above, the jury failed to apportion any liability whatsoever to Mr. Phillips while 
the great weight of testimony was that the stairs were stable under repeated usage. The disparity 
between the testimony and the finding of one hundred percent responsibility on Mr. Erhart 
warrants a new trial because of the excessive damages awarded. 
v. 
A. RULE 59(a)(1): Irregularity in the proceedings. 
A new trial is warranted and should be ordered under Rule 59(a)(1) as there were 
irregularities in the proceedings that prejudiced the Defendant and prevented a fair trial. The 
cumulative effect of repeated irregularities warrants granting the motion. The inappropriate jury 
instruction on cause, the unwarranted instruction on willful or reckless behavior, and the 
complete lack of any evidence to support over $440,000 in economic damages, all created a 
cumulative effect which prejudiced Mr. Erhart and prevented a fair trial. These irregularities 
must be coupled with the express violation of the Court's rulings in limine to warrant a new trial. 
The testimony of Angela Sisco about subsequent remedial measures, and the follO\ving 
inquiry by the Plaintiffs counsel, constituted irregularities and misconduct which warrants 
granting this motion. See Affidavit of David W. Cantrill in Support of Motion for New Trial. 
The Rule states: 
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Rule 59(a). New trial- Amendment of judgment - Grounds. 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
I.R.C.P. 59 (a)(1). "Where a motion for a new trial under LR.C.P. 59(a)(I) is based upon 
misconduct, the moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct occurred. The 
party opposing the motion must then establish that the conduct could not have affected the 
outcome of the trial." Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 710,979 P.2d 107, 112 
(1999). In Slaathaug, the court noted that it was not up to the losing party to prove prejudice 
under the rule because it was not the losing party's behavior which violated the pretrial order. 
Jd. at 711,979 P.2d at 112. 
This Court ruled on a Motion in Limine from the bench that no evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures would be allowed. Notwithstanding this order from the bench, Plaintiff s 
counsel directly inquired of a material witness on the remedial measures taken by the Defendant. 
Upon objection, the Plaintiff argued that the door had been opened. This Court correctly rejected 
the notion of the door being opened by a nonresponsive answer from the witness. The 
solicitation of and testimony on the post accident remedial measures squarely placed evidence 
before the jury that the Court had already excluded. As such, the jury was provided with 
evidence that may have interfered with their judgment and barred the defendant from receiving a 
fair trial. This misconduct, coupled with the irregularities in the jury instructions and the 
unsupported award of economic damages create a cumulative effect which precluded a fair trial. 
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A. Requirements for remittitur. 
Trial Courts in Idaho, as well as in other jurisdictions, may condition the denial of a 
motion for a new trial upon the filing of a remittitur. In that situation, the Plaintiff is given the 
choice between submitting to a new trial, or accepting the trial Court's determination of the 
damage amount that it considers justified. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P .2d at 1198. 
The first step in the process is ruling upon a Rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial, based 
upon excessive damages. If the trial Judge decides that a new trial should be granted, remittitur 
may then enter the picture as an alternative to a new trial. Id 
The Supreme Court described this process as follows: 
In other words, the trial judge can grant an additur or remittitur 
only by offering a new trial as an alternative, and then only if his 
determination that the disparity between his evaluation of damages 
and the jury's award is sufficient to suggest that the jury's 
evaluation of damages was a result of passion or prejudice. 
Howes v. Fultz, 115 Idaho 681, 686, 769 P.2d 558,663 (1989). 
This Court is empowered to order a new trial on the many points outlined above. As 
such, Remittitur is appropriate as an alternative to the new trial the Defendant's seek. As 
outlined above, if the Court rejected the jury's finding that stair repairs were reckless and willful, 
the non-economic damage cap in I.e. § 6-1603 would apply. That would reduce the award to the 
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Phillips to $268,026.56 each for non-economic damages. Further, if the Court conformed the 
economic damages to the evidence presented, that would reduce the $546,174.00 to $101,453.49 
(prior to the stipulated offset for amounts actually paid). All told, any Remittitur in this case 
should reduce the overall award to an absolute maximum of $637,506.61. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
A Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is warranted on three points: that the jury 
awarded over $440,000 in economic damages without a basis in evidence, that the jury found 
that the Defendants willfully and recklessly repaired stairs, and that the jury failed to apportion 
liability. 
In the alternative, a new trial is also warranted because of errors in law for inappropriate 
jury instructions, insufficiency of evidence on both the lost wage award and willful or reckless 
behavior, an excessive award granted with the appearance of passion or prejudice, and for 
irregularities in the proceedings. It is important to recognize the effect of ordering a new trial, 
which is not a final adjudication of the issues, but rather a chance to cure the many deficiencies 
in the first trial. The Supreme Court has stated this well: 
A motion for a new trial, if granted, does not result in an 
adjudication of factual issues by the court. Neither does it 
represent a determination that, as a matter of law, the evidence 
failed to establish an issue of fact. It is the court's statement that it 
believes the jury erred in its findings or in the application of the 
law as contained in the court's instructions, and that the issues 
should be submitted to another jury for redetermination. 
Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 189,579 P.2d 683,686 (1978) (quoting Warren v. Eshelman, 88 
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Idaho 496,500,401 P.2d at 539, 541 (1965). Given the many irregularities, the unsupported 
award of damages, the Court's own statement that it did not know how the jury could find the 
Defendant reckless, a new trial must be ordered. 
If this Court finds a new trial necessary, remittitur would be an appropriate alternative. 
Given the evidence in the record, the absolute maximum award would be over $1 million less 
than that awarded by the ~ 
Dated this.1l. day of April, 2009. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING 
By: Q~U1ftiJdJ 
Davi . Cantnll, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 27, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
John T. Edwards 
Kurt Holzer 
HOLZER EDWARDS & HARRISON, 
CHARTERED 
1516 W. Hays 
Boise, ID 83702-5316 
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Case No. CV PI 0707453 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
1. Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
2. Alternative Motion For a New 
Trial, and 
3. Alternative Motion For 
Remittitur. 
After a complete jury trial during which this court overruled plaintiffs' only two 
spoken objections to questions presented by Defendant and denied plaintiffs' only 
opposed Motion in Limine regarding testimony of Defendant's expert, Defendant seeks 
to have the Court reject the considered verdict of the jury which was less than the 
$2,000,000.00 in liability insurance coverage applicable to the claim. There is no basis 
in fact or law for any of Defendant's motions and all should be denied. 
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I. Substantial Evidence Supports The JUry'S Verdict Thereby 
Precluding Any Claim Of The Appropriateness Of A JNOV. 
By seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Mr. Erhart 
necessarily "admits the truth of all the other side's evidence and every legitimate 
inference that can be drawn from it." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 
P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984).) A JNOV cannot be granted if after "drawing all inferences in 
favor of the jury's verdict, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
verdict." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276, 287 
(2008) (citing Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 238,141 P.3d 1099, 1107 
(2006)). 
The "verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of 
the jury." Hall, 145 Idaho at 324 (2008) (citing Gillingham Const., Inc. v. Newby-
Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 15,20,121 P.3d 946,951 (2005)). "In reviewing a 
grant or denial of a motion for JNOV the court may not reweigh evidence, consider 
witness credibility, or compare its factual findings with that of the jury." Id. 
The court must "review all the evidence and draw all the reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Schwan's Sales 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297,301 (2006) 
(citation omitted). 
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1. Defendant Ignores The Substantial Evidence Of Economic Damages 
Presented To The Jury. 
The jury received evidence in this case that supported an economic loss of as 
much as $1,548,381.80. The jury concluded that the loss was only $546,174.00. The 
only way that defendant can make the argument there was no evidence presented to 
support the jury's award is by ignoring the record in the case. 
A. The Parties Stipulated to Economic Damages 0/ 
$104,053.49. 
There is no dispute that the parties stipulated that the past medical expenses 
were $84,811.21 and shown by stipulated exhibit number 9. The parties further 
stipulated to past lost wages for Mr. Phillips of $16,642.28 for the immediate post-
injury time period as shown by stipulated exhibit number 10. 
In his briefing, Defendant repeatedly fails to acknowledge to the court that he 
also stipulated to the future dental expense of $2,600.00 shown by exhibit number 43. 
B. There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record 0/ Additional 
Future Medical Expenses 0/$197,887.20. 
Plaintiff's submitted substantial competent evidence of future medical costs. 
Defendant ignores that exhibit 22 has the supporting documentation underlying the past 
medical expense exhibit 9. Contained in exhibit 22, as pointed out to the jury in 
closing, is the documentation showing Mr. Phillips' current medications list are priced 
at a combined $378.00 a month. 
Dr. Nancy Greenwald among others, including Mr. Phillips' family physician Dr. 
David Martin, provided testimony that Mr. Phillips will be on these medications for 
life. Further, Mrs. Phillips testified regarding the current monthly value of the 
medications. As the Court instructed the jury, Mr. Phillips' life expectancy is 42.7 
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years. Thus, the undisputed evidence of Mr. Phillips' future medical expenses was 
$193,687.20 ($378/month x 12 months x 42.7 years). 
Moreover, Dr. Glenna Andrews testified that Mr. Phillips would need to see her 
3 or 4 times a year for at least 12 years. Her records establish her billing rate is $100 
an hour. Thus, at an average of 3.5 times a year for 12 years that was evidence of 
another $4,200.00 in future medical costs. 
C. Plaintiff's Lost Wage Claim And Proof At Trial 
Encompassed Far More Than Merely The Stipulated Past Lost 
Wages In Exhibit 10. 
The past lost wages in Exhibit 10 were those the parties stipulated to prior to 
trial. However, there were four additional components of lost wages that Defendant 
just ignores in his briefing. 
First, the evidence established that Mr. Phillips' right shoulder injury was caused 
by the fall. Dr. Greenwald and Dr. Martin testified to this fact. It is also reflected in 
the surgical records admitted at trial and in the stipulated medical expenses. Mrs. 
Phillips testified that Mr. Phillips missed a week of work while recovering from that 
surgery and, at the rate of $26.03 an hour in evidence for that time period, that amounts 
to an additional loss of $1,041.20. 
Second, there were two components to a past loss of earning claim based on lost 
raises not received at the end of the years 2007 and 2008. Mrs. Phillips testified, 
without objection, that her husband had received raises of $300 a month during the 
years that he had received "exceeds expectations" performance reviews. The record 
was replete with proof that Mr. Phillips' "below expectations" performance reviews in 
2007 and 2008 were caused by the injuries he sustained. Thus, the jury could accept the 
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testimony and conclude that absent the injuries it was more likely than not that Mr. 
Phillips would have received the '"exceeds expectations" reviews as he had previously. 
This would have been consistent with the testimony of George Schlender and Angela 
Sisco as well. Therefore, at the time of the verdict there was an additional past wage 
loss of $4,500.00 for 15 months after the end of 2007 and a further $900.00 for the 3 
months that had passed since the end of 2008. 
Third, defendant complains about future lost income because Mr. Phillips has 
done everything he can to keep his job. The testimony at trial made quite evident that it 
is highly likely that Mr. Phillips--despite his best efforts, despite seeking additional 
assistance from Elks Hospital and despite his pre-injury stellar work history--williose 
his job in the near future. 
Mr. Phillips' boss Jim Wilson, Mr. Wilson's boss George Schlender, Mr. 
Phillips' colleague Angela Sisco, Mr. Phillips' California friend and co-worker Ron 
Sundberg and Mrs. Phillips all provided evidence that the standard practice at Rural 
Community Development Corp. was to terminate an employee who received a below 
expectations review two years in a row. Dr. Andrews, Dr. Greenwald and Dr. Craig 
Beaver also offered testimony about difficulties Mr. Phillips will have in maintaining 
and retaining employment or obtaining re-employment. 
Thus, the evidence in the case, including the substantial evidence of Mr. Phillips' 
behavioral issues, was such that the jury as '"sole judges of the facts" bringing with 
them "all of the experience and background" of their lives could have concluded that 
Mr. Phillips would more likely than not lose his job and remain unemployed for life. At 
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the $62,000.00 a year that Mr. Phillips testified to earning that loss would equal 
$1,240,000.00 for twenty years of unemployment. 
The jury obviously did not accept that Mr. Phillips would remain unemployed for 
life. Instead the jurors brought to bear the "considerations [they] use in making the 
more important decisions in [their] everyday dealings" and reached their own 
conclusion about an appropriate award. That was their right, role and responsibility. 
As a matter of law, all the above evidence is true. Thus, after reviewing "all the 
evidence and draw[ing] all the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party" there is no basis whatsoever for the Court to 
conclude that a JNOV is warranted as to the economic damages awarded by the jury. 
There was more than ample evidence for the jury to evaluate and reach the conclusion 
that Mr. Phillips' economic damages were $546,174.00. 
2. Defendant Ignores The Substantial Evidence Of Mr. Erhart's 
Recklessness That Was Presented To The Jury. 
In this case Milt Erhart, acting as professional commercial-property landlord, did a 
negligent job of construction, a worse job of maintenance and ignored express warnings of a 
dangerous moveable stair tread. The recklessness instruction I tasked the jury with determining 
whether Mr. Erhart's actions, were "taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should 
have known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but 
involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result." 
Mr. Erhart admitted that stairs are dangerous and that he was obligated to prevent 
dangerous conditions. The testimony was that he created the very hazards that most likely 
caused Jim Phillips' injuries. Further, shortly prior to the fall he was expressly warned of the 
1 It was Instruction no. 19. It was the version advocated for by defendant and provided to the jury over plaintiffs' 
objection that it was an inaccurate statement ofthe law that inappropriately raised plaintiffs' burden of proof. 
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dangerous condition of the treads. That he should have known of the danger cannot be disputed, 
that a moving stair tread unconnected handrail and multi-code violation stairway presents an 
unreasonable risk of harm certainly is well within the jury's province to conclude. That a 
reasonable man would realize that an unconnected stair tread and unconnected handrail "involves 
a high-probability of harm" is obvious on its face. Any reasonable person who analyzed the 
stairway would agree that there was a high probability that a fall would happen. Dr. Richard 
Gill's testimony was consistent with and affirmed that common sense assessment. In fact, 
neither defendant nor his expert Mr. Harper disputed the dangerousness of a sliding tread and 
unconnected handrail. Rather, Mr. Harper simply argued that they did not cause Mr. Phillips' 
injuries- a theory presented to and obviously rejected by the factfinder. 
The underlying evidence on which the jury's fully supported conclusion rests includes: 
'- 1. Mr. Erhart acknowledged his duty as a landlord to keep the facilities safe; 
" 2. Mr. Erhart admitted he understands that people get hurt if they fall down stairs; 
-- 3. Mr. Erhart admitted he chose to leave out two of the four bolts holding two of the stairs; 
"v 4. Mr. Erhart admitted he was in a hurry when he did the work; 
5. Mr. Erhart admitted that putting a shim in would have slowed him up; 
'''\ 6. Mr. Erhart admitted putting in a shim would have allowed him to use all four bolts; 
~ ~ 7. Mr. Erhart admitted that all four bolts should be used; 
.l,~ 1"0'" l!-';h it .,.at l-'~(..""" ;i) . 
8. Mr. Erhart's expert Mr. Harper admitted that four bolts should have been used; 
\" 9. Mr. Erhart admitted safety is very important; 
\ 1 O. Mr. Erhart admitted he did not consult his supplier when he decided to leave off two of 
the four bolts on two stairs; 
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'\a 11. Mr. Erhart admitted he did not consult the tread manufacturer when he decided to leave 
off two of the four bolts on two stairs; 
". 12. Mr. Erhart is not an engineer or formally educated in construction practices; 
<:::.\)~ ,,\ I' 13. Mr. Erhart admitted that the steps should be constructed consistent with the Uniform 
~ 
~ \ 'il)V<-. , 
Building Code regardless of whether he needed a building permit; 
'" 14. The evidence established the stairway and handrails in the condition it was in on the day 
of Mr. PhiIlips' injury violated general design and loading requirements set forth in the 
1985 Uniform Building Code sections 2303 and 3306 as well as load tables 23-A and 23-
B and the 2003 International Building Code in the sections 1009.11.3, 1009.11.5, 1604.3, 
1604.4, and 1607.7.1; 
jV! fY~ ~ . 15. Mr. Erhart admitted that he was aware that bolts holding the treads loosened up over 
time; 
'\ 16. Mr. Erhart testified there were on the order of seventy uses of the stairway on a daily 
basis; 
, r ~J s J ,t/d:I'lI)('''' -h.f ,-"tH fr ...... f II~ 
yU ..... 17. Mr. 'Erhart was aware that the missing bolts could not be seen; 
"'" 18. Mr. Erhart admitted that the fact there was a hidden danger meant he had to repair 
potential hazards faster; 
\. 19. The evidence showed Mr. Erhart never initially connected the handrail to the baluster; 
L~~~'·~, 20. The evidence showed the movability of the tread and the inadequately secured handrail 
were hidden, dangerous conditions; 
21. The evidence showed the movability of the tread and the inadequately secured handrail 
presented a substantial risk of serious injury to anyone using the stairway; 
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22. Ken Doolittle testified that he noticed in the spring of 2006, "probably February or 
March" that there was "at least one step that was loose on the bottom section of treads;" 
23. Mr. Doolittle testified the step would slide back and forth; 
24. Mr. Doolittle further testified, "I thought it was appropriate to say something to Mr. 
Erhart, which I did, and I, actually tried moving it, and it moved more than a couple of 
inches for me and at that point I thought well this is hazardous, potentially, and that (Milt 
Erhart) should be aware of that, so I told him about it;" 
25 . The photographic evidence from the day of 
the injury confirmed Mr. Doolittle' s 
testimony. This photograph is exhibit IB 
and was taken from on top of the third step 
looking straight down. It shows the step 
having slid back just as Mr. Doolittle warned Mr. Erhart; 
hQt 'I ..... rLC\)(~6. Mr. Erhart admitted he did nothing about Mr. Doolittle's warning; 
27. The photographic evidence ofthe brackets as 
discussed by Dr. Rick Gill in this photo from 
exhibit 21 showed where the lag screw pulled 
out to allow the tread to slide and create the 
i)~~\ ~~~ danger Mr. Doolittle warned Mr. Erhart about 
on the third step from the top; 
~ 28. It is undisputed that the handrail was oversized and violated the Uniform Building Code; 
..... 29. It was undisputed, except by Mr. Erhart, that the open handrail end on the inside comer at 
the intermediate landing violated the Uniform Building Code; 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S l.Motion For Judgment Notwit!GOOB 7 6 
the Verdict, 2. Alternative Motion For a New Trial, and 3. Alternative Motion For Remittitur, - 9 
30. It was undisputed that the open handrail end on the inside comer at the intennediate 
landing created a fall hazard; and, 
31. It was undisputed that the unifonn building code established minimum safety standards. 
In light of all that, Mr. Erhart cannot argue with a straight face that he had no 
basis to know that his poor construction and lack of maintenance of the stairway created 
both an unreasonable risk of harm and a high degree of probability that such harm 
would actually result. 
In short, the real record at trial more than shows there was substantial evidence 
that Mr. Erhart should have known about the unreasonable risk of harm and probability 
of danger. The building owner simply denying those facts does not preclude the jury 
from evaluating the evidence with which it was presented and determining Mr. Erhart's 
actions were reckless. 
Thus, after reviewing "all the evidence and draw[ing] all the reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" there is no 
basis whatsoever for the Court to conclude that a JNOV is warranted as to the jury 
determination that Mr. Erhart's actions were reckless. 
3. Defendant's Argument That The Jury's Factual Finding Regarding 
Apportionment Cannot Be Supported Ignores the Actual Record At 
Trial. 
Because of Mr. Phillips' brain injury, he could offer at trial no testimony of what 
happened. There were no witnesses to the event. Nonetheless, there was substantial 
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circumstantial and expert evidence supporting the fact that the dangerous stairway 
caused the fall. 2 
For example, the first medical record after Mr. Phillips left the emergency room 
shows that Mrs. Phillips knew the "step moved, the hand rail moved" and that caused 
Mr. Phillips' fall. 3 The contemporaneous photographic evidence from the day Mr. 
Phillips was injured (trial exhibit 1), showed that the step moved and the handrail 
moved as well as the numerous other Uniform Building Code violations. The records of 
Mr. Phillips' first visit to Dr. Greenwald also saw some memory of the first few steps 
and the "the rug being pulled out" from under him. Based on his human factors 
analysis, Dr. Gill provided competent expert testimony that regarding Mr. Phillips' fall, 
"the most likely place that the initial loss of balance occurs is in the region that all of 
these defects4 come together." 
The defendant's expert, Mr. Harper, on the other hand argued, as defendant does 
here, that Mr. Phillips "most likely fell because of a misstep." Mr. Harper's analysis 
was based in large part on the fact that Mr. Phillips had left-sided injuries. However, 
Mr. Harper could not explain the right rotator cuff injury, the right jaw fracture and 
medical record of the left sided zygomatic scrapes in a manner consistent with his 
theory. 
Defendant's argument can be summed up as--because there is not direct evidence 
the jury MUST accept that "it was in at least in part plaintiff's own damn fault." The 
2 As the jury was properly instructed in Instruction No.9: "The law makes no distinction between direct and 
circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry." 
3 That was also her testimony in her deposition. The Court precluded her direct testimony on that issue at trial 
although plaintiffs' argued Mr. Phillips' drug and brain injury induced condition made Mr. Phillips' marginally 
coherent statements to her in the emergency room admissible. 
4 The dangerous open end of the inner handrail, the unconnected outer handrail, the illegally sized handrail, the 
improperly low baluster and the unconnected stair tread which were all within a step of each other. 
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law, however, is not as defendant argues. The law is, in fact, quite to the contrary. 
Under Idaho law, even if one assumes that all that exists is merely conflicting 
circumstantial evidence, that is a sufficient quantum of proof to withstand a motion for 
JNOV. See Juarez v. Aardema, 128 Idaho 687, 694, 918 P.2d 271, 278 (1996). 
As the Jury was instructed in IDJI 1.00: 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence 
admitted in the course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, 
you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight 
you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom 
all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no 
magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday 
affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you 
believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. 
Thus after reviewing "all the evidence and draw[ing] all the reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" there is no 
basis whatsoever for the Court to conclude that a JNOV rejecting the jury's 
apportionment of proximate cause for the fall is allowed by law. 
II. There Were No Errors Or Irregularities At Trial or in the JUry'S 
Evaluation Sufficient to Warrant a New Trial. 
The decision to grant a motion for new trial rests within the discretion of the trial 
court. Barnett v. Eagle Helicopters, Inc., 123 Idaho 361,363,848 P.2d 419, 421 (1993) 
(citing Moses v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 118 Idaho 676,677,799 P.2d 964, 965 
(1990)). The trial court is better equipped to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and 
testimony of witnesses and the evidence overall. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 770, 
727 P.2d 1187, 1198 (1986). A trial court's disposition of a Rule 59(a) motion for a 
new trial is not subject to appellate reversal unless the court manifestly abuses the 
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discretion vested in it. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 506, 95 P.3d 
977, 988 (2004). 
The only way in which the Court could abuse its discretion in this case is 
granting any portion of Defendant's Rule 59 motions. 
1. There Were No Errors Of Law Supporting The Award Of A New Trial 
To Defendant. 
The Court's instructions to the jury were accurate, adequate and appropriate. 
They contained no errors that support an award of a new trial. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) provides a trial court may grant a new 
trial for an "error in law, occurring at the trial." A party whose substantial rights are 
not affected by a claimed error is not entitled to a new trial as a matter of right. See 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 645, 39 P.3d 577,585 (2001). A trial court's 
duty to grant a new trial under 59(a)(7) only attaches if prejudicial errors of law have 
occurred. See id. When the jury instructions taken as a whole do not mislead or 
prejudice a party, even an erroneous instruction does not constitute a basis for a right to 
new trial. See Craig Johnson Const., L.L.c. v. Floyd Town Arch., P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 
800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). 
A. The Substantial Factor Jury Instruction Was The Correct 
Proximate Cause Instruction. 
Idaho law required the court to give the substantial factor jury instruction. There 
were multiple and conflicting claimed causes of both the cause of Mr. Phillips' injuries 
as well as the cause of the damages he claimed at trial. Defendant proffered multiple 
witnesses to offer a differing view on both the cause of the injuries and the cause of Mr. 
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Phillips' damages than those offered by plaintiff. Because these multiple causes of 
injury and damage were presented, the substantial factor instruction was required. 
In Instruction No. 11, the Court instructed the jury the entirety of LD.1.!. 230.2. 
It provides: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, 
in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or 
damage likely would have occurred anyway. 5 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. 
When the negligent conduct of two or more persons or entities 
contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury 
regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
This substantial factor instruction was an appropriate instruction that did not, and 
could not, cause any prejudice to defendant. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court does not 
require the use of the "but for" instruction even where there is only one possible cause 
of an injury. The Court has now noted multiple times that a "but for" instruction "may" 
be used. For example, in Newberry v. Mertens, 142 Idaho 284, 288, 127 P .3d 187, 191 
(2005) the court indicates "the 'but for' test may be employed when there is a single 
possible cause." (emphasis added). Most recently, in Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 530, 
534 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007), the Court reiterated "the "but for" test may be employed 
if the case presents a single possible cause of the injury." (emphasis added). 
5 In Newberry v. Mertens, 142 Idaho 284, 288-89,127 P.3d 187,191-92 (2005), the Supreme Court notes that the 
trial court did not include this second sentence of paragraph one because the trial court's view the sentence is in 
substance "simply a rephrasing of the 'but for' test and therefore inappropriate." The Court approved the Newberry 
version of the substantial factor instruction as given. 
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In contrast, the Court emphasizes that "the 'substantial factor' test must be 
employed when there are multiple possible causes of injury, and the jury must be 
instructed accordingly." ld. See also Newberry, 142 Idaho at 288,127 P.3d at 191. 
In Garcia, Justice Burdick distinguished between the "cause of the accident" and 
the "cause of the injury." In that case, the cause of the injury was at issue. Proximate 
cause goes to more than just cause of the injury. Proximate cause, as all the Idaho 
model instructions note, goes to "the injury, the loss or the damage." 
In arguing that the substantial factor instruction was error, defendant simply 
ignores the evidence he put on at trial. There were multiple and conflicting causes of 
Mr. Phillips' inj ury, loss or damage presented to the jury. 
For example, whether spoken of as Mr. Phillips' injury, loss or damages, Mr. 
Erhart's hired medical witness Dr. Steven Asher provided testimony that the cause had 
a different genesis. He testified that Mr. Phillips symptoms such as his irritability and 
distractibility were likely caused by sleep apnea. In contrast, treating physicians, such 
as Dr. Nancy Greenwald and Dr. Craig Beaver testified these problems were the 
consequences of the traumatic brain injury. 
Other injury/damages issues were also subject of multiple cause evidence. Dr. 
Duane Green ascribed Mr. Phillips' current inability to focus and depression to 
emotional issues not related to the brain injury. Treating medical doctors, Dr. David 
Martin and Dr. Nancy Greenwald took a different view and testified the depression and 
inability to focus were caused by the brain injury of March 2006. 
Injury/damages issues related to his work were also subject to multiple cause 
evidence. Defendant cross-examined Jim Wilson in an effort to show Mr. Phillips' 
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problems at work were a result of malingering or choices. Plaintiffs presented evidence 
through Angela Sisco, George Schlender, Ron Sundberg and others that Mr. Phillips 
work based damages were not the result of malingering. 
Directly regarding the cause of the injury, the evidence was likewise conflicting. 
Defendants' witness Mr. Harper testified it was a misstep. Plaintiffs' evidence as well 
as plaintiffs' expert Dr. Gill ascribed the cause of the injuries to Mr. Erhart's poor 
construction and maintenance practices. 
One of the outcomes in this case could have been an apportionment of negligence 
if the jury had accepted Mr. Erhart's arguments. The same is true for the claimed 
damages. In fact, Mr. Erhart asked for a special verdict form that apportioned causation 
between he and Mr. Phillips. Moreover, in this post-trial briefing he still argues for 
some apportionment to Mr. Phillips. Mr. Erhart cannot have it both ways. Either the 
evidence supports it might be a multiple cause case or it does not. 
In no case has the Idaho Supreme Court required the use of a "but for" 
instruction when a substantial factor instruction has been given, even where there is 
only one possible cause of an injury. Rather, the Court has repeatedly recognized there 
are cases that it "may" be given in. However, it has found error when the "but for" 
instruction instead of the "substantial factor" instruction was used. 
Idaho law required the use of the substantial factor instruction and thus, its use 
cannot be claimed as error. 
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B. The Court Properly Instructed The Jury On Recklessness. 
Defendant does not argue that the instruction was an inaccurate statement of law. 
Rather the argument is limited to the claim that there was "no evidence of willful or 
reckless behavior" that would support the instruction. 
Plaintiffs merely refer the Court to the discussion in section I.2. earlier in this 
brief where much of the substantial evidence in the case is recited and shows full 
support for the court's giving of the instruction. Moreover, the fact that the jury found 
recklessness itself helps show that it was an appropriate instruction. 
Given the fact that more than 70 people a day traversed his stairs, the high 
degree of probability that the hidden defects would cause an injury was evident to the 
jury, as it would be to any reasonable person. 
2. The Evidence Was More Than Sufficient To Support The Jury's 
Verdict And There Is No Basis For An Award Of A New Trial Under 
Idaho Rule Of Evidence 59(A)( 6). 
Defendant's efforts to have a new trial asserting the same theories it did for a 
JNOV should provide it no succor. The economic damages award is supported; the 
record is replete with evidence of Mr. Erhart's recklessness; and just because defendant 
does not like the jury's decision on the evidence does not mean that Jim Phillips should 
have negligence apportioned to him. 
A. Although The Trial Court Has Substantial Discretion To 
Evaluate Claims Under Rule 59(A)(6), The Discretion Must Be 
Utilized With Proper Deference To The Jury. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the restrained standard that a trial judge 
should use in evaluating a motion under Rule 59(a)(6). It approved the trial judge's 
description articulating appropriate scope of discretion in evaluating a 59(a)(6) motion. 
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I am to make my own findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
measure my findings against that of the jury .... If I conclude, 
based upon my assessment of the evidence, that the jury result was 
wrong, I may intervene and grant a new trial. ... I am directed to 
act with restraint. I am to respect the collective wisdom of the jury, 
and to intervene only if I am convinced that an injustice has been 
done and a mistake has been made. 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med. Cent., 135 Idaho 775, 780-81, 25 P.3d 88, 93-94 
(2001) (quoting ruling of trial Judge D. Duff McKee). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained that a new trial is only appropriate when the trial judge "is satisfied the 
verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is 
not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be 
subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or 
justice." Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671,429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967). 
The Court in Sheridan goes on to discuss the trial judge's two-prong analysis 
"The first prong directs the trial judge to consider whether the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and if the ends of 
justice would be served by vacating the verdict. The second prong . 
. . directs the trial court to consider whether a different result 
would follow in a retrial." 
ld at 781., (quoting Burggrafv. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171,174,823 P.2d 775,778 (1991). 
In fulfilling his role under this first prong the trial judge is '''not obligated to 
construe the evidence in favor of one side or the other, but [is] directed to weigh all of 
the evidence in making [the] analysis. '" ld. (quoting District Judge McKee). If the trial 
judge concludes, based upon his "assessment of the evidence, that the jury result was 
wrong, [he] may intervene and grant a new trial." 
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The final analysis is under the second prong where the trial judge must conclude 
that it is probable that a different result would be obtained in a new trial. Id. at 782. 
The mere possibility there might be a different outcome is insufficient. Id. 
Defendant meets neither prong of the test. There was no determination against 
the weight of the evidence. There is not a probability of a different result at are-trial. 
Thus, there is no basis for the award of a new trial. 
B. There is substantial evidence sufficient to support the 
economic damages award. 
As is shown in Section 1.1. above, there was substantial evidence at trial 
regarding plaintiffs economic losses. Defendant's argument that there "was no 
evidence to support" the award is demonstrably false. 
Economic damages need only be proved with "reasonable certainty." See 
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740,152 P.3d 604,611 (2007). 
"Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; 
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from 
the realm of speculation." ld. It is for the trier of fact to fix the amount after 
determining the credibility of the witnesses, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and 
drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. See id. There is no need for specific expert 
testimony regarding lost income. See Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, Idaho , 191 
P .3d 196, 201 (2008). 
It has long been the law of Idaho that just because "it is difficult to arrive at [an] 
exact amount of damages, where it is shown that damages resulted, does not mean that 
damages may not be awarded; it is for the trier-of-fact to fix the amount." Bumgarner v. 
Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 640, 862 P.2d 321,332 (Ct.App.1993) (citing Smith v. 
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Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718,471 P.2d 571, 573 (1970)). Where there is sufficient 
evidence, as there is here, that establishes that a JNOV is inappropriate, there is 
sufficient evidence to take a claim for damages out of the realm of speculation. See 
GrijJv. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315,320,63 P.3d 441 (2003). 
In short, there was substantial evidence of economic loss at trial both stipulated 
by the parties or otherwise established by the proof offered by plaintiff. 
C. There Was Substantial And Competent Evidence Upon 
Which The Jury Based Its Finding Of Recklessness. 
Plaintiff again refers the Court to the discussion in section 1.2 above. While the 
evidence was contested in the sense that Mr. Erhart claimed he was a competent 
manager who was concerned abo ut safety, the clear weight of the evidence is to the 
contrary. 
In weighing the evidence, Mr. Erhart's credibility was refuted by Mr. Doolittle 
who testified about Mr. Erhart's lack of responsiveness to the warning of the dangerous 
step. Moreover, Mr. Doolittle testified about Mr. Erhart's general unresponsiveness to 
other building problems. Similarly, Angela Sisco testified about the condition of the 
stairway being "indicative of how everything in the building was maintained." She 
testified that requests for things to get tixed were "either half-assed completed or not 
done or pushed off." Thus, even Mr. Erhart's protestations about the quality of work 
he did were refuted and subject to the evaluation of the jury. 
Given the long list of matters that support a finding of recklessness and the 
relative weakness of Mr. Erhart's claims that his maintenance efforts were competent, 
there is no basis for the court rejecting the "collective wisdom of the jury," or 
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intervening because some "mistake has been made." To the contrary, the proof fully 
supports the jury's findings. 
D. The Law Does Not Obligate The Jury To Find Mr. Phillips 
Had Causal Responsibility For His Injuries. 
The Defendant again seems to argue that the jury is obligated to accept its 
arguments regarding proximate cause. Idaho law is long-settled that proximate cause 
can "be established through a 'chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact 
required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable. 'If Sheridan v. St. Luke's 
Reg. Med. Cent., 135 Idaho 775, 783, 25 P.3d 88, 97 (2001) (quoting Formont v. 
Kircher, 91 Idaho 290, 296, 420 P.2d 661, 667 (1965)(quoting Reinhold v. Spencer, 53 
Idaho 688, 690, 26 P.2d 796,798 (1933) (citation omitted)).) 
In this case, the jury determined the proximate cause was Mr. Erhart's actions in 
improperly constructing the stairs, failing to properly maintain the stairs and ignoring a 
report of danger on the stairway. The jury may have had any number of reasons for that 
conclusion. It may have relied upon Dr. Gill's testimony directly. It may have relied 
upon the medical records showing the step moved and the rail moved. It may have 
concluded that Mr. Phillips stumbled, but, if the handrail had been properly affixed, and 
the step properly attached, it is more likely than not that he would not have been 
injured. It may have relied on the photographic evidence. It may have found Mr. 
Erhart a not credible witness. 
Defendant's argument that the stairs were safe is nothing more than his wishful 
view of the actual evidence. It ignores the evidence the jury actually saw, heard and 
had the opportunity to evaluate. It cannot be fairly concluded that the jury's decision 
was against the weight of the evidence, or an injustice was done or that a different 
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outcome is probable upon retrial. Instead, the jury heard and evaluated the evidence 
and offered its collective wisdom based on that evidence. 
3. The Verdict Amounts Simply Cannot Be Construed As Being Based On 
Improper Passion Or Prejudice 
It is unquestionably the trial court's job to evaluate and weigh the evidence when 
presented with a motion under Rule 59(a)(5). The court then compares its thought of an 
award to the jury's actual award. If there is a disparity between the two amounts that 
"is so great that it shocks the conscience of the court" the court can grant a new trial. 
Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 853, 840 P.2d 392,397 (1992)(emphasis added). This 
is a subjective standard premised on the trial judge's own belief that the inadequacy or 
excessiveness of the award resulted from passion or prejudice. ld. at 852, 840 P.2d at 
396. 
A. The Evidence Of Loss At Trial More Than Supports The 
Jury's Evaluation Of The Phillips' Losses. 
In asking the court to evaluate the award, Defendant ignores the testimony and 
proof regarding the losses incurred by plaintiffs. Of course, the court is required to 
assess the proof. 
Initially, as is shown above in section 1.1, the evidence at trial would support an 
economic damage award in excess of $1 ,500,000.00 in and of itself. The non-
economic awards likewise have substantial support. 
1) Jim Phillips' non-economic losses were enormous and not overvalued by the jury. 
At trial plaintiffs argued that Mr. Phillips' non-economic lossed amounted to 
$1,593,000.00 in and of themselves. Reaching this conclusion requires consideration of 
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the actual testimony about the impacts on his life caused by the injuries incurred in the 
fall. 
The Court must consider the same things the jury was required to evaluate in 
reaching its conclusions such as the nature of Mr. Phillips' injuries. This would 
include things such as: 
• The fact that he had an injury to the brain 
• Changes to his personality - the very thing that defined him 
as a person 
• Changes to his romantic nature 
• Changes to parenting skills & joy in child raising 
• The loss of gregariousness 
• Loss of his quick wit, confidence, certainty and control 
over surroundings 
• His change from being one person to being a different 
person 
• His loss of ability to engage with/connect to his wife, kids 
& family 
• His loss of ability to connect to co-workers, friends & 
others 
The Court would also need to consider, as did the jury, the past physical harm 
endured by Mr. Phillips. This includes things like: 
• Ruptured disk at T-12 
• Broken Jaw 
• A tom rotator cuff in his right annIshoulder 
• Tom axons and swelling in the brain 
• Cuts and bruising on the left side of his body 
• Loss of balance and stability 
• Vision changes/focusing, and 
• Headaches. 
The Court would also need to consider, as did the jury, the past mental harm 
endured by Mr. Phillips. For Mr. Phillips, this includes things like: 
• Lost memory 
• Depression 
• Fear and anxiety 
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• Post traumatic stress disorder 
• Loss of control 
• Inability to multitask 
• Requirement for a quiet area 
• Slowed processing skills 
• Overwhelming Fatigue 
• Having to be treated like a child again by his own mother 
• Being mothered by his wife, and 
• Constantly needing to impose on his employer. 
The Court would also need to consider, as did the jury, the future physical harms 
to be endured by Mr. Phillips. For Mr. Phillips, this includes things like: 
• The pain in his back that is ongoing 
• The ongoing need for regular use of a Tens unit, and 
• His inability to sit/stand long periods w/o pain. 
The Court would also need to consider, as did the jury, the future mental harms 
to be endured by Mr. Phillips. For Mr. Phillips, this includes things like: 
• On-going fatigue 
• Fear every day this is the day he gets fired from his job 
• Trouble concentrating 
• Avoiding distraction 
• Forgetfulness 
• Frustration 
• Emotional Swings 
• Challenges to his self-confidence 
• Adapting to role changes/reversals 
• Need for written notes instead of using memory, and 
• Constant worries over destruction of relationships - family, 
friends & work 
The Court would also need to consider, as did the jury Mr. Phillips loss of ability 
to perform his usual activities. For Mr. Phillips, this includes 
• His reduced capacity to engage in Hunting/Fishing/Diving 
• His inability to drive a boat or navigate forest lands safely 
• His loss of the ability to dive fearlessly 
• The loss of ability to provide Leadership of Groups 
--In professional settings 
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--With activity groups (camping etc) 
--Within his family 
• The change to normal communications and partnership 
with wife 
• The loss of sexual relations with his wife 
• The change to his parenting relationship with boys 
-- homework/reading/part of activities 
• The difference in his comfort in social settings and 
informal groups, and 
• The simple ability to climb out of bed and be comfortable 
in his own skin. 
The jury's evaluation of these and the other losses incurred by Mr. Phillips 
simply cannot be called a result of passion or prejudice rather; it was an honest 
assessment of the profound changes in Mr. Phillips' life and the losses he endures. 
2) Gale Phillips' loss of consortium claim was likewise enormous and the jury evaluation 
is fully supported. 
Except as a portion of the overall award, Defendant ignores the $556,200.00 
award for loss of consortium to Mrs. Phillips. Maybe nothing is speaks louder to the 
validity of the award than defendant's inability/unwillingness to directly attack it. 
Prior to Mrs. Phillips' testimony, defense counsel sought to require a break in the 
proceedings should she break into tears. As noted at sidebar by the undersigned, this 
case was not and never has been presented as a matter of sympathy or pity. Rather it 
was a presentation of a family that has had substantial changes imposed on their lives 
with descriptions of those losses being the essence of the proof. 
Dan Phillips, Linda Phillips, Linda Larson, Craig Beaver, Nancy Greenwald and 
Glenna Andrews all provided compelling testimony of the nature of the pre-injury 
relationship and the changes that Gale Phillips has dealt with. Mrs. Phillips own 
testimony about the changes she dealt with was equally compelling. From the high 
school romance, through the challenges of two special needs children, developing Jim 
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Phillips' career, to moving to Idaho and having a loving partnership, the quality of the 
Phillips' pre-injury relationship was evident in the courtroom. 
The lack of quality in the post-injury relationship was equally evident, from the 
loss of the small romantic things, to the business-like nature of dealing with Mr. 
Phillips' work, Mrs. Phillips has faced and will face less a partnership than a task of 
caring for Jim Phillips for life. She is more alone in many ways than a widow would 
be. 
3) The ratio of non-economic damages to economic damages does not indicate any 
passion or prejudice. 
Defendant seems to argue that somehow the amount of non-economic damages 
awarded is inappropriate because of his (patently wrong) view that there was only 
$100,453.49 in economic damages. As shown above there was far more than 
defendant's stipulated amount of economic damages proven to the jury at trial. 
Moreover, there is nothing inappropriate or indicative of passion or prejudice shown by 
the damages award. 
Shortly after the conclusion of this case, in a different Ada County courtroom a 
different jury on different facts likewise analyzed the non-economic losses suffered by 
various plaintiffs in that case. That jury likewise reflecting the conscience of the 
community also found substantial non-economic damages in relation to the economic 
damages at issue. A true accurate and complete copy of the verdict form from that case 
is attached as exhibit A. The damages calculation is reproduced below. 
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~ No. 3: What is the total 1IJ11QUI11 of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs as a 
result of the accident? 
I. Economic damages. 
(a) Medical Expenses: 
(b) Past Losllncome: 
(c) Future Lost Income: 
(d) Loss of Household Services: 
2. Non-ecanomie damages. 
Ll~1Iq,n 
$ 11.:,000 
$ II, Q I QOO 
$ '!2:l-, <'2:'9 
$ 'fZ~~ I,Zf 
B. 
We __ P\aiBtHf NayeII Carrillo's ,.-l irljury cIaIIIq.eS lIS follows: 
1. Economic damages. 
<a) Medical Expenses: L..'1'?dl1c 
2. Non-ecanomic damages. $ \ j 000,000 
c. We __ PlaIntIff Naye!i Carrillo's wrongful death cIaIIIq.eS 85 follows: 
I. Economic damages. 
(a) Past Loss of Financial Support 
(b) Future Loss of Financial Support: 
(c) Loss of Household ServIces: 
(d) Funeral Expenses 
2. Non-economic damages. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM. Pap 2 
016).11013 
4. There Were No Substantial Irregularities In The Proceedings That 
Warrant A New Trial. 
Just as Defendant ignores the evidence in the case in arguing his Rule 59(a)(1) 
motion, he ignores what occurred at trial. Defendant bases this part of his omnibus 
motion on the cumulative effect of four claimed irregularities. The first three are that 
the substantial factor jury instruction was an error, that the recklessness jury instruction 
is an error and that the evidence does not support the economic damages award. As 
shown above, on none of those issues did any error occur. 
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Because none of those is an error they cannot have any cumulative effect. Thus, 
there is no foundation on which Defendant's motion can be built. There is but one 
small moment at trial upon which defendant bases his entire argument. It is far from 
sufficient to support his motion. 
The one issue on which defendant can attempt to base his claim for a new trial is 
seven words of testimony from witness Angela Sisco. Because those words cannot be 
fairly claimed to create any prejudice to defendant they cannot be the basis of a new 
trial. Moreover, because defendant chose not to have any type of curative instruction, 
defendant cannot now be allowed to claim prejudice. 
Defendant's counsel's affidavit asserting what actually occurred is woefully 
incomplete and does not address either the actual testimony or the context of the 
testimony. 
A. The Testimony Adduced By Defendant Prior To The 
Complained Of Seven Words Of Testimony Is Necessary To 
Understand How It Came About. 
The complained of testimony came on redirect of Angela Sisco. Defendant's 
counsel's cross-examination inquiry was focused on showing Ms. Sisco had not seen 
problems with the steps. 
By [Mr. Cantrill] And never noticed any problems? 
A [By Ms. Sisco] "In the two and a half weeks 
Q: Right 
A: Correct 
Q: Never made any Complaints? 
A: No, not in those two and a half weeks 
Subsequently, counsel emphasized that Ms. Sisco did not remember whether the 
steps moved or teetered on the day of Mr. Phillips' injury. 
Q: And none of them moved? 
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A: I don't recall. 
Counsel then made an inquiry that implied that steps were safe in the condition 
that they were in on March 20, 2006. 
Q: And did you ever use these steps the day after -or after-
A: Yes 
Q: --March 20 
A: Un-hmm 
Q: Did you ever - assuming for the moment that -well and you 
never - how long did you continue to use them? 
A: The steps - by the following Monday morning the steps were 
totally different 
A: Wait. Wait. Wait. Did you 
A: I used them. They were in a totally different state. 
Ms. Sisco's answer indicates that she understood the questioning carried a false 
implication that she used the steps because she perceived them as safe after having 
taken the photos showing the loose bolts. Thus, she attempted to explain her answer. 
Mr. Cantrill objected to the answer as non-responsive and the Court indicated, 
"We'll strike that answer." 
The exchange ended: 
Q: Did you continue to use those steps? 
A: Yes. 
B. The Complained Of Exchange Was Brief And Obscure In 
Meaning. 
Plaintiffs' counsel perceived, as had apparently Ms. Sisco, that defendant 
counsel's implication that Ms. Sisco used the steps because she perceived them as safe 
made relevant a discussion of why she perceived them that way. It should be wholly 
permissible on redirect to allow a party to explain their behavior. 
Q: [By Mr. Edwards) Were you concerned when you used the 
steps the following Monday? 
A: [By Ms. Sisco] Not at all. 
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Q: Why? 
A: They were in a completely different state. 
Contrary to the argument of Defendant that the question was offered to show 
something about the subsequent remedial measures, the question was offered to show 
Ms. Sisco's perception of the stairway and to explain her behavior. 
Defense counsel then asked for the jury to be excused and made a motion for a 
mistrial. In response, this court read reviewed and evaluated the exchange. The court 
rejected plaintiffs' counsel's view that the explanation of her actions was appropriate 
and that defendant could not use the pretrial ruling as a sword. The court explained it 
saw the testimony as essentially obscure and not a serious problem. The court in an 
appropriate exercise of its discretion denied the motion for a mistrial. It offered 
defense counsel the opportunity have a curative instruction should defense counsel 
choose to have one. That opportunity was declined. 
A mistrial motion is made under Rule 47(u) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The decision whether to grant a mistrial motion is a matter within the 
discretion of the district court and such a drastic remedy is only employed if the court 
determines that an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 
_ Idaho _,196 P.3d 341,349 (2008), see also Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 
681,39 P.3d 621 (2001). 
The entire exchange was brief and the sum total of what the witness offered was 
that the steps were in a different state the following Monday. There was no description 
of what had been done, who did it or how it had been done. It cannot be said that these 
seven words in an ambiguous answer during a six-day trial resulted in anything so 
significant as to create prejudice. 
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Defendant's argument based on Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 
705,979 P.2d 107 (1999) wholly misapprehends that case. In Slaathaug, the court 
entered an order precluding non-party fact witnesses from hearing testimony in the case 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 615. In violation of that order, counsel for the insurance 
company obtained daily transcripts of the proceedings and provided them to the 
witnesses. The misbehavior carne to light after the jury had rendered its verdict. The 
trial court granted a new trial because none of the normal methods of curing a violation 
of an exclusion order could be used. Those methods were noted to be "(1) citing the 
violating witness for contempt, (2) permitting the injured party to comment on the 
violation, (3) refusing to let the violating witness testify, and (4) striking the violating 
witness'testimony." Id. at 709, 979 P.2d at 111. It was the lack of the availability of 
those normal methods for cure that ultimately led the court to the conclusion that a 
59(a)(l) motion should be granted. The Supreme Court concurred that the lack of the 
ability to cure during the proceedings was the first step to its analysis. "It is for the 
losing party, in the first instance, to show that there was some communication off the 
record and not in open court." Id. at 710, (quoting Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 208, 
596 P.2d 75, 80 (1979). Likewise, it was again the lack of opportunity to cure that was 
emphasized in Hinman v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 115 Idaho 869, 771 P.2d 533 (1989) 
for such a situation. 
In contrast here, to the extent any cure was needed, defendant had unfettered 
opportunity to do so. This ability to cure what may have been an error is the theme 
running through all these cases. For example, the Court in Van Brunt upheld the denial 
of a mistrial and a 59( a) (1 ) motion after the witness was "admonished by the district 
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judge, who then instructed the jury to disregard Doctor Selznick's comment." 136 Idaho 
at 684, 39 P.3d at 624. 
The real issue is whether there it could reasonably be concluded that the seven 
words of testimony by Ms. Sisco "had prevailing influence upon the jury to the 
detriment of" defendant. See Johannson, _ Idaho at _, 196 P.3d at 349 (citing 
Kerby v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 45 Idaho 636, 651, 264 P. 377,381 (1928).) This 
Court took the opportunity to review that issue at trial and correctly recognized that the 
testimony would not have anything like that significant of an impact. It then offered a 
curative instruction that defendant declined. There is no reasonable comparison of the 
behavior and situation in Slaathaug to the issue in this case. 
III. There Is No Basis For A Remittitur To Issue From This Court. 
The only time that a remittitur is appropriate is if the trial court concludes that 
the disparity in evaluation of damages between the Court's assessment and the jury 
suggests that it was a result of passion or prejudice. As discussed at length in Section 
II.3. above, the jury award cannot be seen as the result of passion or prejudice given the 
actual scope of injuries in the case. Moreover, the jury's findings are fully supported 
by the evidence at trial. 
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Conclusion 
Defendants' claim that there were many deficiencies in the trial arises from his 
failure to acknowledge the actual evidence that was submitted to the jury. Doubtless, 
Defendant wanted the jury to believe him and adopt his arguments regarding the case. 
After a full opportunity to evaluate all the evidence, the jury rejected his views. 
Defendant has made no showing on the merits of any reason why the jury's rational 
evaluation of the facts and award of damages should not be upheld. 
11."'../ 
DATED this h day of~2009 . 
. ~ / 
//~//~/ 
~~~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ? 10 day A;ri{ 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David Cantrill 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King 
PO Box 359 
Boise,ID 83701 
x U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
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NO. ___ -,;~-1111111!!11 - Fiib '& 
A.M .... __ ~P.M.~_rd? __ 
APRIlS 2009, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSE MANUEL CARRll...LO, as an individual 
and as natural parent and Guardian of Case No. CV PI 07-18437 
 a minor child;
 as Personal Representative of the VERDICT :FORM 
Estate of MARISELA L yeAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BOISE TIRE COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was Boise Tire Company negligent? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [.l No [-1 
If you answered this question "No," you will not answer the remaining questions. Sign 
the verdict as instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to 
the next question. 
Question No.2: Was Boise Tire Company's negligenc( a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' 
injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: 





If you answered this question "No," you will not answer the remaining questions. Sign 
the verdict as instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered:his question "Yes," continue to 
the next question. 
Question No.3: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs as a 
result of the accident? 
Answer to Question No.3: 
A. We assess Plaintiff Jose Carrillo's personal injury damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, 
(a) Medical Expenses: 
(b) Past Lost Income: 
(c) Future Lost Income: 
(d) Loss of Household Services: 
2. Non-economic damages, 
$ f :)1, q.,o 
$ ? Z, ,000 
$----1 LR 0 I 000 
$_;;:' 'k I t;'" r9 
$ 'O~~ I \1[ 
B. We assess Plaintiff NayeJi Carrillo's personal injury damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, 
(a) Medical Expenses: $ tl-;d'kY 
2. Non-economic damages, $ " COO I OQO 
C. We assess Plaintiff NayeU Carrillo's wrongful (ieath damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, 
(a) Past Loss of Financial Support 
(b) Future Loss of Financial Support: 
(c) Loss of Household Services: 
(d) Funeral Expenses 
2. Non-economic damages, 
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Question No.4: If you have answered Question No. 1 and Question No.2 "yes," please 
answer the following question: 
Was Boise Tire Company's negligence which was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' 
injuries willful or reckless? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes~ 
DATED this I¢' day of April, 2009. 
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